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Summary
Newborn screening programmes once focused on identifying treatable conditions.
In recent years, increasing numbers of untreatable genetic conditions have been 
included in newborn screening programmes, on the premise that families will 
benefit from the provision of information, support and reproductive choice. 
However, there is a paucity of research documenting families’ experiences of 
newborn screening and the implications of screening for untreatable conditions.
This study focuses on one untreatable condition, Duchenne muscular dystrophy 
(DMD). Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, this study explores the 
implications of two different diagnostic pathways for reproductive decision-making; 
newborn screening and a later clinical diagnosis (which occurs when the child is an 
average age of 4.5 years). Quantitative data on reproductive behaviour were 
collected from 72 families; 38 families who received a later clinical diagnosis 
(LCD) in the west of Scotland, and 34 families in Wales, who received a diagnosis 
through newborn screening (NBS), between 1990 and 2006. Qualitative data (in- 
depth interviews) were collected from a subset of 19 families to explore 
reproductive decision-making; 8 families from the LCD cohort, and 11 families 
from the NBS cohort.
The quantitative data highlighted varied effects of providing families with an earlier 
awareness of risk. Families in the newborn screening cohort were more likely to 
continue family building, and significantly more likely to use prenatal testing 
(p=0.05). However, there was no association between carrier risk and reproductive 
behaviour and little difference in the number of second affected boys.
Participants in the qualitative interviews were often ambivalent about the provision 
of reproductive choice. Mothers’ descriptions of the importance of “choice” were 
juxtaposed against accounts of “ignorant bliss”, profound appreciation of the 
“carefree years”, and relief at the avoidance of “difficult decisions”. The medical 
information provided to families was often perceived to lack experiential validity. In 
addition, few families felt supported. The findings suggest a need for greater 
consideration of the true value of providing information, “choice” and support.
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Introduction
This thesis explores the implications of newborn screening and a later clinical 
diagnosis for reproductive decision-making. One of the main arguments used to 
support the expansion of newborn screening for untreatable conditions is the 
provision of reproductive choice. The first three chapters of this thesis provide the 
background on three key aspects of this study. Chapter One explores the changing 
interpretations of “reproductive choice” through examining the social and political 
response to newborn screening, reproductive technologies and genetic counselling. 
Chapter Two provides a historical overview of the technologies that have enabled 
the diagnosis, and subsequent assessment of carrier risk, in families affected by 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). Chapter Three explores the literature on 
reproductive behaviour and the implications of increasing sophistication of 
technologies, for reproductive behaviour in families affected by DMD.
Chapter Four provides the rationale for using both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, to examine the implications of two different diagnostic pathways for 
DMD. The findings of the quantitative data are explored in Chapter Five. 
Considerable differences in reproductive behaviour were found between the two 
cohorts, particularly in relation to family size, birth interval and the uptake of 
prenatal testing. Qualitative data analysis explores the differences between the two 
cohorts in greater depth in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Differences were 
apparent in families’ experiences of the diagnosis and the early few years of their 
child’s life, which had important implications for reproductive decision-making. In 
the final Chapter, the findings of both the quantitative and qualitative sections are 
discussed.
Chapter One
Defining Reproductive Choice: 
Changing the provision of newborn screening, prenatal 
testing and genetic counselling
Introduction
Newborn screening programmes were traditionally implemented to detect treatable 
genetic conditions; early identification was followed by a treatment regime to 
improve the health of the newborn (Wilson & Jungner 1968). The development of 
sophisticated diagnostic technologies has enabled the detection of an increasing 
number of genetic conditions, many of which are untreatable. In recent years there 
has been a rapid expansion of newborn screening programmes for untreatable 
conditions, across much of Europe and the United States of America. However, 
there remains a considerable lack of concordance between local, national and 
international policies.
Social and political forces have determined the application of technologies and the 
purpose of newborn screening. During the 1970s and 1980s, proponents of newborn 
screening for untreatable conditions argued that early identification of affected 
individuals would reduce the burden of disease (Beckmann et al 1978, den Dunnen 
et al 1989, Gardner-Medwin et al 1978, Greenberg et al 1988). Contemporary 
proponents of newborn screening for untreatable conditions argue that programmes 
should be implemented to provide families with information, choice and support 
(Pollitt 1999, Therrell 2001, Fearing & Levy 2003).
The expansion of newborn screening highlights a number of pertinent questions that 
lie at the heart of this thesis. First, technological capacity has led to a reassessment 
of the meaning of “health” and the role of (genetic) health services. Acquisition of 
knowledge about ways to diagnose genetic conditions is far outpacing the capacity 
to provide therapeutic treatment (Wood-Harper & Harris 2000). However, 
diagnostic technologies have provided the potential to offer families broader, but 
possibly more moderate “lifestyle” benefits (Bailey et al 2005). Should (genetic)
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health services focus on providing medical benefit to the individual, or should they 
reflect a broader definition of “health”, which encompasses information, choice and 
support?
Second, one of the most prominent justifications for the rapid expansion of newborn 
screening programmes, for untreatable conditions, has been the provision of 
reproductive choice. Families are offered genetic counselling and the option of an 
increasing range of reproductive technologies in subsequent pregnancies, but what 
does “reproductive choice” choice mean? Does the provision of “reproductive 
choice” reflect a societal desire to increase individual autonomy, or to reduce the 
burden of disease? Can genetic counsellors provide sufficient information to enable 
families to make autonomous, informed reproductive decisions?
To explore the foundations of these questions and the trajectory of the socio­
political response to newborn screening, from a focus on “births avoided” to 
“reproductive choice”, this chapter is divided into three sections. First, medical and 
social models of health are described. The subsequent sections address the extent to 
which incorporation of the differing models of health into healthcare has influenced 
the changing provision of newborn screening and reproductive choice. The second 
section addresses the early years of newborn screening for treatable conditions, 
prenatal testing and genetic counselling. The third section addresses the 
contemporary approach to newborn screening, reproductive technologies and 
genetic counselling1.
1. Defining health
Preoccupation with our own health and the health of others is a central facet of 
humankind. Throughout history significant changes have occurred in the way we 
define “health” and the degree of autonomy individuals exert over their own health. 
The etymology of the word “health” has routes in “wholeness” and is reflected,
1 It should be noted that the “early” and “contemporary” approaches of newborn screening, prenatal 
testing and genetic counselling are presented as discrete “moments”; aimed at portraying mainstream 
views found in the literature, rather than the vast variety of views that actually existed during each 
“moment”.
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albeit disparately, in two core theories of health in contemporary Western societies: 
the biomedical model and the social model.
The biomedical model emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a 
result of the rise of scientific enquiry, aimed at identifying aetiological agents that 
cause disease (Bowling 2002). The model is based on the premise of scientific 
rationality, which focuses on the structure and functions of the body and the 
eradication of illness through diagnosis and effective treatment. The focus on 
biological and chemical structures reflects the Cartesian philosophy of the human 
body as a mechanistic structure, whose malfunctioning parts can be repaired or 
replaced. Essentially the biomedical model defines health as the absence of disease 
(Jones 1994, Bowling 2002); to heal is to make whole (Townsend & Davidson 
1982).
One of the criticisms of the medical model is that the structure of health care 
becomes oriented towards individual presentation of signs and symptoms of a 
condition, rather than tackling the broader determinants of health (Gabe et al 2007). 
The social model provides a broader definition of health, which emphasises social 
and environmental determinants of health, as well as the biological and medical 
factors. However, although the interpretation of health in the social model has 
broader foundations, it also highlights the expertise of the individual in assessing 
the range of factors that contribute towards quality of life. The absence of disease is 
just one factor amongst many.
The encompassment of wider social factors and the role of an autonomous decision 
maker in interpretations of health are not new. In ancient Greece, followers of the 
goddess Hygeia symbolised health as “rational individual behaviour, socially 
organised to focus not only on freedom from pain and discomfort, but on the 
engagement of individuals with their own well-being in relation to their 
environment and their community” (Townsend & Davidson 1982). In contemporary 
societies the social model is perhaps best encapsulated by the World Health 
Organisation’s (1946) definition of health as a “state of complete physical, mental 
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and mortality”.
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The relevance of different interpretations of “health” should not be underestimated; 
social and cultural definitions are reflected in political frameworks of health service 
delivery. In industrialised nations, the medical model remains the prevailing 
paradigm in modem health care systems (Bury 2005). Health policies and services 
are broadly divided into two categories, those which attempt to preserve the health 
of society through ‘public health’ measures, defined as the “science and art of 
preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the organised 
efforts of society” (Acheson 1998), and those which serve to identify the aetiology 
of disease in individuals and to provide treatment or palliative care. Although the 
public health approach focuses on broader determinants of health, the measurement 
of health still relies on medical explanations of health and illness (Bury 2005).
Although the social and medical models of health can be presented as discrete and 
opposing approaches to health and health care, it should be noted that areas of 
overlap have always existed. Some health practitioners have always recognised 
wider social influences on health, and many proponents of the social model of 
health recognise the medical advances achieved through a narrow focus on the body 
(Bury 2005). In recent decades, however, there have been increasing areas of 
overlap between the two models. Alongside the WHO’s bold recognition of broader 
determinants of health, significant changes have occurred in relation to the role and 
responsibility of the individual in health related decision making.
The development of newborn screening and prenatal testing, together with the 
changing provision of genetic counselling, provide an interesting arena, to explore 
the changing influence of medical and social models of health on health care. The 
following sections explore the foundations of newborn screening, prenatal testing 
and genetic counselling and address the extent to which social models of health care 
have changed the provision of reproductive choice.
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2. Early years of newborn screening, prenatal testing and genetic
counselling: preventing disease
Despite the differing foundations of newborn screening, prenatal testing and genetic 
counselling, the development of the three processes reflects changing approaches to 
the delivery of health care. The following sections focus on the development and 
initial socio-political response to newborn screening for treatable conditions, 
prenatal testing, genetic counselling and newborn screening for one untreatable 
condition, Duchenne muscular dystrophy.
2.1 Newborn screening and public health; improving the health of mankind
Newborn screening has traditionally been rooted in the discipline of public health 
(Khoury 1996, Holtzman 1997, Carlson 2004, Ross 2006). Public health has been 
concerned with threats to population health; focusing on prevention, rather than 
cure. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the public health discipline 
focused on controlling the threat of communicable diseases. Responses to infectious 
disease epidemics employed extensive population measures, with a focus on 
protecting the unaffected either through immunisation or the process of diagnosis, 
isolation, localisation and treatment. For example, polio epidemics in the USA and 
Canada during the first half of the twentieth century were dealt with through mass 
immunisation programmes. Over two million children across the United States, and 
parts of Canada and Finland were involved in the trial of the Salk polio vaccine 
(Meldrum 1998). Once the vaccine was licensed in 1954, several hundred million 
children in industrialised nations were immunised (Shiftman et al 2002). The 
success of such programmes paved the way for the implementation of population 
screening programmes, to enable the prevention of a wider range of conditions.
Newborn screening began in the early 1960s, after Guthrie and Susi developed a 
method of detecting phenylketonuria (PKU) from a blood spot dried on filter paper 
(Guthrie & Susi 1963). PKU is an inborn error of metabolism resulting in deficiency 
of the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase, which causes progressive developmental 
delay and severe learning difficulties if not recognised soon after birth. Early 
implementation of low-phenylalanine dietary interventions had already been shown
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to ameliorate the morbidity and mortality associated with PKU (Bickel et al. 1954). 
The development of a simple method of screening, applicable to whole populations, 
heralded the potential to “improve the prevention of severe handicaps” (Dhondt 
2007:418).
The technological potential was not immediately met with widespread support, 
because of the relative rarity of PKU (Therrell 2001). However, after significant 
pressure from interest groups in the USA, such as the National Association for 
Retarded Citizens (NARC), the public health benefits of testing gained political 
support. Mandated national newborn screening programmes for PKU were 
established across many industrialised nations during the late 1960s (Therrell 2001, 
McCabe et al. 2002, Kemper & Wake 2007).
In 1967, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Scientific Group on Screening 
convened in Geneva to discuss “whether and how newborn screening programmes 
could improve the health of mankind” (WHO 1968). One of the most influential 
reports considered by the Scientific Group was Wilson and Jungner’s (1968) 
“Principles of Early Disease Detection”, which defined the fundamental purpose of 
screening as providing “treatment for those with previously undetected disease” 
while “avoiding harm to those persons not in need of treatment.” The success of 
NBS programmes in ameliorating the medical effects of PKU, combined with 
Wilson and Jungner’s focus on avoiding morbidity and mortality in treatable 
conditions, served to consolidate the emerging field of newborn screening firmly in 
the realms of a disease-focused interpretation of ‘public health’; for the common 
good.
During the 1970s and 1980s, new technologies enabled detection of an increasing 
number of conditions. Newborn screening for congenital hypothyroidism (CHT) 
was initiated using the “Guthrie test” in the mid-1970s after Raiti & Newns (1971) 
and Klein et al. (1972) demonstrated that early treatment avoided intellectual 
impairment. In the 1970s automated punching machines were developed, capable of 
punching and distributing four samples from a single blood spot (McCabe et al. 
2002).
%
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By the mid-1980s it was possible to extract DNA from newborn blood samples and 
by the end of the decade screening for haemoglobinopathies, such as sickle cell 
disease and thalassaemia, had been adopted in many regions. Technology provided 
the potential, Guthrie set the precedent for gaining political support and Wilson & 
Jungner consolidated newborn screening as a valid public health measure. The 
expansion of newborn screening programmes for treatable conditions became 
inevitable.
The capacity to detect increasing numbers of conditions far outreached the capacity 
to treat those conditions. The foundations of newborn screening lay firmly in the 
realms of public health, which traditionally aimed to prevent the effect of a 
condition being realised in an individual. However, the genetic nature of the 
conditions identified created the possibility of pursuing the preventative focus of the 
public health discipline, by preventing the birth of individuals affected by genetic 
conditions. The development of newborn screening had been mirrored by 
significant changes in both reproductive technologies and statutory laws governing 
the rights of the unborn child. First cases of a genetic condition could be identified 
through newborn screening; secondary cases could be avoided by offering families 
prenatal testing and termination in subsequent pregnancies.
2.2 Prenatal testing and termination; creating the inextricable link
Prior to the discovery of sex-linked chromosomes, Barr and Bertram (1949) 
reported the discovery of a technique capable of distinguishing between male and 
female cells. Identification of the Barr body was subsequently used to establish the 
sex of human foetuses from cells extracted from amniotic fluid (Serr et al 1955, 
Fuchs & Riis 1956, Makowski et al 1956, Shettles 1956). Amniocentesis involves 
obtaining a sample of amniotic fluid from the pregnancy sac using a needle inserted 
through the woman’s abdomen. Due to the risk of miscarriage, fetal talipes and an 
increased failure rate in cell culture (Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists 2005) amniocentesis is rarely performed before 15-18 weeks 
gestation. Living cells are removed from the fluid and cultured for 1-2 weeks before 
diagnostic procedures can be performed.
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Amniocentesis provided the potential to inform pregnant mothers of the sex of their 
child, which was deemed a significant advance for families with a history of sex- 
linked genetic conditions. However, although the procedure gained widespread 
acceptance during the 1950s (Ullman et al 1985), amniocentesis and foetal sexing 
were not immediately integrated into the health service.
Until the late 1960s, in the United Kingdom, terminations of pregnancies were only 
permitted for the sole purpose of preserving the life of the mother (Infant Life 
Preservation Act 1929). The Abortion Act (1967) legalised the termination of 
foetuses up to birth if two doctors agree that “there is a substantial risk that if the 
child were bom it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be 
seriously handicapped” or up to 24 weeks if two doctors agree that “the continuance 
of the pregnancy would involve risk greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, 
of injury to the physical and mental health of the pregnant woman or existing 
children of her family” . The integration of amniocentesis and foetal sexing into 
antenatal care only occurred after the legalisation of abortion; suggesting that the 
provision of information alone, regarding the health status of the foetus, was not 
considered to constitute a sufficiently significant benefit to families.
Initially few physicians were able to safely conduct the procedure and few 
laboratories were equipped to culture amniotic samples. Amniocentesis was 
therefore only offered to families with a known family history of congenital 
abnormalities, for whom “management decisions would be changed by the data 
obtained” (Evans et al. 1993). High-risk families were required to demonstrate a 
prior commitment to terminating affected foetuses as a precondition of being 
offered testing (Statham 2002). In practice, limited resources and expertise created 
an inextricable link between prenatal testing and termination (Evans et al 1993).
2 The Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by die Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) also 
reaffirmed and expanded on earlier legislation (the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929) (BMA 
Medical Ethics Committee 2007). The legislation highlights significant ethical dilemmas. First, 
pregnancy will always involve a greater risk to the physical health of the pregnant woman than if she 
was not pregnant and second, it highlights significant tensions between the rights of the mother and 
rights of the unborn child.
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2.3 Genetic counselling; assisting decisions to minimise burden of disease
The increasing availability of amniocentesis meant genetic counsellors became 
increasingly involved with offering at-risk families the option of prenatal testing. 
Kessler (1980) highlighted the growing importance of decision-making in genetic 
counselling to ensure that individuals are informed about their genetic risks and the 
options available through genetic technologies, in order to make informed 
reproductive decisions. To ensure that the procedure of providing prenatal testing 
and genetic information was standardised, a normative, analytic and rational model 
of genetic counselling was derived from classical decision-making theory (Shiloh 
2000, Anderson 2007).
Classical decision-making (CDM) theory evolved from the field of economics in an 
attempt to understand our ability to process alternative options and choose an 
alternative course of action (Sanfey 2007). Although a number of theories fall under 
the rubric of CDM theory (see Lipshitz et al 2001), Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
has been the most commonly used theory in relation to genetic decision-making 
(Shiloh 2000). In EUT, an ‘optimal decision’ maximises ‘expected utility’, which is 
computed as the product of the probability and value of each potential outcome 
(Shiloh 2000, Sanfey et al 2006). Various alterations have been made to the model, 
to include subjective assessment of probabilities (Savage 1954), and to replace 
“expected utility” with “expected burden” (Cote 1983). However, the underlying 
premise remains; people weigh up their objective risk against the value of the 
outcome.
The early approach of many genetic counsellors reflected a paternalistic approach to 
decision-making, derived from the medical model (Emery 2001). Foucault (1973) 
argues modem medicine is based on the notion that medical science, and those 
trained in the profession, merely sees what was already there. From this perspective, 
the medical model of health care entails a paternalistic drive within which only a 
privileged few are able to ‘see’ or grasp the mechanics of health. The individual 
may not have access to relevant factual information, and may not always reason in 
ways conducive to rational choice (Harsanyi 1982), in essence: doctor knows best.
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In an attempt to distance the discipline from any association with the eugenics 
movement, genetic counsellors espoused a non-directive approach to counselling 
(Clarke 1997, Statham 2002). After individuals and couples at-risk of genetic 
disorders had been provided information on recurrence risks, they were expected to 
assign weight and meaning to each potential option to reach an optimal decision. An 
‘optimal decision’ maximised expected utility (Antley 1979, Pauker & Pauker 1987 
in Shiloh 2000), or minimised expected burden (Cote 1983).
Genetic counsellors routinely communicated the complexities of genetic risk to 
families, in an attempt to facilitate their decision-making. However, at the time, risk 
was defined as the “probability of occurrence of a negative genetic outcome”
(Shiloh 2000:91) and disability was predominantly defined as a “constant menace” 
to be desperately avoided (Fraser 1974:642). In addition, increasing technical 
capacity and acceptability of prenatal testing and termination rested on a drive to 
prevent the “negative genetic outcome”. Termination was perceived as a solution to 
the problem of an ‘abnormal’ foetus (Statham 2002) and the elimination of disease 
was largely disassociated from the elimination of foetuses with the disease 
(Cunningham-Burley & Kerr 1999).
The possibility of avoiding the birth of children affected by genetic conditions, 
relied on the assumption that families, after genetic counselling, would choose 
either to cease family building or to utilise increasingly available reproductive 
technologies to diagnose and terminate affected foetuses. The primary focus of 
genetic counselling was therefore to equip people with appropriate information on 
genetic risk, “believing that if they understood scientific explanation, they would 
use it to make rational or logical reproductive choices (i.e. ones that made sense to 
the provider)” (Biesecker 2001:323). During the 1970s and 1980s, ‘minimising 
expected burden’ through the prevention of birth defects and genetic disorders was 
often cited as the primary aim of genetic counselling (Wendt 1979, Moser 1983, 
Kelly 1986).
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2.4 Prenatal testing; reducing the psychological burden of termination
For some families, the capacity to prevent the birth of an affected foetus was a 
valued resource. High-risk couples, who had previously avoided family building, 
were more likely to attempt to have the healthy child they wanted, after the 
introduction of prenatal testing and termination (Laurence & Morris 1981). 
However, although the process of amniocentesis and foetal sexing was considered a 
significant improvement on the reproductive options previously available to women 
at increased risk of genetic conditions (to either cease reproducing or to continue a 
pregnancy unaware of the sex or disease status of the foetus), major shortcomings 
remained.
In 1975, Blumberg et al (1975) reported that families undergoing termination of the 
pregnancy after amniocentesis experienced significant depression and guilt-ridden 
stress periods after the event. Mothers facing a second-trimester termination had 
already felt foetal movements and the pregnancy was usually visually obvious to 
friends and family. Even if families considered a baby with a foetal abnormality to 
be a ‘problem’, “the decision to terminate was difficult, the experience harrowing 
and the psychological impact significant” (Statham 2002:215). One proposed 
solution to the psychological impact of second trimester termination was to conduct 
prenatal testing and subsequent termination in the first trimester. This approach was 
deemed to be more acceptable to women (Hodgson and Bobrow 1989, Norman et 
al 1989, Emery & Muntoni 2003).
The first technique for early foetal diagnosis was proposed by Mohr (1968) and 
subsequent publications reported developments and refinements of the original 
technique (Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Tietung Hospital of Ansham 
Iron and Steel Company 1975, Kazy et al. 1982). In 1982, Ward and Modell (1982) 
introduced chorionic villus sampling (CVS), performed at 10-12 weeks gestation, 
into clinical practice. By 1983, Simoni et al. (1983) had developed a direct 
cytogenetic technique for analysis of CVS samples allowing karyotyping within a 
few hours of sampling (Holzgreve et al. 1984). The technique for chorionic villus 
sampling involves the insertion of a flexible cannula /catheter, either through the 
cervix or transabdominally, into the uterine cavity, to extract chorionic villi which
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are of foetal origin. Sufficient foetal material can be obtained through CVS at ten 
weeks gestation.
The development of CVS mirrored increasingly sophisticated genetic testing 
techniques, enabling DNA studies and diagnosis of a wider range of genetic 
conditions in the first trimester. For some, the capacity to offer reproductive choice, 
to an increasing numbers of families, added impetus to implement newborn 
screening for untreatable conditions. The focus on prevention was mirrored in the 
development of newborn screening for one untreatable condition, Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy.
2.5 Newborn screening for Duchenne muscular dystrophy; reducing incidence
The development of a cheap and reliable assay for creatine kinase (CK) testing for 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) resulted in the introduction of pilot newborn 
screening programmes for DMD in 1975 in Lyon, France (Plauchu et al. 1989); 
Antwerp, Belgium; Iowa, USA (Zellweger & Antonik 1975); and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Beckmann et al 1978). The following year a pilot 
programme was set up in Edinburgh, Scotland (Skinner et al 1982) and in 1978 in 
Auckland, New Zealand (Drummond & Veale 1978). The main arguments for 
newborn screening for DMD focused on preventing the birth of second affected 
males (Rosenberg et al 1993, Jacobs et al 1989, Emery & Muntoni 2003).
Early literature on newborn screening for DMD defined reproductive “choice” in 
terms of enabling families to avoid the birth of second affected boys before the 
diagnosis of the first. Due to the delay in clinical diagnosis of DMD, many families 
were known to have more than one affected boy prior to the diagnosis of the first. 
The proportion of boys who had an affected brother was variously reported to be 
around 13%-18% (Zellweger & Antonik, 1975, Scheuerbrandt & Beckmann 1977, 
Gardwin-Medwin et al 1978), between 15% and 30% (Zellweger et al 1982, 
Worton 1990) and 30%-40% (Greenberg et al 1988).
Numerous authors suggested that mass neonatal screening with subsequent 
detection of carriers and provision of genetic counselling would reduce the
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incidence of DMD (Beckmann et al. 1978, den Dunnen et al. 1989, Gardner- 
Medwin et al. 1978, Greenberg et al. 1988, Emery & Muntoni 2003). For some, the 
potential to avoid second affected boys was the main aim and purpose of screening. 
Beckmann et al. (1980:156) argued that “reduction of the number of DMD cases to 
one-third or less even in the absence of an effective medication is the main goal and 
promise of neonatal screening”. Rosenberg (1993:541) stated that “the primary 
objective of DMD screening is to avoid repeat cases in families and not early 
diagnosis per s e ”
Interestingly, the widespread implementation of newborn screening for DMD was 
not hindered by ethical concerns regarding the focus on avoiding second affected 
boys. Initially concerns focused on practical and financial issues. Gilboa &
Swanson (1976) and Wharton (1976) argued that the CK test would not be sensitive 
enough to be used in a neonatal screening programme. Roses et al. (1977) argued 
that screening for DMD would “create huge costs in manpower and money”. 
Gardner-Medwin et al. (1978) argued that parents would oppose the test. Later on, 
Gardner-Medwin (1979), Al-Jader et al. (1990) and Andrews et al. (1994) raised 
concerns about the effect of an earlier diagnosis on the mother-baby relationship 
and some questioned the wisdom of screening for an untreatable disease (Dubowtiz 
1976).
A number of studies were conducted to assess whether screening could be 
performed at an alternative time. Gardner-Medwin et al. (1978) proposed an 
alternative approach of using the CK test to screen boys at 18 months who are not 
walking and/or who demonstrate delayed gross motor skills. Gardner-Medwin and 
colleagues argued that this procedure would require fewer tests, would be less likely 
to cause parents anxiety as their concern would already be aroused, and would 
identify the vast majority of cases. However, Rosenberg (1993), argued that many 
cases could be missed by screening at 18 months, that repeat pregnancies may 
already have occurred and that a significant number of DMD children start walking 
earlier than this age. Screening at 18 months was eventually trialled in Wales (Smith 
et al. 1989) and “though it did detect half of affected cases, logistical difficulties in 
community health care made the rate of detection unacceptably low”.
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Advances in molecular genetics throughout the 1980s enabled more accurate 
diagnosis of carriers and detection of affected fetuses. Subsequently, pilot newborn 
screening programmes for DMD were established in 1986 in Manitoba, Canada 
(Jacobs et al 1989) and Western Pensylvania, USA (van Ommen & Scheuerbrandt 
1993) and in 1990 in Wales (Bradley et al 1993).
Many of the earlier concerns regarding newborn screening were challenged by 
subsequent research. Reports from the screening programme in France 
(Dellamonica et al 1983) and Germany (Scheuerbrandt et al 1986) proved the 
sensitivity of CK testing to be high. Rosenberg et al (1993:541) evaluated cost 
effectiveness of newborn screening in Canada and concluded that “earlier 
predictions of inordinate costs of screening from DMD are refuted”. Parsons et al 
(2002) study showed that there was no evidence of any long term disruption to the 
mother-baby relationship.
In addition, Firth et al (1983) argued that the majority of families were in favour of 
an early diagnosis. Firth et al (1983) interviewed 53 parents in three regions of 
England, who had received a later clinical diagnosis of DMD. The average age of 
the boy at diagnosis was 5.9 years and some parents discussed “with some bitterness 
the long delays they had experienced in obtaining a diagnosis” (Firth et al 
1983:467). Parents were asked whether they thought screening for DMD would be 
best a) close to birth, b) at 18 months or c) at some other time. There were eight 
families who were undecided, 40 who preferred newborn screening and four with a 
preference for ‘some other time’. Firth et al (1983:468) conclude that the “majority 
of parents (75%) were in favour of neonatal screening”, to avoid the diagnostic 
delay, to prevent the birth of further affected boys and to enable practical and 
emotional preparation. Parents also felt that they had a “right to be informed” (Firth 
etal. 1983:486).
However, the study by Firth et al (1983) also highlighted some contradictions 
between parents’ response to the questions about screening and their experience of a 
later clinical diagnosis. Parents were asked about whether they felt the later clinical 
diagnosis had been made at the best possible time, and only 37.7% (n=20) felt that it 
had not. The same proportion (37.7%, n=20) felt that the diagnosis had been made
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at the best possible time, and a further 24.6% (n=13) of families were undecided. 
The findings of Firth et al ’s (1983) study suggest that there may be a difference 
between actual experience of the diagnosis and a hypothetical view on the best 
possible time to receive a diagnosis.
Studies conducted by Crisp et al (1982), Firth et al (1983), Firth & Wilkinson 
(1983) and Smith et al (1990) and Parsons et al. (2002) also concluded that the 
majority of affected families would favour early diagnosis. However, all of the 
studies, bar one (Parsons et al 2002) relied on parents’ hypothetical preferences, 
rather than their actual experience.
3. Current approach to newborn screening, prenatal testing and 
genetic counselling: providing “reproductive choice”
Earlier concerns regarding the ethics of prenatal testing and the role of genetic 
counselling have become significantly more prevalent. In particular, the disability 
rights movement and feminists have mounted an ever more vocal critique of the 
expanding use of prenatal testing. The following sections explore the arguments 
presented by the disability rights critique, the development and promise of prenatal 
genetic diagnosis, the changing approach to genetic counselling and current debates 
surrounding the expansion of newborn screening programmes. Lastly, the current 
provision of newborn screening for the untreatable condition, Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy, is addressed.
3.1 Disability rights critique: level the field, not the players
The way in which disability is perceived is important for the way society responds 
to disability. In particular, the concept of disability affects the provision of health 
services aimed at managing disability. Views of disability have typically been 
dominated by the medical model conception of disease (Scott 2005, Bury 2005). In 
the medical model, disability is defined as an attribute of the individual; an 
impairment that alters the structure or function of the human body, resulting in an 
inability to perform tasks that a non-impaired person carries out (Bury 2005).
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In recent years there has been increasing recognition of the conceptual difficulty of 
defining disability. Unlike disease, ‘disability’ is “less categorical and more 
‘relational’ in character” (Bury 1996:21). Oliver (1990) argues that disability should 
be perceived as a product of the physical and social environment, rather than an 
attribute of the individual. The focus on the environment, rather than the individual, 
reflects a social model interpretation of disability and calls for attention to be paid to 
“what is wrong with society, rather than what is wrong with the individual” (Bury 
2005:73).
Debates on the social and medical models of disability have become increasingly 
sophisticated. Despite important differences, some degree of common ground has 
been found between the opposing perceptions of disability. Proponents of the 
medical model largely accept that there are “social dimensions” to disability (Harris 
2000:95). Many proponents of the social model accept that “not all problems of 
disability are socially created [...] disability itself limits some options” (Asch 
1990:73). Arguably, some combination of the medical and social models of 
disability “is best placed to capture the reality of impairment and disability” (Scott 
2005:77).
Despite the increasing areas of overlap in the definition of disability, the disability 
rights movement continues to raise considerable concerns about the routine practice 
of prenatal testing and termination for foetal abnormality. One of the most fervent 
arguments presented by the disability rights movement is the “expressivist 
objection”; that “prenatal testing and selective abortion communicate that disability 
is so terrible, it warrants not being alive” (Asch 1999:387). The use of prenatal 
testing has profound implications for the way people with impairments are viewed, 
and also for how they view themselves (Clarke 1991).
Proponents of the disability rights critique also argue that the focus on the 
elimination of disability may lead to a loss of support for existing people with 
disabilities. The technological imperative of prenatal diagnosis may use up 
resources that could otherwise be used to support families with a disabled child 
(Parens and Asch 2003). In addition, the birth of fewer people with a certain 
condition may lead to a loss of support. Research may focus on treatment for more
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prevalent conditions and the political visibility of people with impairments may be 
reduced (Scott 2005).
The interpretation of “reproductive choice” has moved away from an explicit focus 
on “births avoided”, but the notion of “choice” remains the source of considerable 
debate. Clarke (1990:1146) argues that social and political pressures exert influence 
on couples’ decisions to test and terminate pregnancies:
“If there is no confidence in the willingness of society to care for their child 
once they are unable to do so, parents may chose to terminate a pregnancy 
against their own wishes and beliefs.”
In addition, a number of feminists have argued that the medical focus of clinicians 
coerces women into accepting prenatal testing and termination (Lippman 1991, 
Rothman 1994).
3.2 Genetic counselling: is non-directiveness possible?
The increasingly unacceptable nature of linking prenatal testing with termination 
and the changing views on disability, initiated a more widespread desire to provide 
a less directive approach to prenatal testing and genetic counselling. Nondirective 
counselling increasingly focused on psychological well-being and educational 
elements of decision-making. Nondirectiveness was presented as a “guiding 
principle for genetic counselling that promotes the autonomy of the self- 
determination and personal control of the client” (Biesecker 2001).
Emery (2001) argues that genetic counsellors now endeavour to view counselees as 
consumers, who are supplied with sufficient information to reach a decision alone. 
Emery (2001:81) suggests that the doctor/patient relationship is “slowly evolving 
from a paternalistic one towards a partnership, where health professionals share 
their biomedical viewpoint with patients’ personal values and experiences in order 
to meet a mutual decision”. Although the degree to which “shared decision-making” 
is feasible remains controversial, the recognition of differing perspectives highlights 
a significant shift in the approach of the medical profession. Aspects of the social 
model of health, which highlights the expertise of the individual in assessing the
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range of factors that contribute towards quality of life, are increasingly being 
integrated with the medical model approach.
However, the degree to which nondirectiveness is achievable, or even desirable, has 
remained the source of considerable debate (Clarke 1991, Clarke 1997, Michie et al. 
1997a, Statham 2002). The provision of ‘sufficient’ information to enable 
autonomous decision-making requires assessment of the amount of information and 
the content of such information. Lippman and Wilfond (1992:936) argue that it is 
impossible to tell more than one story at one time; “communication about genetic 
disorders will always require choice; no single story, however balanced, can be 
neutral, or value free”. In addition, a number of studies have shown that patients 
attending genetic counselling expect to be offered advice (Michie et al. 1997a) and 
consultations often included attempts by the counsellor to influence patients’ 
decisions (Michie et al. 1997b). In relation to reproductive decision-making, the 
offer of prenatal testing may, in itself, be perceived to be promoting acceptance; an 
implicit directiveness (Clarke 1997).
The influence of genetic counselling on reproductive decision-making has been the 
subject of much debate. Numerous studies have explored the cognitive processes 
through which genetic counselees subjectively appraise their risk (Shiloh & Sagi 
1989, Rothman 1993, Shiloh et al. 2002, Marteau & Weinman 2006). The framing 
of risk information has an important influence on perceptions of risk (Edwards et al. 
2001). However, counselees’ perception of risk prior to counselling remains more 
closely associated with reproductive behaviour (Shiloh & Saxe 1989).
There is no empirical evidence from any studies to suggest that genetic counselling 
influences reproductive decision-making. After reviewing the literature on genetic 
counselling and reproductive decision-making, Kessler (1989:352) concluded that 
“the role of counselling largely is to confirm or reinforce a decision already taken, 
rather than to shape a reproductive decision from the outset”. Sorenson et al. (1987) 
found that counselling appeared to increase the likelihood of at-risk couples having 
more children, particularly in low risk couples. Beeson & Golbus (1985) argue 
families’ reproductive decisions focus on social meanings and consequences of 
having an affected child, rather than on the quantitative analysis of risk.
18
3.3 Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis; avoiding the psychological impact of 
termination
Amniocentesis and CVS carry a risk of miscarriage (1% and 2% respectively)
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2005). In both procedures, the 
only course of action, to ensure that an unaffected child is not bom, is to undergo 
elective termination of all affected foetuses. Numerous studies have shown the 
significant psychological burden accrued from termination, regardless of whether it 
is conducted in the first or second trimester (Rothman 1994, Rapp 1999). White- 
Van Mourik et al (1992) found that, two years after a termination, 27% of women 
felt angry, 60% sad and 33% guilty. Many feminists have argued that the 
paradoxical lack of choice presented by termination makes a mockery of choosing 
(Rothman 1994, Chandler & Smith 1998).
The first real possibilities of avoiding terminations through pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) of human X-linked genetic conditions were demonstrated in 1989 
(Handyside et al 1989). The procedure works by removing ova by laparoscopy from 
a carrier female, fertilizing them with her husband’s sperm, and allowing them to 
develop in vitro. Initially embryos obtained in vitro were tested to ascertain the 
existence of the Y-chromosome; only female embryos would be transferred. 
Increasingly sophisticated molecular and cytogenetic techniques have enabled the 
analysis of disease status; only female or unaffected male conceptuses are 
reimplanted in the uterus to undergo further development (Raeburn 1995, Vergeer et 
al. 1998, Emery & Muntoni 2003).
Laboratories have now been set up in many countries to perform PGD (Klipstein 
2005). Arguably if the technique was easy and inexpensive it would supplant 
prenatal diagnosis for DMD (Raeburn 1995). However, although PGD has been 
performed regularly since the late 1990s, it is still fraught with difficulties. PGD is 
technically very demanding and consequently prohibitively expensive. In the UK, 
few families meet the criteria for funding set by local health administrations of the 
NHS; of those that do only around 20% of families give birth to an unaffected child 
as a result of PGD (Soini et al 2006). In addition, the process of PGD can be a 
stressful experience for couples. Although couples often perceive PGD to be
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morally less problematic than termination (Katz et al 2002), Lavery et al (2002) 
found that 41% of patients undergoing PGD described the experience as stressful 
and anxiety-ridden.
3.4 Newborn screening: technological promise and the arrival of a varied 
political response
Although the development of tests, during the 1970s and 1980s, reflected the 
political focus on treatable conditions, the introduction of tandem mass- 
spectrometry (MS/MS) in the late 1990s introduced new considerations and ethical 
dilemmas. MS/MS technology enabled the detection of “over fifty disorders 
simultaneously from a 3mm dried blood spot, in around two minutes per sample” 
(Wilcken 2008: 173), facilitating cheap and reliable screening for a range of rare 
inborn errors of metabolism. There is evidence that screening for one of these 
conditions, medium chain acyl CoA dehydrogenase deficiency (MCADD) may be 
beneficial for an affected individual, but for the majority of detectable conditions 
there is limited clinical evidence on the natural history of the condition, the 
effectiveness of treatments and the sensitivity and specificity of MS/MS to justify 
implementation of nationally mandated screening programmes (Stuart 2006).
Technological development has transformed screening potential from one condition 
to over fifty and it is now estimated that around a quarter of the world’s newborns 
are screened for at least one condition (Wilcken 2007). Newborn screening policies 
throughout industrialised nations are nominally founded on Wilson & Jungner’s ten 
principles (Therrell 2001, Pollitt 2006, Wilcken 2007) and consistently affirm the 
“necessity of treatment potential and proven benefit to the infant” (Bailey et al 
2005:1889). However, there has been significant international debate on whether 
traditional criteria should be expanded to include screening for untreatable 
conditions (Pollitt 1999, Therrell 2001, Fearing & Levy 2003).
There is a lack of even broad concordance in national policies. In the United States 
of America (USA), newborn screening programmes have been implemented 
“sometimes as a result of scientific findings (e.g. new testing technologies, 
automated punching), sometimes due to financial incentives (e.g. federal support of
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sickle cell testing) and sometimes due to consumer advocacy and accompanying 
political pressures” (Therrell 2001:64). In the United Kingdom (UK), newborn 
screening programmes have been implemented as the result of scientific findings, or 
personal research interests (Downing & Pollitt 2008). Different justifications for 
implementing newborn screening programmes highlight the disparate and highly 
varied influence of interest groups and political interpretation of traditional criteria.
Increasing technological sophistication in the field of medical genetics has fuelled 
ethical tensions. Acquisition of knowledge about genetic conditions is far outpacing 
the capacity to provide therapeutic treatment (Wood-Harper & Harris 2000). 
Technology has confronted health care systems with the imperative to decide, by 
default if not deliberately, as to whether or not to implement assorted genetic 
screening programmes. Although political and social bodies have often provided 
support, relevant guiding principles have not been sufficiently developed to direct 
contemporary practice (Parsons and Bradley 2003).
The disparate implementation of newborn screening programmes in the UK and the 
USA highlights very different interpretations of traditional criteria. In 1996, the 
National Screening Committee (NSC) was established in the UK to unify 
approaches to the implementation of screening programmes by developing national 
policies and regulatory strategies (Downing & Pollitt 2008). The NSC developed a 
set of 19 screening criteria based on the Wilson and Jungner’s 10 criteria and 
recommended that “there should be an effective treatment or intervention for 
patients identified through early detection, with evidence of early treatment leading 
to better outcomes than late treatment” (NSC 2003). The NSC currently 
recommends newborn screening for five conditions: phenylketonuria (PKU), 
congenital hypothyroidism (CHT), sickle cell diseases (SCD), cystic fibrosis (CF) 
and medium chain acyl CoA dehydrogenase deficiency (MCADD) (National 
Screening Committee 2005).
In contrast, the American College of Medical Genetics (AMCG) highlight the 
potential of newborn screening to identify conditions even when improved clinical 
outcomes may be not be substantial or relevant to the affected individual, noting 
however that “the nature of genetic disease is such that knowledge of its presence
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can be of value to other family members”. In 2005, the ACMG proposed that 29 
conditions should be included in uniform newborn screening programmes, despite 
the lack of evidence that early treatment leads to better disease-related outcomes in 
all conditions (Grosse et al. 2006).
3.5 Newborn screening; expanding interpretations of “benefit”
The acknowledgement of a broader interpretation of benefits of screening, beyond 
‘treatability’, has been welcomed by many (see Bailey et al 2005, Pollitt 2006, 
Kemper & Wake 2007). Although the broad spectrum of non-medical benefits may 
vary for each condition, those which are most generalisable include the avoidance of 
the often difficult and time-consuming process of establishing a diagnosis for 
relatively rare conditions (Kemper & Wake 2007); access to supportive, educational 
and therapeutic services (Bailey et al 2005); and the provision of information on 
genetic risk to inform reproductive decision-making (Bailey et al. 2005, Pollitt 
2006, Kemper & Wake 2007). Bailey et al. (2005) also argue that the expansion of 
newborn screening could provide other societal benefits by increasing knowledge 
about the incidence, developmental patterns and range of effects of particular 
conditions, as well as encouraging the research agenda for the development of new 
treatments.
Grosse et al. (2006) and Dhondt (2007) suggest that expanding interpretations of 
‘benefit’ marks a shifting paradigm in newborn screening; a gradual yet distinct 
move away from the “Guthrie age”, characterised by the prevention of morbidity 
and mortality to a “genetic age”, which justifies screening on the basis of “broader 
but possibly more moderate benefits” (Bailey et al. 2006:270). Although newborns 
are essentially screened for genetic conditions, the foundations of contemporary 
newborn screening policy clearly lie firmly in the realms of public health (Khoury 
1996, Holtzman 1997, Carlson 2004, Ross 2006), which conflicts with the 
traditional remit of genetic testing, whose foundations are historically rooted in 
“principles of individual choice, informed consent and autonomy” (Parsons and 
Bradley 2003:336).
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The broader interpretation of benefit mirrors a more social approach to health care. 
However, the increasing focus on individualism and the requirement for informed 
choice creates both logistical and ethical difficulties. Medicine is becoming more 
technologically sophisticated and simultaneously less paternalistic (Hunt et al 
2005). At risk families are frequently presented with ever deeper and more 
encompassing problem explorations, and expected to make deliberate choices about 
whether to conceive, test and terminate wanted pregnancies. There has been 
considerable debate regarding the capacity for informed decision making for both 
prenatal testing (Marteau & Dormandy 2001, Michie et al 2003), and newborn 
screening (Clarke 1997, Parsons et al 2002).
Historically, state regulation of health care has reflected the need to monitor and 
control individual action which may conflict with the preservation of societal health. 
Arguably modem political and health care systems are founded on the philosophy of 
utilitarianism: the ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ (Mooney 2003), but the 
rise of prevailing ethical paradigms “predominantly concerned with individualism 
and choice” (Chadwick 2004:162) have resulted in increasing ethical tensions. 
Mooney (2003:62) argues that the tension between social and individualistic ethics 
creates significant problems in medicine and health care: “first in determining what 
is common good and, second, in devising appropriate institutional arrangements to 
allow it to prosper alongside the individualistic ethics of virtue and duty.”
The shifting paradigm raises three cmcial questions: first, do families actually value 
the avoidance of diagnostic delay, access to supportive services and the provision of 
information on reproductive risk? Second, is it feasible for public health services to 
provide sufficient information to enable autonomous informed decision-making? 
Finally, pending a positive response to the first two questions, should newborn 
screening programmes be expanded to reflect a social model which recognises a 
broader interpretation of health, beyond the absence of disease?
Although in the United States and many European nations newborn screening 
programmes are expanding, on the implicit understanding that there is inherent 
value in providing access to information and reproductive choice, there is a paucity 
of evidence to justify this assumption. The lack of evidence is due to the recent
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development of the new MS/MS technology and the changing value commitments 
of industrialised societies, which are increasingly reflecting individualised ethical 
paradigms and - albeit tentatively - a social model of health. However, due to the 
early implementation of newborn screening programmes for the untreatable 
condition, DMD, there is potential to address the implications of an earlier diagnosis 
for reproductive decision-making.
3.6 Current provision of newborn screening for DMD; providing information, 
choice and support
The fourteenth European Neuromuscular Committee (ENMC) workshop focused on 
neonatal screening for DMD (van Ommen & Scheuerbrandt 1993). The consensus 
recommendation of the ENMC concluded that a number of benefits were accrued as 
a result of newborn screening. Firstly, the avoidance of diagnostic delay through 
newborn screening reduced the anxiety and stress experienced during the 
manifestation of the disease “especially, the retrospective regret, reported by many 
families about their lack of tolerance for their child’s earlier clumsiness and 
difficulties walking”. Secondly, female relatives are offered the options of carrier 
detection and prenatal diagnosis before embarking upon future pregnancies, 
enabling genetic counselling “in an atmosphere of relative calm reflection, rather 
than hasty decisions being made in anxiety, under pressure of last minute 
information”. Lastly, the earlier diagnosis allows parents time to “prepare for 
decisions related to their future life with a handicapped child, e.g. selection of 
proper housing, timely education and assistance, provisions for early nursery etc”.
The consensus report concluded that the aim of neonatal screening for DMD should 
be to provide optimal information, choice and support to families afflicted by DMD. 
Arguably this conclusion marks a move away from screening as a public health 
focus on prevention of affected males, towards offering parents the option of testing 
and the option of prenatal diagnosis in subsequent pregnancies.
Despite the technical capacity to screen babies for DMD, evidence to refute some of 
the earlier concerns and support the suggestion that families may benefit from an 
earlier diagnosis, the implementation of programmes has remained controversial.
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Nearly all the original pilot programmes ceased before the recent interest in 
expanding the benefit of newborn screening. Within Europe, the only programmes 
remaining are in Antwerp, in Belgium, and Wales. Various reasons have been 
provided for ending the programmes3. The majority cite technical and financial 
issues. However, programmes that were implemented on the basis of avoiding 
second affected boys found that success was limited. In addition, the programme in 
Lyon reported a high proportion of families suffering from psychological 
disturbances, as a result of the early diagnosis.
In the United Kingdom, persistent reticence to screen for an untreatable condition, 
combined with the perception that families would benefit from an earlier diagnosis 
(Firth et al 1983) has resulted in a continued quest to find alternative ways of 
reducing the diagnostic delay. Mohamed et al (2000) proposed screening boys who 
demonstrated any of the following criteria; not walking by 18 months, delayed 
speech and global developmental delay, awkward gait, inability to run or painful 
legs under the age of four years. However, the study by Parsons et al (2004), on a 
cohort of 18 affected boys diagnosed through newborn screening, demonstrated that 
five out of the six criteria would have limited effectiveness in detecting DMD. The 
only criterion that was apparent in the majority of affected boys (94%) was 
awkward gait under four years of age. Parsons et al (2004) argue that concerns 
regarding awkward gait would not be triggered until the child was two to three years 
old, and the problem may be easily mistaken as orthopaedic, rather than 
neuromuscular.
One possible explanation for the continued use of newborn screening for DMD in 
Wales is that the primary purpose of the programme did not rest on the ethically 
dubious aim of preventing second affected boys. Uniquely, newborn screening was 
introduced in Wales as an “opt-in” programme, in addition to the routine tests for 
PKU and hypothyroidism. The programme aimed “to provide families with 
reproductive choice in future pregnancies, to enable them to plan for the future with 
a child with a disability; to avoid the experience of a prolonged diagnosis; and to
3 Personal correspondence via Don Bradley, Director of Newborn Screening in Wales
25
identify a presymptomatic cohort who may benefit from future treatments” (Bradley 
etal. 1993).
In addition, newborn screening for DMD in Wales has been hailed as the only 
programme that “provides a systematic, integrated psychological and social 
assessment of the effects of the screening program” (van Ommen & Scheuerbrandt 
1993). The programme also provides a systematic approach to disclosure of 
diagnosis, by working “closely with each child’s primary health care team, a 
network of paediatricians in each district and the Muscular Dystrophy Group family 
care officers” (van Ommen & Scheuerbrandt 1993).
Continued evaluation of the newborn screening programme in Wales has shown that 
the majority of families were happy with the way the diagnosis was disclosed. In 
addition, families expressed a favourable attitude towards newborn screening, as it 
provided them with reproductive choice and time to prepare emotionally and 
practically (Parsons et al 1996, Parsons et al 2002).
4. Summary
The social and political response to diagnostic and reproductive technologies 
highlights the varying influence of medical and social models of health on the 
delivery of health care. Early implementation of newborn screening, prenatal testing 
and genetic counselling reflected the medical focus on disease prevention. Newborn 
screening programmes for treatable conditions focused on preventing the realisation 
of genetic conditions in individuals, while screening for one untreatable condition, 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy focused on preventing second affected cases.
The genetic nature of the conditions identified through newborn screening meant 
that families were offered genetic counselling and prenatal testing. Genetic 
counsellors communicated the complexities of genetic risk to at-risk couples, with 
the aim assisting the counselee to make an “optimal” decision. However, the main 
aim of genetic counselling was often described as reducing the burden of disease 
and many have argued that an optimal decision was one that made sense to the
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provider. In addition, prenatal testing was initially limited to at-risk couples who 
demonstrated a commitment to terminating an affected foetus; creating an 
inextricable link between testing and termination.
Changing views on disability and the increasingly unacceptable nature of linking 
prenatal testing with termination initiated a desire to provide a less directive 
approach to prenatal testing and counselling. Genetic counsellors, in an attempt to 
disassociate genetic health care from the spectre of eugenics, have shifted away 
from the traditional paternalistic approach to decision-making. In recent years there 
has been greater acknowledgement of the role of the individual in health-related 
decision making. Individuals and families affected by genetic disorders have, to an 
extent, become responsible for negotiating their own ethical dilemmas and 
reproductive decisions. However, concerns remain about the social and political 
pressures exerted on at-risk couples offered prenatal testing. The very offer of 
prenatal testing may imply a recommendation to accept the test and proceed to 
termination in the event of a positive diagnosis.
The foundations of newborn screening lie firmly in the realms of public health, 
which has traditionally focused on population-wide preventative measures. The 
capacity to detect untreatable conditions through newborn screening has also raised 
questions about the role of newborn screening. Screening for conditions to provide 
families with broader, but possibly more moderate benefits such as information, 
choice and support raises some critical questions. Do families value the provision of 
information? Do families receive support? Furthermore, what are the implications 
of newborn screening for reproductive decision-making?
Implementing newborn screening programmes to provide families with reproductive 
choice remains controversial. There is now a greater range of reproductive options 
(amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling and preimplantation genetic diagnosis), 
but each is associated with psychological burdens. In addition, the disability rights 
critique and feminists have questioned whether reproductive “choice” is really a 
choice. Considering the explicit focus on “births avoided”, from early proponents of 
newborn screening programmes for one untreatable condition, DMD, the lingering
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concerns regarding the real meaning of “reproductive choice” are entirely 
justifiable.
Assessment of all potential benefits of early identification for all untreatable 
conditions is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, one of the most prevalent 
justifications for screening for untreatable conditions is the provision of information 
on genetic risk to inform reproductive decision-making. In Wales, newborn 
screening for one untreatable condition, Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) has 
been available since 1990. The programme has been continuously monitored and 
reviewed, providing a unique opportunity to utilise a significant body of data to 
assess the implications of newborn screening for reproductive decision-making.
This thesis focuses on an analysis of reproductive decision-making in families in 
Wales after their sons were diagnosed with DMD through newborn screening 
compared to families in the West of Scotland4 whose sons were diagnosed later 
through traditional clinical diagnosis.
4 Justification of the use of families from the West of Scotland as a comparative cohort is provided in 
Chapter Four: Methodology.
Chapter Two 
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy
Introduction
Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) is an X-linked condition, affecting around 
1:3500 males worldwide5. DMD is one of the most severe forms of muscular 
dystrophy. Progressive muscle weakness results in wheelchair dependency by the 
age of twelve years. Subsequent deterioration in lung and heart function limits an 
affected male’s lifespan; the majority die in their early twenties.
Significant developments in respiratory care have, to date, had considerably more 
impact on extending life expectancy of affected males than genetic therapies. There 
is considerable potential in recent advances, to suggest that genetic therapies may 
provide the possibility of treatment for some patients (depending on the location and 
size of the gene deletion). However, for the majority a cure remains a distant 
promise; potentially beyond their lifetimes.
Although a cure remains elusive, during the last fifty years, increasing technological 
sophistication has created the potential to provide families affected by DMD with 
reproductive choice. Providing families with reproductive choice depends on two 
factors; ensuring families are aware of their risk and offering families reproductive 
options. The previous chapter showed how the development of newborn screening 
has provided some families with an earlier awareness of their risk, and reproductive 
technologies have provided risk-aware families with a greater range of options in 
subsequent pregnancies. This chapter focuses on the development of carrier testing 
procedures that have provided families with an increasingly accurate awareness of 
genetic risk.
5 Mean incidence from neonatal screening and several exhaustive population studies is estimated to 
be 1:3500 but single study estimations range from 1:3000 to 1:7000 (Emery & Muntoni 2003, 
Walton 1974, Zellweger and Antonik 1975).
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the technologies that 
have enabled the diagnosis, and subsequent assessment of carrier risk, in families 
affected by DMD. This chapter is divided into four sections. First, the causes, 
effects and nature of the condition are described. Second, the tools used to clinically 
diagnose DMD are explored; from early clinical observations to developments in 
histological tools and the identification of specific testable biochemical defects. The 
third section explores the advent of cytogenetics and recombinant DNA techniques, 
the localisation of the DMD gene, and the subsequent development of highly 
predictive tests to either confirm or exclude diagnosis of DMD. The final section 
summarises the implications of increasingly sophisticated technologies for 
reproductive options.
This chapter needs to be presented with a caveat; for the non-geneticist, it may 
appear - at best - a little dense. However, it is deemed essential to convey the 
technological developments for two key reasons. First, whilst the drive to increase 
our knowledge about the genome may have emerged from a desire to develop gene 
therapies (Marteau & Richards 2000), in practice, the developments have served 
primarily to increase the accuracy of information used in reproductive decision­
making. Second, if risk awareness and choice are so valuable -  as proponents of 
expanded newborn screening programmes often profess -  technological 
developments have had significant implications for the degree of awareness and the 
degree of choice.
1. Overview of Duchenne muscular dystrophy
Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) affects smooth muscle, skeletal muscle and 
cardiac muscle (Korf 2000). Around 5-10% of female carriers demonstrate some 
degree of muscle weakness, but the majority of carriers are asymptomatic (Emery 
2002). Affected boys are phenotypically normal at birth and frequently little clinical 
weakness can be detected before 3-5 years of age (Kunkel & Hoffman 1989, 
Dubowitz 1995, Emery & Muntoni 2003). Due to the delayed manifestation of signs 
and symptoms of the condition, it is often difficult to detect and diagnose the 
condition for some years after birth. The mean age at which boys are clinically
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diagnosed in the UK is 4.5 years (range: 3 months to 8.5 years) (Appleton & 
Nicolaides 1995, Bushby et al. 1999).
During the early symptomatic stages progressive weakness of muscles of the pelvis, 
knee and hip extensors may cause delayed walking, abnormal gait, toe walking, 
frequent falls, and difficulty climbing stairs. Often affected males demonstrate 
difficulty rising from the floor. Some boys may also present delayed intellectual 
milestones, in particular a delay in speech development. Some degree of intellectual 
impairment occurs in 20% of cases but, unlike muscle weakness, it is not 
progressive (Emery 2002).
As the disease progresses, muscle tissue degenerates and is replaced by fat and 
connective tissue. Fifty percent of boys lose ambulation by 8.5 years (Emery 1993). 
Once a wheelchair is required many boys develop progressive scoliosis and other 
deformities thought to be related to their increasing immobility. Many develop 
contractures of the flexors of the elbows and pronators of the forearms resulting in 
loss of antigravity function in their upper arms.
Around half way through the course of the disease weakness of intercostal and 
associated muscles cause a gradual deterioration in lung function. Episodes of 
respiratory failure and pneumonia are the primary cause of death in 70-80% of 
affected boys with the remaining deaths thought to be caused by progressive 
weakness of cardiac muscle, resulting in dilated cardiomyopathy (Heckmatt et al 
1989). Until the early 1990s, 90% of boys died before twenty years of age; 
improvements in respiratory and supportive care have now resulted in survival into 
the mid-20s (Emery & Muntoni 2003). However, DMD remains an incurable 
condition.
2. Development of clinical diagnosis for DMD
Before the discovery of a biochemical marker in the 1970s, clinical diagnosis of 
DMD relied on two factors; the ability to recognise signs and symptoms as 
indicative of Duchenne muscular dystrophy and the ability to distinguish between
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DMD and other forms of muscular dystrophy, using muscle biopsies. In recent 
decades clinical observations and histological tools have been complemented by the 
capacity to detect muscle enzymes, found to be raised in patients with muscular 
dystrophy, and the advent of cytogenetics and recombinant DNA techniques. 
Development of the capacity to recognise signs and symptoms and conduct muscle 
biopsies are explored in the first subsection. The capacity to detect muscle enzymes 
is explored in the second subsection. The advent of cytogenetics and recombinant 
DNA techniques is explored later on, in section four.
2.1 Signs, symptoms and muscle biopsies
Cont and Gioga were the first to recognise DMD as a specific clinical disorder in 
1836 (Emery & Muntoni 2003). Further developments were made in the mid­
nineteenth century by an English physician, Edward Meryon and a French 
physician, Guillaume Benjamin Amand Duchenne. Meryon studied the physical 
effects of the condition in affected males and conducted post-mortem microscopic 
examinations of muscle tissue. Meryon described the condition as a disease of the 
nervous system, primarily causing destruction of muscle tissue and noted that DMD 
was a family disorder with a predilection for males.
Guillaume Duchenne characterised the disease by progressive weakness of 
movement, starting with the lower limbs and progressing to the upper limbs. He 
described a gradual increase in size of many affected muscles (pseudohypertrophy) 
and the production of abundant fibrous and adipose tissue in the later stages (Emery 
& Muntoni 2003). Duchenne’s name became most closely associated with the 
pseudohypertrophic muscular dystrophy studied by both himself and Meryon, 
leading to the now commonly used name Duchenne or Duchenne’s muscular 
dystrophy.
Meryon and Duchenne’s work on muscular dystrophy enabled a diagnosis of the 
condition to be made based on the clinical manifestation of signs and symptoms.
thHowever, in the early 20 century Willheim Heinrich Erb, a German neurologist 
suggested the existence of multiple forms of muscular dystrophy. The hypothesis 
was confirmed in 1955 by the German human geneticist, Peter Emil Becker, who
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proved that there were clearly two separate, but related clinical manifestations of 
progressive muscular dystrophy, namely DMD and another milder version, now 
known as Becker muscular dystrophy (BMD).
BMD is rarer than DMD with an incidence of 1:18500 males. BMD also has a later 
onset, around the age of twelve years (although sometimes as late as 40-50 years), 
and a slower disease progression (Emery 2002, Lai et al 2006). However, males 
affected with severe forms of BMD demonstrate similar characteristics to those with 
DMD. Reliance on the recognition of clinical manifestations to distinguish between 
milder forms of DMD and more severe cases of BMD is problematic.
One of the most commonly used techniques to differentiate between DMD and 
BMD is the muscle biopsy. Developments in histological procedures provided 
means of analysing microscopic structure of muscle. Muscle biopsies from young 
boys demonstrating severe degeneration, with marked variation in muscle fibre size 
and the presence of connective tissue and fat separating muscle fibre, is usually 
indicative of the more severe form of muscular dystrophy; DMD. Since the 
discovery of the protein product ‘dystrophin’6 analysis of the presence of dystrophin 
in muscle biopsies has enabled a more definitive differentiation between the two 
conditions.
2.2 Biochemical markers
In 1949, Sibling & Lehninger noted that a serum enzyme, adolase, could be raised 
in patients with muscular dystrophy. In subsequent experiments several other serum 
enzymes were found to be raised in muscular dystrophy and other muscle disorders, 
namely aminotransferases, lactate dehydronase and creatine kinase (Dubowitz 
1995).
Ebashi et al (1959) were the first to show that creatine kinase (CK) activity is 
raised in muscular dystrophy patients and the finding was confirmed in the 
following year by Dreyfus et al (1960). Creatine kinase proved to be the most
6 The identification of dystrophin is explored in greater detail, later in this chapter, in the section on 
cytogenetics and recombinant DNA techniques.
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sensitive and easily detectable serum enzyme. Boys affected by DMD demonstrate a 
marked elevation of CK of up to 100 times higher than an unaffected boy 
(Dubowitz 1995, Specht & Kunkel 1993, Emery & Muntoni 2003). In 1960, 
Schapira and colleagues introduced the CK test into clinical practice, allowing a boy 
presenting with symptoms of DMD to immediately undergo a diagnostic test 
(Schapira et al. 1960).
The current process of providing a clinical diagnosis for boys affected by DMD in 
the UK occurs in four stages. First, signs and symptoms of the condition must be 
recognised as being indicative of DMD. Second, creatine kinase tests are conducted. 
Third, genetic tests are conducted to identify the exact location of the genetic 
deletion or duplication. Lastly, if a mutation cannot be detected, families are offered 
the option of a muscle biopsy to determine whether the child has BMD or DMD.
The creatine kinase test also enabled newborn screening for DMD and was later 
used to identify carriers of the condition. One of the key justifications for providing 
newborn screening for DMD has been the capacity to provide mothers with some 
awareness of their genetic risk in subsequent pregnancies. The following section 
explores the considerable changes in cytogenetic and recombinant DNA techniques, 
which have increased the capacity to provide families with an accurate awareness of 
their genetic risk.
3. Cytogenetics and recombinant DNA techniques; increasing the 
accuracy of carrier testing techniques
The hereditary nature of DMD has been suspected since the mid-nineteenth, when 
Meryon described DMD as a family condition. Subsequent developments have 
radically changed our understanding of the processes involved in the genetic 
inheritance of DMD. This section is divided into three subsections; Mendelian 
principles, the role of creatine kinase, and the evolution of genetic testing 
techniques, which have enabled detection of specific gene deletions and mutations 
in an affected boy and subsequent identification of same mutations in carrier 
mothers.
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3.1. Mendelian Principles
t liIn the late 19 century a Moravian monk, Gregor Mendel, began the first scientific 
study of heredity; his observations became the foundations of the modem discipline 
of genetics. Mendel argued that particulate properties did not combine when passed 
on to the next generation; some were dominant, whilst others recessive. He made 
the distinction between the observable properties (phenotype) and specific genetic 
constitution (genotype) of an organism. Through analysis of dominant and recessive 
traits Mendel reasoned that ‘parents’ must have two alternative forms (alleles) of a 
gene, which can be distinguished from other alleles by their phenotypic effects.
Mendel developed two key laws of heredity: segregation and independent 
assortment. In the first law on the principle of segregation, Mendel reasoned that in 
order to avoid gene pairs doubling, in each successive generation, they must 
segregate during gamete formation. Mendel’s second law, on the principle of 
independent assortment, describes how the segregation of one gene pair (in one 
gamete) occurs independently of the other pair in a separate gamete. Mendel’s laws 
describe the separation of what we now refer to as chromosomes, during a process 
called meiosis (see Box 1).
Box 1 -  Meiosis
Each individual has two copies of each of the  23 chrom osom es in 
every cell, 46 chrom osom es in all. Genetic information is inherited 
from the paren ts in the  gam etes, the sperm  and the  egg. These 
gam etes are  produced from the  germ cells in the  te s te s  and the  ovary 
in a process term ed 'm eiosis7. During meiosis each pair of 
chrom osom es replicates and then separates , forming four cells which 
contain 23 chrom osom es (each chrom osom e is represen ted  in an 
unpaired condition). Fertilisation of two gam etes to form a zygote 
restores th e  chrom osom e num ber to 46 and provides a full se t of 
genetic information. The combination of genes carried on the 
chrom osom es is a unique selection of the  genes presen t in the two 
parents of each individual. Individuals th a t carry two identical alleles 
of a given trait are  referred to as 'hom ozygous7, whilst those th a t carry 
two different alleles are  'heterozygous7.
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3.2 Genetic linkage for pedigree analysis
Walter Sutton and Theodore Boveri proposed the idea that genes are carried on 
chromosomes in 1903. In 1915 Thomas Hunt Morgan described the principle of 
genetic “linkage”; alleles located relatively close together on a chromosome tend to 
be inherited together. Morgan and colleagues studied the distance between a number 
of traits on the same chromosome and the frequency with which traits are inherited 
together, to create the first linkage map.
In 1956, Tjio and Levan revealed the number of chromosomes in humans to be forty 
six. Subsequent experiments have estimated the number of genes carried on 
chromosomes to be around 25,000 in humans. The majority of chromosomes are 
called autosomes, apart from one pair involved in sex determination, known as sex 
chromosomes. Through numerous studies on Turner and Klinefelter syndromes, 
females were found to have two X chromosomes and males to have one Y and one 
X chromosome (Christie & Tansey 2003).
Although the gene responsible for DMD had not yet been located, Mendelian 
principles could be used to study a family tree, referred to as a pedigree chart. A 
particular trait could be tracked through generations to determine whether the trait 
had a dominant or recessive pattern of inheritance and to assess whether the gene 
causing the trait was located on an autosome or sex chromosome. BMD and DMD 
were both found to be X-linked recessive disorders (see Box 2), enabling clinical 
geneticists to track the affected x-chromosome through generations.
Following the pattern of X-linked transmission through generations, once an 
affected male had been diagnosed with DMD, enabled carrier risk assessment of 
females related to the proband. If a female had an affected son as well as another 
known affected maternal male relative, it was assumed7 that she was an obligate 
carrier, with a 1:4 risk of having an affected boy in subsequent pregnancies.
7 Although this assumption was usually correct new mutations have occurred in families with a 
known family history (Douglas Wilcox, Personal correspondence).
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Frequently the condition occurs in families with no known history o f the condition. 
If the mother of an affected boy had few male relatives or little information on 
distant male relatives, the probability that she was a carrier had to be statistically 
assessed. Bayes theorem, a mathematical formula used for calculating conditional 
probabilities, enabled the inclusion of information on all unaffected male relatives 
to provide a female with a numerical carrier risk. At risk females would either be 
provided with a numerical risk or be designated to a “high”, “intermediate” or “low” 
risk category by clinicians. The complexity and influence o f external factors in 
pedigree analysis often resulted in unsatisfactorily uncertain risk estimations.
Box 2. DMD and X- Linked R e c e ss iv e  T ran sm ission
X-linked recessive, carrier mother
Unaffected Carr e f
mothai
Unaffected 
□  Affected 
[ |  Carrier
AffectedUnaffected Unaffected Carrier
son daughter daughter
U .S . N a t io n a l  L ib ra ry  of M e d ic in e
H em izygous m ales are affected  
and hom ozygous fem ales  are 
carriers
Males p ass on the X 
chrom osom e to all daughters  
but not to  their so n s8
Fem ales transm it an X 
chrom osom e to all their 
children, but only half will 
receive the affected X- 
chrom osom e, therefore carrier 
fem ales p ass on th e trait to half 
their son s and carrier sta tu s to  
half their daughters
Phenotypic expression  is much 
m ore com m on in m ales.
Fem ales 'affected ' by DMD are 
carriers of the condition but 
infrequently exhibit m uscle  
w eak ness; their secon d , 
unaffected X -chrom osom e is 
usually sufficient for normal 
function
3.3. The role of creatine kinase
The establishment o f basic genetic inheritance, combined with the identification o f a 
testable biochemical indicator o f DMD (creatine kinase), provided a breakthrough 
in the identification o f female carriers. Although creatine kinase (CK) tests enabled
8 Due to the clinical progression o f  DMD affected males rarely reproduce.
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the development of newborn screening for DMD, Pennington (1980) argued that the 
most important application of CK measurements in muscular dystrophy was the 
identification of female carriers. Although female carriers do not demonstrate such a 
marked elevation of serum CK activity, it was possible to combine pedigree 
analysis with CK test results, to assess a female’s carrier risk (Hodgson & Bobrow 
1989, Emery & Muntoni 2003).
Analysis of CK levels quickly became the most widely used method of carrier 
detection, but the test did not prove to be reliably precise. A number of factors were 
shown to affect detected levels of CK. Serum CK activities were shown to fall 
during pregnancy (Blyth & Hughes 1971, Emery & King 1971, King et al 1972, 
Emery 1980), be raised due to physical activity (Emery 1980, Pennington 1980) and 
to lower with progressive age (Moser & Vogt 1974, Skinner & Emery 1974,
Bundey et al 1979, Nicholson et al 1979). Consequently only 70-75% of carriers 
demonstrate raised CK (Thompson et al 1967, Walton et al 1969, Dubowitz 1995).
Due to the variability in different samples it became general practice to calculate the 
mean of samples taken on three separate occasions. Logarithms of CK values in 
healthy individuals and carrier females were developed to enable statistical analysis 
of the probability that a female, with a given mean, was a carrier (Pennington 1980, 
Emery 1980, Hodgson & Bobrow 1989). However, questions regarding reliability 
remained. Bullock et al (1979) conducted a survey to assess whether clinical 
geneticists obtained the same carrier risk after analysis of CK results and pedigree 
data. The results revealed a serious lack of precision. Nevertheless, carrier risk 
assessed using a combination of pedigree analysis and CK results remained 
significantly more accurate than pedigree analysis alone.
During the late 1970s, it was hoped that CK analysis could be used to detect at-risk 
fetuses. Mahoney et al (1977), Stengel-Rutowski et al (1977) and Dubowitz 
(1995) all reported the successful diagnosis of at-risk fetuses using CK testing. 
However, Mahoney et al (1977) had also reported normal fetal serum CK and the 
subsequent birth of an affected male. Ionasescu et al (1978) and Golbus et al 
(1979) reported further false negative results. The process was later abandoned 
amidst fears of unreliability (see Edwards et al 1984a, 1984b. 1984c).
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3.4. Evolution of genetic testing techniques
Increasingly sophisticated genetic technologies have rapidly transformed the ability 
to identify specific gene deletions and duplications in affected males. Once a 
deletion or duplication was identified, many of the same technologies could be used 
to identify whether the mother was a carrier of the condition. Each technology is 
explored in subsequent sections, in relation to the order in which they became 
available.
3.4.1 G en etic lin kage u sin g lin k ed  D N A  m arkers
During the 1960s and 1970s, there were significant developments in understanding 
genetic processes. Chromosomes were known to be carried in the nucleus of every 
cell and DNA had been identified as the substance within chromosomes that carries 
genetic information. In 1953, Frances Crick and James Watson discovered the 
double helix structure of the DNA molecule (see Box 3) and a few years later 
Brenner, Jacob and Meleson determined the role of mRNA, as the messenger 
molecule that carries genetic information from DNA in the cell nucleus out to the 
cytoplasm; the cell ultimately uses mRNA to make specific proteins (see Box 4).
Box 3. Basic DNA structure
The ou ter rails of the  double helix consist of phosphate molecules 
and sugar (deoxyribose) molecules. The rungs th a t weakly bind the 
outer rails toge ther are  m ade up of molecules consisting of bases. 
There are  four different bases which always pair in the sam e way: 
adenine (A) always pairs with thym ine (T) and guanine (G) always 
pairs with cytosine (C). A single strand of DNA is m ade up of le tters 
representing the  bases (e.g. ATGCTCGAATAAATGTGAATTTGA etc). A 
sequence of th ree  nucleotides constitutes one codon, which 
encodes information for one of tw enty different amino acids (e.g. 
ATG CTC GAA TAA ATG TGA ATT TGA etc). A chain of amino acids 
may constitu te a particular gene product (protein) (e.g. < ATG CTC 
GAA TAA>).
In 1966, Marshall Nirenburg and H. Gobind Khorana demonstrated the triplet 
nature of genetic code; each of the 20 amino acids is coded by a sequence of three 
nucleotide bases, called codons. In 1978, David Botstein and colleague discovered a
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useful type of DNA polymorphism called restriction fragment length 
polymorphisms (RFLPs), which provided a breakthrough in gene mapping.
Restriction enzymes digest specific fragments of DNA. DNA probes, each 
consisting of a length of DNA from a specific segment of the human genome, 
recognise their complementary sequences in DNA from a patient or family member. 
The length of DNA recognised by a probe varies, depending upon the pattern of the 
restriction enzyme sites around the sequence of DNA that is recognised by the 
probe. The variation can be used to track the restriction site and probe through a 
family to ascertain whether the disease tracks with the probe and restriction site 
(Emery & Muntoni 2003, Cummings 2003).
Analysis of rare individuals with chromosome translocations indicated that the gene 
responsible for DMD was located on the short arm of the X-chromosome. The exact 
position of the DMD gene was finally located on the short arm at Xp21 in 1983 
(Kunkel and Hoffman 1989, Dubowitz 1995, Korf 2000, Emery & Muntoni 2003) 
and a linkage map became available. Initially the most commonly used intragenic 
probes (pERT and XJ1.1) were used to detect polymorphic RFLPs within the gene 
and were able to detect deletions in about 10% of patients (Hodgson & Bowbrow 
1989). Use of multiple probes, including flanking markers used at both the proximal 
and distal ends of the dystrophin gene locus, increased the proportion of cases 
showing deletions to over 25% (Hodgson & Bowbrow 1989).
Despite the increased accuracy, obtained through use of multiple probes, there was 
still a chance that crossing-over (recombination), during gamete formation, could 
have moved the RFLP to the healthy allele. As even the closest markers were 
located some distance from each other, recombination occurred in approximately 
5% of cases, making interpretation difficult. If an actual deletion was identified in 
an affected boy the risk of recombination could be circumvented (Hodgson & 
Bowbrow 1989, Dubowitz 1995).
The advent of linked markers enabled more precise identification of carriers. Once a 
boy was suspected of having DMD, DNA would be collected from as many family 
members as possible and linked markers used to track the affected gene through the
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family. If a deletion was detected in an index case this provided a direct marker for 
antenatal diagnosis or carrier detection. If a deletion was not detected, carrier 
detection was significantly more complex.
If a mother of an affected boy was found to have different polymorphic marker 
alleles on her two x-chromosomes (i.e. she is heterozygous), it was possible to 
ascertain that if the allele inherited by her affected son was also inherited by her 
other children, they would also inherit the DMD mutation (affected male or carrier 
female), unless recombination had occurred. If the mother of an isolated case of 
DMD also had a normal son(s), the presence of the same x-chromosome in both 
normal and affected boys increased the probability that the affected boy had the 
condition as a result of a new mutation, and that she was therefore not a carrier. If 
her sons had inherited different x-chromosomes, her carrier risk would be increased 
(Hodgson & Bobrow 1989).
In practice, the risk of recombination meant that the use of linked markers alone was 
an unreliable assessment of carrier risk. It became standard practice to combine 
pedigree analysis, biochemical tests of carrier status (CK), and linkage analysis, 
assessed in a Bayesian calculation, to provide an integrated risk figure. Despite 
these efforts many families still received uncertain results; the quest for more 
powerful diagnostic tools able to directly detect gene mutations began.
A few years after the discovery of the gene locus the entire gene had been cloned 
and the protein product of the gene discovered and named “dystrophin” (see Box 4). 
The dystrophin gene was found to be the largest genetic locus characterised to date, 
containing over 2 million base pairs and at least 79 exons (Kunkel & Hoffman 
1989, Emery & Muntoni 2003). Extracting mRNA from the leucocytes and cloning 
as complementary DNA (cDNA) provided a means of examining in more detail the 
location and extent of deletions identified with genomic probes. Approximately 
70% of mutations in DMD and BMD patients could be identified using cDNA 
probes, as deletions (Love et al. 1989:666). Around 7% of boys were found to have 
duplications and the remainder were presumed to have point mutations, not 
detectable by existing techniques (Dubowitz 1995, Yau et al 1996).
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Certain deletions were found to result in the production of virtually no 
dystrophin, causing the more severe clinical phenotype of DMD, while other 
overlapping and often larger deletions could result in the production of abnormal 
dystrophin resulting in the milder clinical phenotype of BMD (Kunkel & Hoffman 
1989, Dubowitz 1995).
Box 4. Genes and protein production -  the basics
Gene expression leads to protein synthesis. The action of the 
protein is responsible for specific hereditary traits. Within m ost 
hum an genes there  are  nucleotide sequences th a t are  transcribed 
but not translated  into the  amino acid sequence of a protein; these 
are called introns. The nucleotide sequences th a t are  transcribed 
and translated  into protein are called exons. Gene expression has 
two stages, transcription and translation.
Transcription begins when a section of DNA unwinds. An enzym e, 
RNA polym erase, binds to a particular nucleotide sequence ju s t 
outside the  gene, called the  prom oter region. The RNA polym erase 
then moves along the DNA strand adding nucleotides to their 
com plem entary RNA strand . The rules of base pairing are the  sam e 
as in DNA replication except th a t RNA contains Uracil (U) which 
replaces Thymine (T). When the RNA polym erase reaches a specific 
nucleotide sequence known as the term inator region, the  newly 
formed single strand of RNA detaches from the  DNA strand  and the 
DNA strand re-form s to m ake a double helix.
During translation m essenger RNA in the  cytoplasm binds to the 
ribosome. A second RNA molecule, transfer RNA, carries its specific 
amino acid from the cytoplasm and transports it to the  ribosome, 
to produce a specific am ino acid chain, called a polypeptide, which 
corresponds to  the mRNA. Once formed th e  polypeptide folds into a 
th ree dimensional shape, determ ined by its amino acid sequence. 
Mutations in genes can a lter folding and lead to genetic disorders. 
Once a polypeptide is folded, modified and functional it is called a 
protein.
To explain the variation in clinical severity, Monaco et al. (1988) proposed a 
hypothesis of ‘in frame/out of frame’ mutations. A deletion in DMD, irrespective of 
size, leads to frame shift of the triplet codons for amino acids, resulting in a ‘non­
sense’ type of mutation and a severely truncated non-functional protein, whereas in 
Becker dystrophy the nucleotides remain in frame, resulting in mRNA molecules 
capable of directing the translation of a semi-functional protein. The hypothesis
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proved to be correct in over 90% of cases with deletions (Kunkel & Hoffman 1989, 
Specht & Kunkel 1993, Dubowitz 1995).
The dystrophin gene was also found to have a very high mutation rate, thought to be 
related to the enormous size of the gene. The high rate of new mutations redefined 
the types of known carriers (Table 2.1). New mutations are now thought to account 
for approximately one third of all affected males and can occur in the egg cell that 
produced the affected boy or the sperm or egg that produced his mother (Korf 
2000). In the latter case the woman is likely to be a carrier with a 1:4 risk of having 
another affected boy.
A mutation occurring in the egg cell that produced the boy is referred to as germ- 
line, germinal, or gonadal mosaicism; mothers are not genetic carriers but are at risk 
of transmitting a mutation to more than one child due to somatic mutation.
Estimates of frequency of germ-line mosaicism among families with DMD have 
been variously calculated to be between 12% and 20% (Emery & Muntoni 2003).
Table 2.1 Types of carriers
Type of carrier Description Risk in subsequent 
pregnancies
Carrier Female "carries" a 
m utation in the 
dystrophin gene
1:4
Non-carrier (a t risk of 
germline mosaicism)
New m utation 
occurred in m other's 
egg which resulted in 
affected boy
Estimated to be 
approxim ately 1:20
Localisation of the dystrophin gene and the potential to identify mutations in 
individual cases, through linked markers and gene specific cDNA probes, further 
extended the sensitivity of carrier detection and male diagnosis. In the first decade 
following the identification of the dystrophin gene the most commonly used 
mutation detection technique was the Southern blot, involving the transfer of DNA 
after digestion with restriction enzymes, followed by hybridisation with fragments 
of relevant genomic DNA (probes).
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Once the gene was isolated and sequenced, a series of cDNA probes were made 
available to laboratories around the world, which made possible the screening of 
probands for deletion of individual exons with the gene. Plauchu et al (1989:669) 
argued that “neonatal screening programmes for DMD now have an increasing 
place among preventive programmes for genetic disorders.”
3 .4 .2  P olym erase Chain R eaction
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was invented in 1986 and revolutionised the 
diagnosis of affected boys and detection of female carriers. PCR works by firstly 
separating the double strand of DNA (denaturation). The nucleotides of interest on a 
single strand are then marked or “primed” by the addition of two short strands of 
nucleotides (oligonucleotides), designed to bind at specific points on either side of 
the chosen nucleotides. A copy of the desired area of the strand is then produced 
using the enzyme Taq polymerase to form a new double strand. After every round 
of replication the double stranded products are separated and used as templates. The 
process of amplification is then repeated, to create thousands or millions of copies 
of the desired area of DNA. Amplification increases the size of the PCR products, 
making it possible to visualise them by running them on a gel, followed by staining 
with ethidium bromide. Deletions result in products which are smaller than that of a 
corresponding normal allele, whilst duplications generate products which are larger 
(Tyrrell 1997, Cummings 2003, Korf 2000, Young 2005). Deletions and 
duplications cluster in the 5 prime and 3 prime hotspots and therefore not all 
mutations needed to be analysed for identifying most mutations (Dubowitz 1995, 
Emery & Muntoni 2003).
In the late 1980s, Jeff Chamberlain and his colleagues (1988) and Alan Beggs et al. 
(1990) developed a modification of the PCR process known as the ‘multiplex 
method’, in which multiple pairs of primers are used to bind to a number of regions, 
which are known to be deletion susceptible. Amplification of more than one exon in 
a gene allowed “hot spot” regions to be simultaneously analysed (Emery & Muntoni 
2003:65). Multiplex PCR proved to be significantly less time consuming than 
linkage and Southern blot and required a considerably smaller amount of DNA 
(Korf 2000).
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By studying 19 exons in two multiplex PCR assays, over 98% of deletions can be 
detected (Chamberlain et al. 1988). Although the procedure is rapid, reliable and 
accurate, in practice multiplex PCR can only detect gene deletions in about 70% of 
cases. Of the remaining cases, around 10-15% of duplications can be detected; the 
rest carry point mutations that are spread throughout the entire gene, some of which 
occur outside of the ‘hot spot’ regions analysed by multiplex PCR (Emery & 
Muntoni 2003).
Multiplex PCR is not sensitive enough to detect deletions or duplications in 
females, due to the activation of their second X chromosome. If a deletion or 
duplication has been identified in a male, female DNA is assessed for the amount of 
PCR product produced at the site of the mutation through a process called 
‘quantitative PCR’, or ‘dosage’. The use of automated and quantitative florescent 
PCR system facilitated the detection of deletions, making it possible to assign the 
carrier status of females related to an affected male with a known mutation (Emery 
& Muntoni 2003).
3.4 .3  Id en tify in g  p o in t m u tation s
Various techniques have been used to identify mutations which escape detection 
following the multiplex PCR approach; only those used regularly in laboratories 
today are reviewed in this section. During the 1990s the most commonly used test 
was the protein truncation technique (PTT), developed in the early 1990s by 
Roberts et al. (1991 in Dubowitz 1995). PTT requires an RNA sample from a blood 
sample, or preferably a muscle biopsy which is amplified and translated into protein 
using an in vitro system. The proteins are run on a gel and analysed; if a fragment 
carries a mutation the resulting protein will be truncated. The cDNA corresponding 
to the truncated fragment can then be sequenced to identify the mutation (Emery & 
Muntoni 2003:191)
Bennett et al. (2001) described a PCR-based scanning method, referred to as 
‘denaturing high performance liquid chromatography’ (DHPLC) or WAVE 
technology. DHPLC is based on the differential separation of mismatched 
heteroduplexes that form after normal and mutant DNA strands are bonded back
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together. DHPLC is an extremely sensitive method for detecting base substitutions 
and small deletions or insertions (Young 2005).
3.4 .4  M u ltip lex  litig a tio n -d ep en d en t p ro b e am plification  an d sequ en cin g
Schouten et al. (2002) described a new technique to screen the entire DMD gene for 
duplications and deletions. Multiplex litigation-dependent probe amplification 
(MLPA) analyses all 79 exons in one assay which allows detection of large genetic 
rearrangements by simultaneous amplification of nucleic acid sequences. Each 
MLPA probe consists of two target-specific oligonucleotides and a PCR primer 
binding sequence, which hybridize to the target sequence at sites immediately 
adjacent to each other. After hybridisation to the target DNA, the two halves of each 
probe are joined together by a ligation reaction, which can be amplified by PCR.
The quantity of the PCR products appears in different lengths allowing peak areas 
to be identified (Lai et al 2006). MLPA has been shown to be considerably more 
sensitive and accurate than PCR, enabling detection of all known deletions and 
duplications.
Sequencing of the entire dystrophin gene is the ‘gold standard’ method for detecting 
deletions and duplications. The initial stages of sequencing follow the PCR method: 
strands of DNA are denatured and a single strand acts as a template for the synthesis 
of a complimentary strand using Taq polymerase. In sequencing the Taq polymerase 
is combined with a mixture of deoxynucleotide (dNTP) in four separate reactions in 
each of which a specific dideoxynucleotide (ddNTP) is incorporated. Each reaction 
generates a series of different sized fragments. The fragment from each reaction are 
then analysed enabling the position of each fragment to be compared and the 
sequence of the complementary strand to be read (Young 2005). Sequencing is both 
time-consuming and expensive (Young 2005). Occasionally sequencing will be 
used for a particular exon if a suspected point mutation has been highlighted 
through PCR.
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4. Summary of implications of testing techniques for reproductive
options
During the last fifty years there have been considerable changes in the techniques 
used to diagnose boys and identify carriers. Table 2.2 shows how diagnostic 
procedures, carrier testing and reproductive technologies have transformed the 
reproductive options available for families affected by DMD. It should be noted that 
throughout all these stages families could -  of course -  choose to continue with 
family building without intervention; the third column merely indicates the 
alternatives options available in each decade.
The developments are complex, remarkable and hugely significant. Only in recent 
years has it become possible to provide mothers with a reasonably accurate 
assessment of their carrier status. The drive to increase the accuracy of genetic 
testing techniques initially occurred in an era when prevention of genetic 
abnormality was a paramount feature of the genetic discourse. In more recent years 
there has been increasing recognition of the difficulty families face, in trying to 
decipher complex risk assessments (Parsons & Atkinson 1993).
The trajectory of risk-awareness began with recognition of the familial nature of 
DMD and the simultaneous realisation that not all family members will be affected 
by the condition. The reproductive options available to families were to either cease, 
or continue, family building. In recent decades mothers have been provided with 
ever more complex (and at times unreliable) assessments of their carrier risk. 
Capacity to detect the sex of the foetus occurred in an era when disability was 
overtly defined as tyranny to be desperately avoided. Families were offered the 
desperately difficult decision: to terminate all male foetuses, without knowing 
whether or not they were affected, or to risk the birth of an affected male.
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Table 2.2 Impact of technological developments on reproductive options
Decade Technological
Developm ents
Reproductive options
1950s Pedigree analysis No more children -  based on estim ation 
of risk
1960s Amniocentesis 
Foetal sexing,
(UK Abortion Act)
Test pregnancy a t 16-18 w eeks and 
term inate if foetus male
1970s Creatine kinase (CK) Test pregnancy a t 16-18 weeks and 
term inate if foetus male
1980s Linkage
Southern blotting with 
cDNA probes
Chorionic villus sampling
Test pregnancy a t 10-12 w eeks and 
term inate if male foetus affected -  not 
always possible or accurate
1990s PCR Multiplex
Pre-im plantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD)
Test pregnancy a t 10-12 w eeks and 
term inate if male foetus affected -  
available for more families and more 
accurate
OR
Avoid testing and term ination through 
PGD -  limited availability and low 
success rate
2000s dHPLC
MLPA
Sequencing
Test pregnancy a t 10-12 weeks and 
term inate if male foetus affected -  
available for all families with increased 
accuracy
In recent years technological sophistication has perhaps reached the ‘gold-standard’; 
finally, it has become possible to inform a mother whether she carries the genetic 
‘mutation’ responsible for DMD (and therefore has a 1 in 4 risk of having an 
affected child), or has a risk of ‘germline mosaicism’ (and therefore has a 1 in 20 
risk of having an affected child). It is now highly unlikely that a family would have 
to face the option of termination, unaware of the disease status of the foetus. 
However, as noted in chapter one, there are still significant psychological issues 
associated with terminating a wanted pregnancy on the basis of foetal abnormality.
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Increasing technological sophistication has radically changed the reproductive 
options available to families at risk of DMD. However, it is unlikely that technology 
is the only consideration in the reproductive decision-making process. The 
following chapter explores literature on the determinants of fertility; the motivations 
and considerations that form the reproductive decision-making process, in the 
general public and in families affected by DMD.
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Chapter Three 
Reproductive Behaviour: A review of the literature
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to address the literature on the key contextual and 
subjective aspects of reproductive decision-making for families affected by 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). It is possible that the genetic condition may 
not be the only consideration in reproductive decision-making and it was therefore 
deemed necessary to explore the determinants of fertility in families who are not 
faced with the additional consideration of genetic risk. Therefore, the chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first section explores the determinants of fertility in 
relation to having a child without a disability. The second section addresses the 
influence of perceptions of disability on fertility in the general population. The final 
section explores the literature on reproductive behaviour in families affected by 
DMD.
1. Determinants of fertility; theoretical contributions from 
demography, sociology and psychology
This section explores the development of key theoretical approaches to fertility, to 
address questions that lie at the very heart of our understanding of human 
reproduction: what motivates people to have or not have a child, and to have the 
number of children they have? (Miller 1992). Contributions from demography, 
sociology and psychology are used, to develop an integrated framework of the 
determinants of fertility9. Literature from the field of demography focuses on 
fertility at the population level, and utilises economic theories of cost-benefit
9 It should be noted that demography and medicine use two disparate definitions of ‘fertility’, which 
reflect two facets of the human experience of sexual reproduction. Medicine is concerned with the 
biological processes affecting an individual’s capacity to conceive. In contrast, demography 
examines the product of fertility: population. My concern here is not with assessment of biological 
determinants of (in)fertility, nor with the measurement of global trends. However, it is important to 
note that my use of the term ‘fertility’ draws upon both notions. In this chapter I use ‘fertility’ to 
refer to the constituents of ‘fertility behaviour’, which include an individual’s capacity to conceive, 
and the wider context that influences fertility trends.
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analysis to explain the decline in fertility. Sociological theories address the benefit 
aspect of the cost-benefit analysis, by focusing on the social value of children. 
Psychological theories address individual motivation and lifestyle factors that 
influence reproductive decision-making.
1.1 Demography and Transition Theory: aggregate analysis of changing 
populations
Demography involves statistical analysis of population parameters and dynamics, 
and the causes and consequences of population structures and change (Marshall 
1998). The focus of demography is the examination of changing facets of 
populations, such as mortality, fertility and migration, primarily through the 
collection and analysis of survey data and population censuses. Critics argue that 
survey data generates abstract data (Pfeffer 1999), and creates logistical and 
interpretative issues associated with both inputting values and assessing the 
relationship between listed values (Friedman et al. 1994, Schoen et al 1999). 
Demography is criticised for being “all methods and no theory” (McNicoll 
1980:441). However, until recently, fertility was the most studied topic in the 
discipline (Greehalgh 1996). The extensive collection and subsequent presentation 
of data provides substantial foundations for subsequent theoretical contributions on 
the determinants of fertility.
The production of demographic data enables recognition of the significant changes 
in fertility trends in the UK. Firstly, the average age of mothers at first pregnancy 
has risen. In 1977, women aged 25-29 were twice as likely to give birth as a women 
aged 30-34, whereas in 2007 women aged 30-34 had the highest fertility rate (ONS 
2008). Secondly, demographic data demonstrates a decrease in average family size. 
In the 1960s, the average completed family size was 2.46 children, compared to 
1.74 children today and the proportion of families with three or more children has 
fallen by almost half (ONS 2008). Lastly, the median birth interval has increased; in 
1972 the second child was bom 31 months after the first, compared to 35 months in 
2007. The increase in birth interval between the second and third child is less 
marked; 39 months in 1972, compared to 40 months in 2007 (ONS 2008).
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The recent decline in fertility in the UK reflects a broader trend in industrialised 
nations. Fertility decline in Western societies, during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, was matched by substantial increases in the population size of 
many pre-industrialised, ex-colonial nations (Hirschman 1994). To explain such 
patterns, Thompson (1929) and later Nonestein (1945) developed the theory of 
fertility transition. Transition theory attributes the decline in fertility to 
“urbanisation, industrialisation, rising levels of living, popular education, and 
popular participation in political life” (Nonestein 1945:52).
Henry (1961) argued that Westernisation had enabled individuals to exert deliberate 
control over their own fertility. Henry (1961) presented the concept of “natural 
fertility” to refer to fertility controlled through social norms that prescribe, for 
example, the number of partners and frequency of coital activity. Henry (1961) 
proposed that “natural fertility” occurred in societies where people make no 
conscious attempts to limit their fertility. In contrast, “controlled fertility”, refers to 
the conscious parental limitation of fertility when desired family size had been 
reached. Henry (1961) also argued that fertility behaviour in Western cultures had 
shifted from “natural fertility” to “controlled fertility”.
Two key points emerge from demographic data on fertility. First, the gradual 
decline in fertility suggests that the provision of reproductive choice, for families 
affected by DMD, may have become a less pressing issue when newborn screening 
for DMD first became available, thirty years ago. Families are now more likely to 
have fewer children. However, the average birth interval is around three years and 
families receive a later clinical diagnosis of DMD, on average, 4.5 years after their 
child’s birth. Although less people are having large families, many of those who do 
continue family building remain unaware of their risk.
Secondly, the focus on fertility decline and transition theory in demography has 
resulted in micro-level descriptions of individual behaviour (Greenhalgh 1996). In 
demography, society is no longer viewed as “integrated and cohesive system”, but 
as an “atomistic collection of individuals” (Greenhalgh 1996:40); each endowed 
with the capacity to deliberately plan and control their own fertility (Pfeffer 1999).
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The focus on the individual has had substantial implications for subsequent 
theoretical assessments of fertility.
1.2 Economic theories of fertility; assessing the cost of children
The prominence of economic development in transition theory, and the new-found 
focus on the individual, paved the way for the application of economic theories to 
fertility. Becker (1960) applied price theory to fertility. The economic theory of 
fertility classified children as “durable consumption and production goods” (Becker 
1960:210); children, like any other material object, were thought to provide utility 
to the consumer. The determinants of fertility, therefore, were defined as “the 
relative cost of children versus other goods, the couples’ income, and their 
preference for children versus competing forms of consumption” (Mason 
1997:444).
Subsequent reformulations of Becker’s (1960) microeconomic theory of fertility 
attempted to convey broader determinants of fertility. Easterlin (1975) argued for 
the inclusion of sociological variables, and proposed that facets of “natural fertility” 
were still applicable to Western democracies. Cultural beliefs, for example, “that 
sexual intercourse should be avoided while a mother is nursing” or practical 
considerations such as the “physical separation of partners due to such events as 
civil strife or seasonal migration for employment purposes” may still influence 
fertility behaviour (Easterlin 1975:56).
Although the approach taken by Easterlin (1975) lacked in-depth sociological 
theory, it provided some counterbalance to the dominant demographic theories of 
the time. Even when direct measures of “controlled fertility” could not be 
determined, patterns of sustained declines in fertility were often interpreted as 
conscious parental planning (Hirschman 1994). Despite recognition of sociological 
variables, economic theories maintained a monopolistic position in the explanation 
of fertility behaviour (Nauck 2007). Couples were “assumed to maximise utility” 
(Bagozzi 1978:302, emphasis in original) and assumed to consciously plan. The 
varying forms of economic theory detached the decision-making process from the
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socio-cultural and political contexts within which reproductive decisions are made, 
and motivational aspects of fertility were entirely ignored (Price & Hawkins 2002).
1.3 The theory of the Value of Children; assessing the benefit of children
During the 1970s, attention turned to why families in industrialised nations were 
still having children, since they had become an “economic liability” (Hoffman and 
Hoffman 1973:19). In an attempt to explore cross-cultural differences in fertility 
behaviour Hoffman and Hoffman (1973) developed the theory of the Value of 
Children (VOC) to explore the motivations for parenting. VOC complemented 
economic theories of fertility by addressing cultural factors and the subjective value 
of children (Nauck 2007). Whilst economic theory offered “fresh insights into 
neglected aspects of the demand for children” (Greenhalgh 1996:54) the value of 
children approach emphasised the supply side (Hoffman & Hoffman 1973).
Hoffman & Hoffman’s approach to the concept of ‘value’ was “anchored in 
psychological needs, tied to the social structure and subject to cultural variation” 
(Hoffman and Hoffman 1973:20), enabling consideration of both the personality of 
the individual and structures of the social environment (Buhler 2008). Through 
empirical studies, Hoffman and Hoffman (1973) showed that children satisfy a 
broad range of psychological and economic needs. Having children signifies adult 
status, expands the identity of the parents into a larger social entity and 
demonstrates the fulfilment of social norms. Parenthood may strengthen existing 
family ties and simplify parental access to supportive resources. Having children 
may also provide couples with the opportunity for new experiences, can expand 
their prestige and status, and may provide fun and stimulation.
Although the theory of the Value of Children emerged from the discipline of 
psychology, the incorporation of economic, social and cultural dimensions 
enhanced its interdisciplinary appeal. The theory of the Value of Children has 
continued to be influential throughout recent decades (Michaels and Goldberg 1989, 
Friedman et al. 1994, Nauck 2007). By focusing on the values, or benefits, parents 
hope to accrue from having a child, VOC provided a “substantial contribution to the
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understanding of the processes of declining fertility and to explanations of why 
people in modem societies still want to have children” (Buhler 2008:570)
1.4 The theory of the social value of children: assessing the social benefit of 
children
A number of sociologists have re-conceptualised the theory of the value of children 
in relation to theories of social structure. Nauck (2007:616) proposed a revised 
version of the VOC approach, which “deduces VOC from a general social theory”. 
According to the theory of social production functions, human actors aim to 
maximise social esteem and physical well-being, by seeking social reinforcement 
and physical survival, in his or her social context. Social esteem and well-being are 
achieved through context-specific production factors. Production factors govern 
whether parenthood is an efficient strategy to achieve social esteem by determining 
the (positive) value of children.
Nauck (2007:617) argues that children help to improve parent’s physical well-being 
“if they actively contribute to household production and thus function as productive, 
not just consumptive goods” and by providing “physical and psychological 
stimulation”. Children may optimise parents self esteem indirectly, by intensifying 
existing relations and initiating new relations, or directly, through the creation of an 
intimate, life-long social relationship between parent and child (Nauck 2007).
Buhler (2008) uses theories of social networks, interpersonal exchange and social 
capital to address the structural value of children. Social capital refers to how 
individuals access, and utilise, resources embedded in social networks (Portes 1998, 
Lin 1999). The general determinants of fertility behaviour are identified in relation 
to interpersonal relationships between parents and children, and the extended family 
or local community perception of parenthood (Buhler 2008). A universal element of 
relationships is that they are created and maintained under the expectation of 
attaining either personal benefit (Coleman 1990), or mutual benefit (Buhler 2008).
Opportunities to access direct or indirect exchanges of “information, goods, 
services, emotions, affection or recognition” (Buhler 2008:573) are defined by
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social networks. The location of an actor within a specific network defines 
opportunities, and interpersonal exchange focuses on individuals’ intentions to 
profit from their activities, by creating and maintaining personal relationships which 
will provide access to social capital (Coleman 1990, Buhler 2008).
Buhler (2008) argues that social networks influence fertility behaviour by defining 
preferences and opportunities. However, having a child also changes parents’ social 
networks:
“The child becomes a new and highly significant network member and it alters 
its parents’ personal relationships and social environments. It affects the 
nature of the tie between mother and father, their relationships with relatives, 
friends, or neighbours, and changes the parents’ status in the local community 
or society” (Buhler 2008:572)
Buhler (2008) suggests that by changing the parents’ social networks, children also
alter exchange relationships, which constitute the building blocks of the social
network. Parents invest time and financial and emotional resources, in the
expectation of eventually receiving love, support at old age, or material benefit from
their children. The reaction of relatives or other members of the parents’ social
network, to the birth of a child, may initiate changes in the parents’ social status and
induce greater access to both family and social support.
Social capital emerges as an “unintended bi-product of existing relationships and 
group memberships or as an outcome of purposeful investments in existing or new 
relationships” (Buhler 2008:575). In the structural approach to the value of children, 
value is defined as direct or indirect consequences of having children, which alter 
interpersonal exchange relationships and social networks.
Theories of social production functions, social networks, interpersonal exchange 
and social capital all focus on the primacy of social interaction in creating social 
structure, thereby providing an interesting and comprehensive sociological approach 
to the socially constructed determinants of fertility. However, sociological theories 
do not address the subjective mechanisms through which costs and benefits are 
perceived, nor how the group values relate to individual differences in attitudes, 
intentions, or personality (von der Lippe 2006).
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1.5 Psychological determinants of fertility; personality traits and the influence of 
individual experience
Fertility behaviour reflects the salience of individual agency and purposeful human 
action; theoretical elements which are lost in demography’s aggregate analysis of 
numbers (Schoen et al. 1999), and reviewed as a cumulative product by sociological 
theories. In response to the methodological limitations of demographic research, 
psychologists have sought to move beyond “merely listing the values and costs of 
having children, to incorporating intentions and attitudes into parenthood decision­
making” (Purewal & van der Akker 2007:79).
Three core concepts of fertility behaviour lie at the heart of psychological analysis 
of fertility: motivations, desires and intentions. Miller (1992) argues that 
motivations are antecedent to desires, and in turn desires are antecedent to 
intentions. According to Miller (1992:281), fertility motivation emerges from 
“biologically based human traits” that “govern the human tendency to form 
attachments and perform care-taking”. Miller’s (1992) study revealed that two 
personality traits affected fertility motivation; nurturance and affiliation. Two more 
recent studies have presented similar findings. Langdridge et al (2005) found that 
the most popular reasons for wanting a child were to “give love” and “receive love”, 
to “become a family” and to “have a child that is biologically related to both 
members of the dyad”. Three related themes emerged from Purewal & van der 
Akker’s (2007) qualitative study on the meaning of parenting: “parenting as 
selfless”, the “fulfilling role of parenting”, and the “importance of genetic ties”.
Miller (1992) argues that when motivations to have a child are activated, they are 
experienced as the desire for a child, or for a specific number of children. Desires do 
not lead directly to action, until they are converted, through personal commitment to 
act, into intentions. Only when the situational conditions are conducive, and the 
intentions reach sufficient intensity, is intention translated into behaviour (Miller 
1992).
In their theory of reasoned action, Fishbein and Azjen (1975) regard intention as the 
principal predictor of behaviour; the stronger the intention, the more likely the
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intention will be translated into action. Ajzen (1985:29-30) developed a more 
complex assessment of intentions in the theory of planned behaviour, by redefining 
intention as “intention to try” and performance as “attempt to perform”. To 
emphasise the mediating affect of context and circumstance, Azjen (1985) 
introduced a number of intervening variables between intention and behaviour, 
including the strength of the attempt to perform and the degree of control that the 
individual has over their behaviour.
Control is a central aspect in the psychological approach to fertility behaviour. 
Motivation, desire and intention to have a(nother) child may be apparent, but the 
transformation of intention into behaviour may not be possible due to constraints, 
which are out of the individual’s control. Constraints may be internal (e.g. 
infertility) or external (e.g. absence of a willing partner) (Schoen et al 1999).
Schoen et al (1999) argue for the inclusion of the Tife course perspective’ in the 
assessments of external constraints. Significant life events, such as “the formation 
and dissolution of sexual relationships and entries into and exits from both 
education and employment”, generate external constraints on fertility behaviour 
(Schoen et al 1999:791). Miller and Pasta (1995) present three categories of 
constraints: spouses intentions (whether the couple’s intentions concur): life cycle 
factors (such as age, marital duration, parity, gender and age of previous children), 
and changes related specifically to reproduction (such as unplanned pregnancy and 
divorce).
The combination of personality traits and life events provides a useful addition to 
social and economic theories of fertility. Although every individual is part of a 
social network and an economic and cultural context, analysis of an individual’s 
subjective experience of specific life events helps to elucidate the differences 
between individuals located in the same context.
1.6 Summary of the determinants of fertility
The common thread between theories of the determinants of fertility is the 
cost/benefit analysis, whereby people weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of
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having children in order to reach a reproductive decision. Using an integrated 
framework, consolidating the most salient aspects of theories from each discipline, 
an individual “evaluates the economic and psychological costs and benefits of 
children, taking into account personal factors and social context to reach a 
subjective opinion regarding a preference toward having a(nother) child” (Lawson 
2001:74). Fertility behaviour therefore results from complex interactions between 
biological forces, ideology, cultural representations of gender roles, normative 
expectations presented by family, friends and role models (Sonsenstein et al 1997) 
as well as economic considerations, personality traits and life experience.
2. Disability and the determinants of fertility
This section addresses the determinants of fertility in relation to disability. 
Perception of the type and magnitude of the costs and rewards of parenting a child 
with a disability may differ from those perceived in relation to parenting a child 
with no disability. There may be “economic factors”, such as medical care and 
equipment, and “psychological costs”, such as “higher rates of marital dissolution 
elevated levels of maternal depression, restricted mobility and poor social 
relationships” Lawson (2001:74). Two studies were identified (Lawson 2001 and 
2006), which used an integrated framework of economic, sociological and 
psychological theories, to explore the perceived costs and rewards of parenting a 
child with or without a disability.
In the first study, Lawson (2001) conducted a survey of 165 women to examine the 
perceptions of raising a child with Down’s syndrome, spina bifada and cystic 
fibrosis and attitudes toward using prenatal testing. Over half of the participants 
(n=92) had personal experience with disability. However, the degree of experience 
was not noted (i.e. whether participants knew of a person with a disability, had a 
relative or child with a disability). In addition, despite differences between Down’s 
syndrome, spina bifada and cystic fibrosis, perceptions of the three different 
conditions were amalgamated.
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The findings showed that the dominant view of raising a child with a disability 
(compared to raising a child without a disability) was negative, especially in relation 
to three key factors: 67.9% (n=l 12) mentioned financial expense, 66.7% (n=l 10) 
mentioned time commitment and 65.5% (n=108) mentioned the emotional toll of 
raising a child with a disability. The author notes “that these three factors were 
generated with such a high frequency suggests that both psychological and 
economic concerns are relevant when women are evaluating the potential 
experience of parenting a disabled child” (Lawson 2001:79). However, it should be 
noted that the financial concerns may have been less prevalent in a sample from the 
United Kingdom, due to the nationalised provision of free health care.
In the second study, Lawson (2006) conducted a survey of 335 university 
employees to explore how perceptions of parenting a child with Down’s syndrome 
differed from attitudes toward parenting a child with muscular dystrophy, and 
toward parenting a child with no disability. The type of muscular dystrophy was not 
explicitly noted. However, the vignette provided to participants, described a 
condition that appeared to be DMD: “your child will gradually lose muscle use [...] 
the muscle weakness will making walking very difficult and a wheelchair will likely 
be necessary” (Lawson 2006:47). A large proportion of participants indicated that 
they had no personal familiarity with someone with either mental disabilities 
(61.4%) or physical disabilities (49.3%).
The study measured a number of factors relating to the perception of parenting a 
child with a disability; personal enrichment, continuity of self and family, social 
isolation, commitment, and tangible instrumental costs. All factors were found to be 
significantly associated with less positive perceptions of parenting a child with a 
disability. However, loss of anticipated parenting rewards appeared to have a greater 
influence than expectation of heightened costs. The findings suggested that 
perceptions of parenting a child with Down’s syndrome were significantly less 
positive than those of parenting a child with no disability (pO.OOl), and marginally 
less positive than that of parenting a child with muscular dystrophy (p=0.062). The 
perception of parenting a child with muscular dystrophy was also significantly less 
positive than those of parenting a non-disabled child (pO.OOl).
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Both of Lawson’s studies (2001, 2006) reviewed perceptions of disability in relation 
to perceived willingness to consider termination. Lawson (2001, 2006) concluded 
that perceptions of the costs and rewards associated with raising a child with a 
disability are predictive of stated willingness to undertake prenatal testing and 
termination. Both studies reviewed hypothetical decision-making. However, the 
studies provide interesting insight into the general perception of the costs and 
rewards associated with parenting a child with a disability.
3. Reproductive behaviour in families at-risk of Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy
Numerous studies have tried to assess reproductive behaviour in families at-risk of 
genetic disorders, who already have a child, or relative, with a disability. Studies 
have focused on different genetic conditions and the findings are varied and often 
conflicting. It is often difficult to ascertain whether the different findings are due to 
different study designs, different settings, or different conditions. A number of 
studies have shown that the severity of the condition affects reproductive decision­
making (Verp et al 1988 Evans et al 1993, Eggers & Zatz 1998, Lerman et al 
2002). Therefore, this section only addresses literature on reproductive decision­
making in families affected by Duchenne muscular dystrophy10.
A total of ten studies were identified which addressed varying aspects of 
reproductive decision-making in families affected by DMD. The studies are 
explored in three sections. First, literature on reproductive behaviour in DMD 
families after a later clinical diagnosis is explored. Second, literature on 
reproductive behaviour in families whose sons had been diagnosed through 
newborn screening is addressed. Third, literature on the way women make sense of 
their carrier risk of DMD is explored. Although the final section does not directly 
address reproductive behaviour, the studies highlight the difficulty individuals 
experienced in retaining complex mathematical probabilities of risk.
10 Although some studies include families at-risk of other genetic conditions (e.g. Beeson & Golbus 
1985, Kay & Kingston 2002), when possible, data is presented only from families affected by DMD.
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3.1 Reproductive behaviour after later clinical diagnosis of DMD
Six studies were identified that explored reproductive behaviour in families affected 
by DMD, after receiving a later clinical diagnosis: Hutton & Thompson (1976), 
Beeson and Golbus (1985), Cole et al. (1988), Parsons and Atkinson (1993), Eggers 
et al (1999) and Kay and Kingston (2002). The studies are addressed in 
chronological order, to explore the reproductive behaviour as different testing 
procedures became available.
Hutton & Thompson (1976) study was published after creatine kinase testing had 
been introduced to assess mothers’ carrier risks. Hutton and Thompson address 
families’ attitudes towards family planning after a later clinical diagnosis and assess 
whether “reproductive performance correlated inversely with their genetic risk” 
(Hutton & Thompson 1976:749). Questionnaires were sent to 336 female relatives 
of boys with DMD, one year after genetic counselling, to assess their future family 
planning.
All women invited to participate in the study were at reproductive age and had 
already had their carrier status assessed using creatine kinase and pedigree analysis. 
Women were divided into four categories of carrier risk: “high”, “doubtful”, 
“moderate” or “low”. Although 256/336 (76%) responded, only 105 (31%) were 
included. The rest were excluded due to being “single, separated, divorced, infertile, 
sterile or family complete”, or because they had failed to complete the whole 
questionnaire (Hutton & Thompson 1976:749).
A total of 24 women suggested that they would like one or more subsequent 
pregnancies; 58% (n=14) of whom had been informed that they were low risk. None 
of the 42 high risk carriers expressed a desire to have subsequent pregnancies. The 
findings showed that 81% (n=34) of high risk carriers indicated that they were 
deterred from having subsequent pregnancies as a result of their carrier risk. Of 
those who had been deterred, 55% (n=19) had sought sterilisation. In contrast, 
among the women who had been informed that they had a low risk of having an 
affected child, only one indicated that she was deterred from having subsequent 
pregnancies by her genetic risk.
62
Although the study reviewed future, and therefore potentially hypothetical 
decisions, the larger numbers of high risk carriers undergoing sterilisation suggests 
that families at this time were keen to avoid reproducing altogether. Families 
described their family planning in relation to their carrier risk. Hutton & Thompson 
conclude that “the decision by the majority of proven carriers to prevent the birth of 
further male offspring was reflected in the recent decline in the frequency of a 
known family history of DMD among newly ascertained cases”.
Beeson and Golbus (1985) reviewed reproductive behaviour in 26 families at-risk of 
X-linked conditions; 11 of whom were at-risk of DMD. Details were not provided 
on carrier testing techniques. However, it was noted that all families were “high- 
risk” (Beeson & Golbus 1985:108). Families were offered amniocentesis in 
subsequent pregnancies.
Beeson and Golbus (1985) proposed that people at risk of DMD often did not 
consider themselves to be engaged in decision-making as only one course of action 
appeared tenable. The authors found that only 3 of 11 couples, at risk of DMD, were 
willing to risk the birth of a child affected by DMD; all three of whom who had no 
exposure to the later stages of the condition. For those who had lived with muscular 
dystrophy, the experience of caring for an affected child appeared to increase 
motivation to use prenatal testing and termination.
The study by Cole et al (1988) reports on the outcome of 53 pregnancies after the 
use of DNA restriction length polymorphisms (RFLPs) was introduced into clinical 
practice. The 53 pregnancies occurred in 34 women at risk of DMD and 6 women at 
risk of Becker muscular dystrophy (BMD). No differentiation was made between 
reproductive decision-making in families affected by the two different conditions, 
perhaps suggesting that the severity of the condition was not deemed an important 
consideration. After carrier tests were carried out, families chose not to test 8 
pregnancies; one was terminated, 4 miscarried and 3 mothers “no longer wanted 
chorionic villus sampling following reduction in their carrier risk estimates” (Cole 
et al 1988:265).
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After carrier tests had been performed 45 (85%) chose to have chorionic villus 
sampling (CVS) and 25 male foetuses were identified. The study highlights the 
complexity of using restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs); DNA 
analysis had to be conducted on numerous family members in order to provide 
mothers with an estimated risk of carrying an affected child. Foetal risk estimates 
were calculated based on the sex of the foetus and the risk of a male foetus carrying 
either a high or low risk maternal chromosome. The authors defined a high risk 
foetus as 6-99%.
DNA analysis was not possible in two pregnancies; both of which were terminated. 
Fourteen male foetuses were identified as high risk; of which 11 were terminated. 
Three male foetuses identified in high risk women were carried to term and one was 
diagnosed with DMD. Nine male foetuses were identified in low risk mothers, eight 
of which were carried to term: the remaining pregnancy miscarried. The authors 
conclude that “DNA analysis of at-risk pregnancies seems to be an acceptable and 
effective form of diagnosis, providing a means of preventing the births of boys 
affected with this disease” (Cole et al. 1988:265). The study by Cole and colleagues 
highlights the complexity of using RFLPs for foetal diagnosis; it is highly likely that 
a number of the 13 terminated foetuses were not affected by either DMD or BMD.
Parsons and Atkinson (1993) report findings from in-depth interviews with 54 
women at-risk of DMD; 22 mothers, whose sons had received a later clinical 
diagnosis and 32 sisters of affected boys. A total of 113 pregnancies had occurred in 
the 54 women. The study focused on reproductive decision-making and outcomes of 
40 pregnancies, occurring in 22 risk-aware women. Details of specific tests used to 
assess genetic risk were not included. However, it is clear that the majority of 
women had been provided with estimates of their carrier risk and reproductive risk; 
at the time it was only possible to inform a few mothers that they were definitely 
carriers.
Parsons and Atkinson (1993) divide women into three categories: risk takers 
(women who consistently chose not to have PND), risk refusers (women who 
consistently, either tested and terminated male pregnancies or terminated 
pregnancies prior to PND) and risk modifiers (women whose reproductive decisions
64
were not consistent in all subsequent pregnancies). Nineteen (48%) pregnancies 
were untested, resulting in 2 affected males, 8 unaffected males and 9 females. 
Sixteen pregnancies were tested resulting in 5 terminations of males, one 
miscarriage and the births of 10 females. Five further pregnancies were terminated 
prior to PND.
The authors note that risk refusers generally had a higher carrier risk (mean risk of 
67%), compared to risk takers (mean risk of 23%), suggesting families behaviour 
reflected an important association between carrier risk and reproductive behaviour. 
However, it should be noted that not all risk refusers were high risk carriers and not 
all risk takers were low risk. Parsons and Atkinson (1993) highlight the complexity 
of factors influencing reproductive decision-making; namely the desire to have 
children regardless of the risks, experience of living with an affected boy, attitudes 
towards abortion and prior experience of late terminations.
Eggers et al (1999) review the impact of genetic counselling in 263 young women 
at-risk of DMD; 64% sisters and 36% cousins, aunts or nieces of affected males. 
Reproductive outcomes and plans, requests for DNA tests for carrier detection and 
prenatal diagnosis were analysed according to genetic risk, comprehension of 
genetic counselling issues, family and personal history, socio-educational level and 
opinion on abortion.
Genetic risk was estimated using pedigree analysis, creatine kinase levels and 
(undefined) DNA tests. Women’s risk was classified as very low (1-4%), low (5- 
9%), intermediate (10-24%) or high (>25%). However, the authors note that the 
allocated risk categories did “not reflect counselees’ opinion about the magnitude of 
the risk” (Eggers et al 1999:448). Genetic counselling included at least one session 
when the aetiology, prognosis and management of the condition and the counselees’ 
genetic risk, carrier detection and options for prenatal and preclinical diagnosis were 
discussed. Reproductive plans were simplistically classified as “wants children” or 
“doesn’t want children” depending on whether participants expressed a hypothetical 
wish for biological children. Requests for both carrier tests and prenatal diagnosis 
tests were analysed together, despite potentially significant differences in influence 
on reproductive decision-making.
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Findings showed that 65% of women had not had children at the time of the study.
The mean number of children in those who already had children was less than mean
observed in general population, with comparable age and socio-economic status.
However, it was not clear whether women in the study were refraining from having
more children or merely delaying reproduction. Genetic risk magnitude was not
found to have a significant influence on reproductive plans or outcome:
“Women with a greater reproductive risk >25% did not reproduce 
significantly less after genetic counselling, did not request DNA tests more 
frequently, and did not express fewer reproductive plans than those with 
genetic risks (=<24%), even considering only those who showed a good 
comprehension of information received during genetic counselling” (Eggers 
etal. 1999:448)
There was no difference between sisters, aunts, cousins and nieces despite 
significantly more sisters having intermediate to high risk (p<0.01).
The only factor found to be significantly associated with reduction in the number of 
subsequent pregnancies was good comprehension of genetic counselling issues, 
which was significantly correlated with socio-educational levels. DNA tests were 
more frequently requested by counselees from higher socio-economic backgrounds 
and with more than one DMD relative.
Kay and Kingston (2002) conducted in depth interviews with 14 known carriers of 
X-linked conditions; nine of whom were carriers of DMD. None of the 14 women 
had affected children of their own, but all had either an affected sibling or distant 
male relative. All but one of the women in the study intended to make, or had made 
decisions, to avoid having a child affected by the condition by opting for prenatal 
testing and termination if the foetus was found to be affected. The one woman, who 
would not consider termination of an affected pregnancy, had no personal 
experience of her relative with DMD.
The seven women who had grown up with brother(s) affected by DMD were certain 
that they could not knowingly allow a boy with DMD to be bom. In contrast, 
women with less direct, or no, personal experience of the affected relative appeared 
less sure about their intentions to avoid having an affected child. The authors 
conclude that “it seems that prospective decisions made to terminate an affected
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baby were easier in a sense for women ‘with personal experience’ since they saw no 
alternative.” (Kay & Kingston 2002:176). Kay and Kingston’s (2002) study 
reflected the findings of Beeson and Golbus (1985); individuals at-risk of DMD 
were more likely to test and terminate pregnancies if they had personal experience 
of the condition.
3.2 Reproductive behaviour after newborn screening diagnosis of DMD
There is a significant paucity of studies that address reproductive decision-making 
after newborn screening for DMD. Only two studies were identified: Hildes et al 
(1993) and Parsons et al (2002). The studies are addressed in chronological order.
Hildes et al (1993) report on reproductive decision-making in families after a 
family member had been diagnosed with DMD through newborn screening, in 
Manitoba, Canada. Separate questionnaires were sent to both parents of 8 boys, two 
high probability carriers aunts and one high probability carrier sister (n=17), three to 
six years after the diagnosis of the proband. Data were collected on demographics, 
knowledge of DMD, reproductive outcome and attitude to prenatal diagnosis and 
newborn screening for DMD. Responses from fathers were excluded due to a low 
response rate so results were analysed from questionnaires returned from 10 at-risk 
women and interview data from a mother who had not completed the questionnaire.
Results showed that 7 of the 8 families had no family history of DMD; in one 
family the maternal uncle of the proband had died from the condition. Carrier status 
was defined as high risk (>95%), low risk (<5%) or obligate. All respondents were 
aware that the condition was severe, fatal and inheritable. However, only 7 of thel 1 
had correct recall of their carrier status. Six of the 11 women or their partners had 
undergone elective sterilisation; in 4 of the 6 cases sterilisation had occurred prior to 
genetic counselling and “seemed largely based on previous perceptions of ideal 
family size and maternal age” (Hildes et al 1993:671). Seven pregnancies had 
occurred in 6 women after the diagnosis of the proband, of which 6 were in women 
who had been defined as high risk (>95%) carriers. Prenatal testing was utilised in 
only two pregnancies, both of which were found to be female. The remaining
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untested pregnancies resulted in the birth of two females, one unaffected male and 
two affected males.
Hildes et al. (1993) note that the previous reproductive history combined with older 
mean maternal age may have had an impact on the low uptake of prenatal testing. 
However, the authors also suggest that the lack of clinical symptoms in newborn 
boys may account for the low uptake; four requests for PND were made by families 
whose sons had been clinically diagnosed in the same period. Hildes et al. 
(1993:672) conclude that “identification of DMD males in population screening 
programmes may not be an effective way of decreasing the number of repeat cases 
of DMD within families or the overall population frequency of DMD”.
There are three key drawbacks to the study by Hildes et al. (1993). First, the study 
appeared to focus on whether newborn screening reduced the incidence of DMD, 
rather than how it influenced the reproductive behaviour of families affected by 
DMD. Second, the sample size was extremely small, and as the authors themselves 
note “the amount of social chaos in the lives of the four high risk women who did 
not request prenatal diagnosis seems disproportionately high for our small number 
of index cases”. [...] The socially disrupted lives of these four women appear to be 
one important factor in their reproductive decision-making.” Lastly, it is possible 
that more recent developments in carrier testing techniques may influence families’ 
response to newborn screening.
The study by Parsons et al. (2002) study reviewed reproductive behaviour in 20 
families who had received a diagnosis of DMD through the newborn screening 
programme in Wales, and 16 who had received a later clinical diagnosis. Greater 
sophistication of genetic testing techniques used at this time meant that the majority 
of mothers were informed whether or not they were carriers, rather than provided 
with complicated risk assessments.
The Institute of Medical Genetics was informed about 27 subsequent pregnancies in 
the 20 newborn screening families. Four pregnancies were terminated prior to 
testing; the relationship between the diagnosis and the decision to terminate was 
unknown. A total of 19 (83%) of pregnancies “were tested or identified as being at
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minimal risk” (i.e. 1 in 20 germline mosaicism risk). The outcome of the 
pregnancies was 7 unaffected boys, 7 girls, termination of 4 foetuses affected by 
DMD and a further termination of a foetus with a chromosomal abnormality. Of the 
16 families in the later clinically diagnosed cohort, 10 had subsequent pregnancies 
prior to the diagnosis of the first affected child. The outcome of the 10 pregnancies 
was 5 unaffected boys and 5 girls.
Parsons et al (2002) report that reproductive behaviour had changed in 80% (n=16) 
of families who had received newborn screening (n=16). Fifteen families stated that 
they had wanted more children but, after the diagnosis, 4 had decided against 
another pregnancy and 11 had delayed. The mean birth interval in the 20 families 
between the first and second child was 41 months, compared to 21 months in the 
general population.
The authors conclude that “most families modified their reproductive decisions and 
used prenatal testing”. In addition, the majority of those who received either a later 
clinical diagnosis or a diagnosis through newborn screening expressed a favourable 
attitude towards newborn screening “on the grounds of gaining time to prepare 
emotionally and practically”. Families who received a later clinical diagnosis 
“perceived the advantage of avoiding diagnostic delay and expressed regret about 
misunderstanding their sons’ early symptoms”.
3.3 Making sense of being ‘at-risk* of DMD
Two studies were identified that focused on the way women at-risk of DMD make 
sense of their risk: Parsons and Atkinson (1992), Parsons and Clarke (1993). 
Parsons and Atkinson (1992) report the findings of interviews conducted with 44 
women (22 mothers and 32 daughters) in families affected by DMD. The study 
focused on women’s constructions of genetic risk. The authors conclude that 
women at risk of DMD turned probabilistic assessments of risk into definitive, 
descriptive categories. Although the vocabulary of percentages or ratios was still 
employed, women tended to use a simplistic format, such as fifty-fifty, or ‘high 
risk’ or ‘low risk’; “the probabilistic was expressed as a matter of certainty” 
(Parsons & Atkinson 1992: 454). There was also evidence to suggest that for
69
women at risk of DMD, their genetic risks garnered differing degrees of relevance, 
depending “critical junctures in the life course” (Parsons & Atkinson 1992: 454).
Parsons and Clarke (1993) report a study of 48 women (16 mothers and 32 
daughters representing 28 families) in families affected by DMD. Women in the 
study had been provided with information regarding their carrier risk and their 
reproductive risk. Carrier risk was generally assessed using a Bayesian calculation 
of linkage and creatine kinase results; few families were provided with an exact 
assessment of their risk (i.e. that they were carriers and had a 1 in 4 risk in 
subsequent pregnancies or that they had a germline mosaicism risk of 1 in 20).
Parsons and Clarke’s (1993) study found that a number of women, when quoting 
their mathematical risk, confused reproductive risks with their carrier risks. In 
addition, there was “evidence that several of the women did not retain their risk in a 
mathematical form but had translated it into a descriptive category which resolved 
their risk into greater certainty” (Parsons and Clarke 1993: 562). The findings 
suggest that providing women with a less complex assessment of their risk may 
facilitate understanding of risk awareness.
3.4 Summary of literature on genetic risk and reproductive behaviour in families 
affected by DMD
The ten studies addressing the assessment of carrier risk information and/or 
reproductive behaviour provide a useful starting point for this study. Although the 
number of studies is relatively low, a number of salient points emerged. Firstly, 
increasingly sophisticated diagnostic and carrier testing techniques potentially 
reduced the number of foetuses terminated. Prior to genetic analysis, many families 
who were informed of being at high risk of having a child with DMD refrained from 
family building. After the introduction of genetic testing techniques, families often 
continued family building, using prenatal testing.
Cole et a l ’s (1988) study demonstrated that when the only genetic test available to 
families was RFLPs, the majority of families chose to terminate high risk foetuses; 
many of which may not have been affected. Although the study by Cole et al.
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(1988) included a similar number of families (n=53) as Parsons and Atkinson’s 
(1993) study (n=40), the uptake of prenatal testing was considerably lower in the 
latter study; 85% compared to 52%. In addition, the number of terminations was 
considerably lower in the latter study (13 compared to 5).
The studies did not report a uniform response to carrier risk. Hutton & Thompson 
(1976), Cole et al. (1988) and Parsons and Atkinson (1993) suggest women are 
either deterred from reproduction or choose to use prenatal testing in subsequent 
pregnancies. However, Eggers et al. (1999) and Hildes et al. (1993) report no 
association between carrier risk and reproductive behaviour. Beeson and Golbus 
(1985) and Kay and Kingston (2002) argue that experience of the condition has a 
notable impact on reproductive behaviour; mothers with experience of DMD were 
more likely to avoid the risk of having an affected boy.
Parsons and Atkinson (1993) and Parsons and Clarke (1993) highlight mothers’ 
difficulty of making sense of complex assessments of risk, particularly in defining 
the difference between carrier risk and reproductive risk. Risk was found to be 
relevant at different points in women’s lives. Probabilities were redefined as 
certainties; families often perceived risk to be either high or low. It is possible that 
subsequent developments in carrier testing techniques have reduced the degree of 
confusion resulting from complex assessments of carrier risk and reproductive risks.
Only two studies addressed reproductive behaviour after diagnosis of DMD through 
newborn screening. Hildes et al. (1993) and Parsons et al. (2002) reached 
considerably different conclusions. The study by Hildes et al. (1993) showed a 
limited uptake of prenatal testing in families identified through newborn screening, 
compared to families who had received a later clinical diagnosis. However, the 
study size was small. Parsons et al. (2002) concluded that newborn screening had a 
significant influence on reproductive behaviour, with the majority of families 
choosing to either cease family building, delay subsequent pregnancies and/or test 
subsequent pregnancies.
The studies explored in this chapter provide a useful background to address how 
families, at risk of DMD, have previously made sense of their carrier and
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reproductive risks to inform reproductive behaviour. However, increasingly 
sophisticated technologies have had considerable impact on the capacity to provide 
families with a more accurate assessment of their carrier risk; few of the studies 
reviewed were conducted after these technologies became available. In addition, 
only two studies have been published on reproductive behaviour following a 
newborn screening diagnosis and they present conflicting findings. The rapid 
acceleration of technological capacity calls for a contemporary assessment of the 
implications of carrier testing techniques, diagnostic pathway and reproductive 
options for reproductive behaviour in families affected by DMD.
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Chapter Four 
Methodology
Introduction
This chapter provides the rationale for using both quantitative and qualitative 
methods to answer the following research question:
What are the implications of newborn screening for Duchenne Muscular 
Dystrophy for reproductive decision making?
The chapter is divided into five sections. First, the background and context of the 
study, the research sites and the sample population are addressed. Second, the 
rationale for using mixed methods is provided. Third, the practicalities of collecting 
and analysing quantitative data are addressed. Fourth, the practicalities of the 
collecting and analysing qualitative data are addressed. Lastly, the theoretical 
approach to data analysis is explored. Disparities between the positivist 
(quantitative) and interpretivist (qualitative) paradigms are addressed, followed by 
an exploration of the practical and conceptual difficulties and advantages of 
combining methods.
1. Background and context of the study
The purpose of exploring the implications of newborn screening for Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy (DMD) for reproductive decision-making was addressed in 
Chapters One, Two and Three. In summary, newborn screening policies were 
initially limited to testing for treatable conditions. However, increasingly 
sophisticated technologies enabled the detection of increasing numbers of 
unbeatable genetic conditions. Newborn screening programmes have rapidly 
expanded and there is now little consensus on the number and type of conditions 
that programmes should include. The primary justifications for screening for 
unbeatable conditions are to avoid the diagnostic delay (Kemper & Wake 2007); 
provide access to supportive, educational and therapeutic services (Bailey et al.
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2005); and to provide information on genetic risk to inform reproductive decision­
making (Bailey et al. 2005, Pollitt 2006, Kemper & Wake 2007).
However, there is a paucity of research addressing any of the proposed benefits of 
newborn screening; data on implications for reproductive decision making are 
limited and conflicting. Thus, a comparative mixed methods design was utilised. 
The first part of the study involved a review of medical files for the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data on reproductive behaviour. The second part of the 
study involved in-depth qualitative interviews with a subset of families, from the 
sample used for quantitative section. The aim of collecting qualitative data was to 
explore families’ experience of reproductive decision-making. Details of the 
research sites, the mixed method design and the quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of the study are provided in subsequent sections.
1.1 The research sites: Wales and the west of Scotland
In most of the United Kingdom, DMD is diagnosed clinically when the child is on 
average 4.5 years old (range: 3 months to 8.5 years) (Appleton & Nicolaides 1995, 
Bushby et al 1999). However, a newborn screening programme for the unbeatable 
condition DMD was implemented in Wales in 1990. The programme has been 
continuously monitored and reviewed, providing a unique opportunity to utilise a 
significant body of data, to assess the implications of newborn screening (NBS) for 
reproductive decision-making.
Funding was limited and therefore only one region in the UK could be selected to 
provide comparative analysis of families who had received a later clinical diagnosis 
(LCD). The west of Scotland was an obvious candidate. The west of Scotland 
Regional Genetics Centre in Glasgow provides services for Duchenne families 
living in Argyll and Clyde, Ayrshire and Arran, Forth Valley, Greater Glasgow, 
Highland and Lanarkshire. The Institute of Medical Genetics in Cardiff provides 
services for Duchenne families throughout Wales. The population size between the 
areas is very similar; 2,703,876 in the west of Scotland (General Register Office for 
Scotland 2005) and 2,958,600 in Wales (Office for National Statistics 2005). Both
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areas have a similar urban/rural divide with a concentration of people living in the 
major cities of Glasgow and Cardiff.
1.2 Sample population
One of the main justifications for implementing the newborn screening programme 
in Wales was to ensure that families received information on their reproductive risk, 
prior to having subsequent pregnancies. Obviously the provision of reproductive 
risk information is aimed at families who are not already aware of their risk. Some 
families have an affected relative and are therefore already aware of their risk, prior 
to having an affected child of their own. However, there is a high rate of new 
mutations in the dystrophin gene, which is thought to be related to the particularly 
large size of the gene. Approximately one third of cases are a result of a new 
mutation and therefore families are unaware of their risk of the condition until their 
child is diagnosed. In addition, occasionally mothers are unaware of having a family 
history of DMD; affected relatives may not have been alive in the mothers’ lifetime, 
or family communication with a distant relative may have been minimal.
In order to address the proposed benefit of providing families with an earlier 
awareness of their risk through newborn screening, it was essential to ensure that 
families included in the study were not already aware of a family history of the 
condition. Families were therefore divided into two categories: those with a known 
family history of the condition and those for whom the diagnosis was a new and 
unexpected event. Any family who was aware of the condition in family was aware, 
to some degree, of their risk in subsequent pregnancies prior to the diagnosis and 
were therefore excluded from analysis.
The newborn screening programme for DMD began in Wales in 1990 and data 
collection took place between 2006 and 2007. The study population for the 
quantitative section of the study was therefore families:
• With a child affected by Duchenne muscular dystrophy
• Who had no known family history of the condition
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• Who had received a diagnosis between 1990 and 2006, either through 
newborn screening in Wales or a later clinical diagnoses in the west of 
Scotland
The sample for the qualitative aspect of the study was drawn from the study 
population used for the quantitative aspect of the study.
Thirty-four families in Wales, who had no known family history of DMD, had their 
sons diagnosed through newborn screening between 1990 and 2006. Forty-three 
families in west Scotland with no known family history of DMD were identified as 
having had their sons diagnosed clinically with DMD between 1990 and 2006. The 
average 4.5 year delay in making a clinical diagnosis means it is quite possible that 
some cases bom since 2000 have not yet been diagnosed in the west of Scotland. It 
is also possible that some cases may not have been diagnosed in Wales, due to 
parents opting out of newborn screening, or receiving a false-negative diagnosis.
2. Using mixed methods to address the research question
The aim of this section is to describe the rationale for using a mixed methods 
approach, as well as a description of the typology of mixed method used for this 
study.
2.1 Rationale for using mixed methods to address the research question
The selection of a particular research method (or methods) depends on finding the 
most appropriate method for answering the research question. This study required 
assessment of two factors; reproductive outcomes and reproductive decision­
making. In simplistic terms: what is happening and why is it happening? Therefore 
mixed methods were chosen as an appropriate approach for this study.
The term “mixed methods” has been used to describe many different types of 
methodologies, from using two or more quantitative methods, two or more 
qualitative methods, or the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. Around 
40 mixed method designs have been reported in the literature (Teddlie &
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Tashakkori 2003), with four major purposes or rationales: “enhanced validity and 
credibility”; “greater comprehensiveness of findings”; “more insightful 
understandings”; and “increased value consciousness and diversity” (Greene et al 
2001:30).
This study used both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative methods 
were used to address and outline the overall reproductive ‘picture’: the number of 
children in each family/cohort, whether the affected boy had been diagnosed prior to 
subsequent pregnancies, the provision and uptake of prenatal testing and the 
outcome of each pregnancy. Qualitative methods were used to explore the decision­
making behind the outcomes through an exploration of the factors families felt had 
influenced their reproductive decision-making. Factors were explored that could not 
be addressed through quantitative data, such as contextual factors (e.g. change of 
partner, infertility issues etc), and psycho-social responses to the diagnosis (e.g. 
perception of risk, view of disability etc). The rationale for using mixed methods in 
this study was therefore to provide more insightful understanding.
2.1.1 E xplorin g th e ep a tie n t vo ice’ through qu a lita tive m eth ods
An additional advantage of using qualitative methods is that it offers the potential to 
explore the patient voice. There is growing recognition of the importance of 
exploring patients’ experiences of health services. ‘Health’ is increasingly 
recognised as not just the absence of disease. A person with cancer, for example, is 
also a person with other priorities and a particular approach to life; each of us may 
respond quite differently to the diagnosis. In addition, technological capacity is 
leading to the implementation of healthcare programmes that may not provide 
families with medical benefit. To ensure that proposed “lifestyle” benefits of 
providing information, choice and support are reflected in practice, it is imperative 
to explore families’ experiences of such health services.
In recent decades there has been a growing call for greater public participation in 
health policy, in line with democratic ideals (Rowe & Frewer 2000). Increasingly 
complex decision-making processes require a more informed policy process, to 
assess how individuals define, interpret and experience health services. In academic
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fields, the drive for research to inform policy has led to an increasing emphasis on 
employing an appropriate mix of methods, to address the complex mix of social- 
economic, environmental, and political factors that affect health (Baum 1995, 
Brannen 2005).
Quantitative methods provide a way of addressing what people ‘do’ in response to 
health services. Qualitative methods provide a way of exploring the explanations 
people provide for what they ‘do’. The patient voice is an essential resource to 
counteract the ‘technological imperative’. This study explores families’ experiences 
of two very different health policies. In addition to providing health policy decision­
makers with evidence of the implications of their policies, this study provided a 
platform from which families could communicate their experiences of the 
diagnostic procedure and subsequent reproductive decision-making.
2.2 Mixed method design
There are a number of mixed method typologies that define whether priority is 
given to quantitative or qualitative methods; whether data is collected 
simultaneously or sequentially; and whether the methods are integrated during data 
collection, analysis or interpretation (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003). These issues are 
explored in the following paragraphs. Detailed description of the quantitative and 
qualitative procedures used is provided in subsequent sections.
Often mixed methods grant priority to either the quantitative or qualitative approach 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003). In this study, the quantitative data collection aimed to 
provide an outline of reproductive outcomes, which would inform the qualitative 
data collection process. Before data collection and analysis commenced, it was 
thought that the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the study would be given 
equal priority.
Initially, it was assumed that the overall size of the cohort (n=72) would be large 
enough to conduct effective statistical analysis. However, during the process of 
analysing the quantitative data it became apparent that there were a number of 
potential factors that may influence reproductive decision-making (e.g. carrier
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status, number of pregnancies occurring prior to the birth of the index). The sample 
size proved to be too small to conduct multivariate analysis of all the disparate 
factors. It was therefore decided that the quantitative data was more likely to 
provide descriptive statistics, rather than statistically significant results. Priority was 
therefore given to the qualitative aspect of the study.
There are also a number of different mixed methods typologies that refer to the 
order in which data is collected. Morse (1991) developed a notational system to 
describe the sequence of data collection and the priority given to either the 
quantitative or qualitative approach. For example QUAN + qual indicates that 
quantitative and qualitative data was collected simultaneously with priority given to 
quantitative data, while quan QUAL indicates data collected sequentially, with 
priority given to qualitative data. In this study, quantitative data collection occurred 
first, followed by qualitative data collection. The quan -> QUAL design, which was 
used in this study, has been described as the “sequential explanatory design” 
(Cresswell 2003, Ivankova et al 2006). Figure 1 provides an outline of the 
sequential explanatory design used in this study.
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3. Quantitative data collection and analysis
This section describes the quantitative aspect of the study. The aims and objectives 
are described, followed by a description of the data collection methods, the 
subsequent sample and methods used for analysis.
3.1 Aims and objectives
The aim of the collecting quantitative data was to identify reproductive outcomes. 
In order to achieve the aim it was necessary to execute the following objectives:
1. To determine the number of children bom before and after diagnosis of first 
affected male in the family (index)
2. To ascertain the number of pregnancies occurring between the birth and 
diagnosis of the index
3. To determine the number of families who accepted the offer of prenatal 
testing (chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis)
4. To examine the pregnancy outcome:
a. Number of males/females bom
b. Number of affected/unaffected males bom
c. Number of pregnancies terminated as result of DMD diagnosis 
through prenatal testing (TOPs)
d. Other (e.g. stillbirth, miscarriage, social terminations11)
3.2 Data collection and sample included for analysis
Although the final sample for the quantitative aspect of this study included 72 
families (LCD=38, NBS=34), data was initially collected from 77 families 
(LCD=38, NBS=34), as well as their relatives. This section provides details of the 
data collection methods and justification for the subsequent decision to exclude 
relatives and five families from the LCD cohort.
11 Defined as terminations of pregnancies occurring for reasons other than a positive diagnosis of 
DMD
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Families’ medical files were held at the West of Scotland Regional Genetics Centre 
in Glasgow, or the Institute of Medical Genetics in Cardiff. Files of families who 
had no known family history of the condition, and who had an affected boy 
diagnosed between 1990 and 2006, were reviewed (west of Scotland = 43, Wales 
=34). To achieve the objectives of the research, data was collected on the following 
fields:
- Affected male (index)
o Date of birth of affected male 
o Age of affected male at diagnosis
o Index diagnostic tests and results (creatine kinase, muscle biopsy,
linkage, polymerase chain reaction multiplex, point analysis techniques, 
multiplex litigation-dependent probe amplification) 
o Affected exons
- Mother of affected male
o Date of birth of mother
o Carrier testing for mother and subsequent risk given to her after each 
test/assessment (family history, creatine kinase, linkage, polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) multiplex, PCR dosage, point analysis techniques, 
multiplex litigation-dependent probe amplification, sequencing)
- Reproductive behaviour
o Previous pregnancies (date of birth, sex and DMD status) 
o Subsequent pregnancies (tested or not, terminations, date of birth, sex 
and DMD status)
- Key points from genetic counselling sessions/letters to families/doctors
o Details of risk information provided to parents 
o Miscellaneous information (e.g. mother pregnant when receiving 
diagnosis/mother sterilised etc)
Data was also collected on reproductive behaviour of all female relatives of the 
index to assess the implications of the diagnosis on the wider family. However, 
since the data appeared to be incomplete it was decided to exclude data from 
relatives. In some files, the pedigree chart showed the existence of at-risk female 
relatives, but not further information was available. Although the data on relatives
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provided anecdotal evidence of the wider implications12 of a later clinical diagnosis, 
it was not possible to collect data on all female relatives. In addition, the carrier 
tests had often been conducted at laboratories in other regions and it was therefore 
not possible to check the file information with laboratory data. Rather than include 
incomplete and potentially incorrect data on female relatives, they were excluded 
from analysis.
Often there was data missing from medical files on the affected male and their 
immediate family (e.g. no test results). Collecting data from files held at the west of 
Scotland Regional Genetics Centre in Glasgow proved to be particularly 
problematic. A flood in the department in 2002 had destroyed many of the files and 
although the department had created new files, often letters and test results had not 
been replaced. It was therefore necessary to search for original copies of test results, 
kept in the laboratory.
Thorough searches were also conducted of laboratory records stored on 
computerised databases, paper files and patient cards. Reviewing data from a 
number of different sources enabled triangulation and increased the breadth and 
validity of data. The same process of triangulation was used in both Wales and the 
west of Scotland. Each file was subsequently discussed in depth with an Associate 
Specialist in Medical Genetics in Cardiff and with an Honorary Consultant in 
Medical Genetics in Glasgow, both of whom were closely involved with families 
affected by DMD in their area throughout the 1990-2006 period of the study. Any 
anomalies found between the medical files and laboratory data were addressed. The 
medical geneticists were usually able to provide either copies of missing letters, 
genetic counselling notes, or verbal confirmation of the risk information provided to 
families. Data were not included for analysis unless it had been double checked and 
confirmed.
Files were excluded if they did not include a sufficient amount of data to warrant 
analysis after the checks. Files which still had some fields missing were retained but
12 A number of pregnancies occurred in at-risk female relatives prior to the diagnosis (all of which 
were unaffected). In addition, a number of female relatives chose to test pregnancies after becoming 
aware of the diagnosis.
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excluded from analysis of particular aspects (i.e. if the age of mother was missing 
the file would not be included in overall analysis of ages of mothers). A total of five 
files were excluded from analysis from the later clinically diagnosed cohort. No 
files were excluded from the newborn screening cohort. Final analysis was 
conducted on 38 families who had received a later clinical diagnosis and 34 families 
who had received a newborn screening diagnosis.
Ensuring the medical files included up to date reproductive data required further 
measures. It was possible that families had chosen not to inform medical genetics of 
subsequent pregnancies and if no cytogenetic tests had been conducted there would 
obviously be no laboratory records. Letters were therefore sent out from medical 
genetics to all families, who had not had contact with the department for some 
years, to offer them a clinic appointment. As a result, many families either 
telephoned the geneticist or were seen in clinic, enabling collection of up to date 
reproductive information. It should be noted, however, that it was not possible to 
contact all families and therefore it is possible that a minimal number of subsequent 
pregnancies may have been missed. Due to use of the same thorough data collection 
methods and a similar response rate from families in both Scotland and Wales it is 
fair to assume that any pregnancy data missing from the files would be roughly 
equal in both cohorts.
3.3 Quantitative data analysis
The primary aim of collecting quantitative data from medical files was to analyse 
any differences in reproductive behaviour resulting from the diagnostic procedure. 
However, as already noted, during the process of data collection and analysis a 
broad and varied range of confounding factors13 were identified and therefore any 
assessment of any potential association between diagnostic procedure and 
reproductive behaviour proved to be complex.
To avoid either falsely demonstrating an apparent association between the 
diagnostic procedure and reproductive behaviour (type I error), or masking an actual
13 Variables which may also be related to the outcome measures; reproductive behaviour
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association (type II error), it was essential to control for confounding factors. 
However, the sample size proved to be too small to conduct multivariate analysis. In 
addition, some of the confounding factors that may have affected reproductive 
behaviour could not be measured quantitatively (see Table 4.1). The small sample 
size and the existence of residual confounding meant that only a few statistical tests 
could be conducted to provide evidence of the influence of diagnostic procedure on 
reproductive behaviour. Data was analysed using SPSS version 12, to assess 
frequencies, and to conduct analysis of variance.
Table 4.1 Confounding variables
Measured quantitatively Explored qualitatively
• Age of m other
• Number of previous 
children/index position
• Carrier s ta tu s
• Desire for children/ideal family 
size
• Experience of condition
• Knowledge of condition
• Perceived risk
• View on pregnancy term ination
• Life situation (work 
com m itm ents, financial 
constrain ts etc)
• Parental relationship (together/ 
sep a ra ted / divorced)
In addition to the difficulties arising from potential confounding factors, grouping 
people into neat categories (e.g. risk aware families) proved to be inherently 
complex. For example, how do you decide from numerical data what equates to 
being “risk aware”? Were families aware of their risk as soon as they received the 
diagnosis, when the first carrier test was conducted (e.g. creatine kinase test), or 
after mothers received (genetic) confirmation of their carrier status?
Further problems ensued when addressing families’ reproductive decision-making. 
For example, one family received a later clinical diagnosis while pregnant with 
another child. Should they be defined as risk aware or should risk-awareness only 
refer to families who received the diagnosis prior to conceiving? The pregnant 
mother received the diagnosis in the second trimester of her pregnancy and chose to 
have an ultrasound to find out the sex of the foetus; the foetus was female, so the
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family chose not to have an amniocentesis. Would they have chosen to have 
amniocentesis if the foetus was male? Does ultrasound equate to testing the foetus? 
If so, should it be included with the data on families who had chorionic villus 
sampling or amniocentesis?
Quantitative data can be manipulated by defining and redefining categories, to 
‘prove’ what the researcher is aiming to demonstrate. For example, including the 
use of ultrasound in the category of a “tested pregnancy” would have increased the 
statistical significance of the difference in the uptake of prenatal testing between the 
two cohorts. However, the aim of this study was not to ‘prove’ that newborn 
screening had either a positive or negative effect on reproductive behaviour. The 
aim was to address the implications of the diagnostic procedure. Therefore, every 
attempt was made to ensure families were categorised with the utmost attention to 
detail. Table 4.2 shows how each factor was defined.
Table 4.2 Definition of categories used in quantitative analysis
Factor Definition
Risk aw areness All three possible points of risk aw areness were 
assessed  to address which one had the  m ost impact on 
reproductive behaviour: 
diagnosis 
- first carrier te s t
confirmation of carrier s ta tu s
Carrier s ta tu s Tests conducted and evidence in file th a t m other is 
informed of the results.
Pregnancies All pregnancies (ra ther than  life-births). Details 
provided on miscarriages, stillbirths and term inations.
Prenatal testing Amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling (not 
ultrasound)
4. Qualitative data collection and analysis
This section describes the qualitative aspect of the study. Firstly, the aim of the 
qualitative section and the rationale for using in-depth qualitative interviews is 
described. Secondly, the sample population and experience of collecting qualitative 
data is explored. In the final section, the practical issues of analysing the qualitative
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data are described. However, the theoretical underpinnings of the analysis are 
explored in the second part of this chapter.
4.1 Aim and rationale for using in-depth qualitative interviews
The aim of collecting qualitative data was to explore family accounts of the lived 
experience of reproductive decision making and the benefits and burdens of 
reproductive choice. The qualitative data method used was in-depth qualitative 
interviews.
In-depth semi-structured interviews were deemed the most appropriate method for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, observation of families would be inappropriate as there 
were a set of specific questions that needed to be asked about past and present 
reproductive behaviour and future reproductive plans. Secondly, it was necessary to 
ask a number of potentially sensitive questions, such as views and experiences of 
testing and terminating pregnancies. Sensitive issues are best addressed in more 
intimate, one-to-one settings, rather than through focus group discussions. Lastly, 
semi-structured in-depth interviews were chosen over structured or narrative 
interviews because it was necessary to provide families with the opportunity to 
expand on questions, to talk about the issues that were important to them, whilst still 
obtaining specific information about their reproductive decision-making process.
4.2 Sample population
The aim was to invite each of the 72 families (NBS=34, LCD=38) to participate in 
the qualitative aspect of the study, to obtain a purposive sample (i.e. maximum 
variation). However, to ensure that the letter would not arrive at an inappropriate 
time for the family (e.g. a death in the family or a recent termination), health 
professionals, who were closely involved with the families, were asked to provide 
their view on whether the families may be upset by receiving a letter about the 
study. It was felt that this method of contact provided additional safeguards for the 
families. No issues were identified and therefore letters inviting all 72 families to 
participate in the study were sent out by the All Wales Medical Genetics Service 
and the West of Scotland Regional Genetics Centre. Families were asked to
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complete and return an "expression of interest" form if they were willing to be 
contacted by myself to discuss the research further.
An initial round of letters resulted in expression of interest forms being returned by 
eight families in Wales and three in the west of Scotland; the majority of whom had 
chosen not to have subsequent pregnancies. A second round of letters was therefore 
sent out to specifically to families who had pregnancies after the birth of the index. 
A further three families in Wales and four in the west of Scotland returned forms.
I was approached by another family who were keen to be involved in the study, 
during a family meeting in Glasgow. Although their son had been diagnosed shortly 
after the cut off date, it was felt that their experience of the diagnosis and 
subsequent reproductive decision-making added relevant and valuable insights. A 
total of eight families, from the later clinically diagnosed cohort, were therefore 
interviewed, one of whom was not in the original cohort. A total of 11 families, 
from the newborn screening cohort, were interviewed, all of whom were from the 
original cohort.
4.3 Qualitative data collection
After expression of interest forms had been returned, families were contacted to 
discuss any questions they had regarding the study. All families, who returned the 
form, were keen to be involved and arrangements were made for a suitable time to 
conduct the interview, either at the medical genetics centre or in their homes. All 
participants chose to be interviewed in their homes. The majority of interviews were 
conducted with mothers. However on three occasions, the husbands were present 
for part or all of the interview process. All participants were provided with a 
consent form, which they signed to indicate whether they were willing to allow me 
to review their medical genetics files and record the interview. All families 
consented.
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The topics addressed during interview were as follows:
• The impact of the diagnostic process on the participant, their partner, their 
immediate family and their wider family -  especially in relation to their 
perceptions of having more children
• The effect of living with the disease, DMD, on “family life” in a broad sense 
and also in relation to their perceptions of having more children
• Reproductive plans before the diagnosis
• The experience of making decisions regarding the following both before and 
after diagnosis:
- family planning methods
- prenatal testing
• Whether the outcome of reproductive plans matched their intention (i.e. had 
they had more children even though they had planned not to, or vice versa)
I conducted all 19 interviews. Each interview started with the same question “Can 
you tell me a bit about how [name of son] was diagnosed?” From that point 
onwards the order in which questions were addressed differed in each interview.
I wrote field notes immediately after each interview. Usually the field notes 
recorded aspects of the environment, my feelings about how well I had managed to 
‘connect’ with the participant, and an outline of their main points. However, on one 
occasion the tape recorder failed to record and on another occasion there was so 
much background noise that I was concerned the mothers’ voice would be 
indecipherable on the recording. On both of these occasions I left their homes, 
drove a short distance away and then immediately recorded everything I could 
remember about the conversations.
I attended a number of qualitative interview courses prior to starting interviewing 
and I practiced my newfound skills by conducting a small pilot study. However, 
courses and practice do not necessarily prepare you for the real thing. As a novice 
interviewer I found the process of keeping field notes an extremely useful learning 
tool. I recorded what had worked and what had not and changed my approach to 
interviewing accordingly. For example, during my first real interview I asked the 
participant whether she had found health professionals interfering. She replied that 
she had found them very interfering and used the word ‘interfering’ in much of her
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subsequent descriptions. In subsequent interviews, I asked “how did you find your 
involvement with health workers?” and avoided the use of any other leading 
questions.
I also realised the potential impact of subtle changes in interaction between myself
and interviewee. The following extract is taken from my field notes after the first
few interviews had been conducted and demonstrates my changing approach to the
interview process.
I didn’t think that I would need to learn much to conduct qualitative 
interviews: if  s just chatting to a stranger about something personal 
and I’d had plenty of conversations like that over the years. How 
wrong I was! There are a few fundamental issues that make an 
interview entirely different from a random conversation, namely:
1. You are collecting data
2. You don’t need to talk to make people feel comfortable
3. You have to learn when it is time to speak, when it is time for 
silence and how best to make a conversation flow around the topics 
you want addressed.
By getting better at doing interviews I’ve overcome the issue I had 
with data. I saw the families as data and then felt guilty about 
manipulating it out of them and worried about judging them and being 
judged. Now I see it as having the skills to enable a flowing 
conversation, in which you give nothing away, make no judgements, 
listen and direct.
I have also learnt that you can make people feel comfortable without 
saying very much. To me a conversation is about reciprocity, but in an 
interview situation, it is neither necessary, nor wise to share your 
views. I learnt to use non-verbal signs of encouragement, empathy and 
understanding (e.g. nodding, smiling etc). After reading the transcripts 
from the first few interviews I realised that I occasionally interrupted 
people with a new question. It is frustrating to think that I may not 
have allowed enough time for people to say everything they wanted, 
so I have learnt to take things slower, to try to assess from their 
demeanour, whether they have finished or still have more to say (Field 
notes from 9th September 2007).
Focusing on the participants became considerably easier as I became more familiar
with the interview questions. I always avoided sitting down with a list of questions
in front of me, because I was concerned that it would make the situation seem
clinical. I wanted the participants to feel that we were having a cup of tea and a
chat, rather than me firing endless questions at them from a clipboard. I also learnt
to say as little as possible, to listen as hard as I could and to respond in ways which
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encouraged participants to elaborate -  even on issues where it was easy to assume a 
shared interpretation.
4.4 Qualitative data analysis -  practicalities
I transcribed the first four interviews; the remaining 15 were transcribed by a 
professional company. After I received each transcript I checked them for accuracy 
by listening to the recordings again. This was particularly useful for the interviews 
with participants with strong Scottish accents. I had become accustomed to the 
deciphering the Scottish accent and, having participated in the interview, I was more 
aware of the topics addressed.
I took an iterative approach to data analysis; alternating between analyses of 
transcripts and conducting interviews. This process enabled me to reflect on ‘what 
was going on’ and then use that information to guide my thoughts during the next 
interview. After I had carried out preliminary analysis of the first three transcripts, 
three of my fellow students also read and coded the transcripts. The aim of the 
exercise was to ascertain whether my interpretation of the data would be replicated 
by others. We discussed emergent themes, which highlighted a considerable degree 
of overlap, but also helped to highlight some aspects I had not considered. I used 
my colleagues’ thoughts to inform further analysis. I also combined transcripts with 
my field notes and with information from the families’ medical file, to provide a 
more complete picture of each family’s situation.
When all of the interviews had been completed, I conducted detailed coding of each 
transcript. To inform the coding process, I drew upon a simplified version of Strauss 
and Corbin’s (1990,1998) process of coding. However, for two key reasons, I do 
not claim that this study was conducted with a grounded theory approach. Firstly, 
grounded theory, as outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) has been criticised for its 
failure to acknowledge the influence of implicit theories which guide research at the 
early stage (Bryman 1988, Silverman 2000). Conducting a mixed methods study, 
with a sequential explanatory design, further undermines the possibility of being 
devoid of implicit theories. Secondly, I used the process of open coding, axial 
coding and selective coding, as outlined by grounded theory, as a way of guiding
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the analysis process. Rather than adhering to the strict tenets of grounded theory, I 
use the process to develop categories of information, to interconnect the categories 
and to build a story that connected the categories.
During the open coding stage, I created a list of ten headings and cut and pasted the 
data from each interview under each heading (see Box 4.1). This process was 
extremely simplistic. My aim was to organise the data into headings in order to 
become familiar with the data and to get an overall picture of the variety of views 
held.
I then went through all the data under each heading and organised them under 
subheadings (see Box 4.2). For example, to explore whether and why people chose 
to have or not have subsequent children, I cut and pasted all extracts using 
hyperlinks (so that clicking on the extract would take me back to the exact position 
within the original transcript). Again, this was a simplistic approach aimed at 
becoming familiar with the data. It also served as a useful organisational tool; 
before I became familiar with exactly who had said a particular thing, I could refer 
to the main document and simply click on the relevant extract to find the original 
transcript.
Box 4.1 Example of open coding
1 . Positive experience of NBS (Negative LCD)
2. Negative experience of NBS (Positive LCD)
3. Experience of LCD
4. General experience of living with boys with
DMD
5. General understanding of genetics and risk
6. Feelings associated with being a carrier
7. To have or not to have children
8. General view of PND/TOP/PGD
9. General experience of disability
10. Effect on relationship
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Box 4.2 Example of coding of one category
To have or not to  have children
1. Diagnosis com plicates decision-making
2. Diagnosis changes num ber of children and /o r birth spacing
2.1 Replacem ent child
2.2 Good for affected sibling
2.3 Hard for unaffected sibling
2.4 Unaffected sibling provides 'welcom e ta s te  of 
normality'
2.5 Need to devote time to affected boy
3. Diagnosis does not change num ber of children and /or birth 
spacing
After completing the process of open coding, it was possible to address how the 
some of the categories were interconnected through axial coding. Strauss and 
Corbin (1990,1998) suggest that the researcher identifies a single category from the 
open coding list, which is extensively discussed by participants. I chose the category 
of ‘to have or not have children’ as the core category and began the process of 
examining the connections between the different sub-headings. It quickly became 
clear that families often provided the same reason for different decisions. For 
example, some families described their decision to have more children in relation to 
how another child would provide resources for their affected boy (e.g. 
companionship and care). In contrast, other families described their decision not to 
have more children, in relation to how another child would take away resources 
otherwise focused on the affected boy (e.g. parental time and financial resources). 
Through cross-category analysis, it became clear that the justification provided for 
having or not having more children required more in-depth analysis.
Examining similar justifications for the disparate decisions formed the third stage of 
coding, ‘selective coding’. I developed propositions that connected the different 
decisions by addressing the way families described their decisions. Rather than 
focusing on ‘factors’ (e.g. resources), I reanalysed the data in relation to the way 
each factor was described (e.g. prioritising responsibility towards existing child, 
rather than future, unborn child). I reanalysed the extracts in the coding system, with
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a deeper level of analytical and interpretative thought. A number of cross-cutting 
themes emerged, such as responsibility, perception of disability and desire for 
children. For the final analysis I therefore once again reviewed each transcript in its 
entirety, and assessed the range of contextual factors individually for each family.
5. Theoretical considerations
Historically, quantitative and qualitative methods have been understood to reflect 
two disparate and opposing paradigms: positivism and interpretivism. Simplistically 
speaking, the two paradigms represent dualistic notions: objectivity versus 
subjectivity, deduction versus induction, generality versus context, realism versus 
relativism. Due to the dichotomous divide between the two paradigms, there has 
been considerable debate about the feasibility of combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The aims of this theoretical section of the chapter are to 
explore the proposed differences between the two paradigms, describe my own 
experience of the practical and conceptual difficulties of combining methods, and 
lastly, to explore my theoretical approach to the methodology.
5.1 Ontological, epistemological and methodological disparities between the 
positivist and interpretivist paradigms
This section will present the disparities between the positivist and interpretivist 
paradigms. To address the extremes of each paradigm, I draw upon the arguments 
commonly presented in text books on methodology. Although this is an 
unconventional approach for a PhD thesis, it serves two main purposes. Firstly, it 
enables me to present the key disparities between the two paradigms in their 
simplest form. Secondly, (and perhaps in paradoxical contrast to the first point) it 
highlights the oversimplification of the dichotomies between the two paradigms, 
which are used to educate emerging academics and further solidify a disputable 
notion of the incompatibility of quantitative and qualitative methods.
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5.1.1. Disparities between the positivist and interpretivist paradigms
The positivist and interpretivist (often combined with constructivist) paradigms 
encompass disparities at three levels of the research process: ontological, 
epistemological and methodological. Simplistically speaking, at the ontological 
level, positivists argue for the existence of an objective, aprehendible reality, whilst 
interpretivists argue that there are multiple, subjective realities (Guba & Lincoln
2005). At the epistemological level, positivists take an objectivist stance, believing 
that phenomena can be reduced to their constituent parts, and inductively tested and 
measured using scientific methods (Baum 1995). In contrast, interpretivists argue 
that phenomena cannot be irreducible. Interpretivists argue that all knowledge is 
subjective; a matter of context-specific interpretation, and therefore research 
findings are created (Baum 1995, Guba & Lincoln 2005, Morgan 2007).
At the methodological level, quantitative research uses deductive experimental 
methods adopted from the natural sciences, which are used to test the relationship 
between variables from predetermined hypotheses, to explain and predict an ordered 
universe (Baum 1995, Guba and Lincoln 2005). In contrast, qualitative methods are 
designed to help researchers deductively understand the human dimension; to 
explore meanings and perspectives, through observation, interviews and documents 
(Silverman 2006). Qualitative methods are deemed to produce micro, context- 
specific findings, whereas quantitative methods seek objective, macro, context-free 
generalisations (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004). Table 4.3 summarises the 
disparities between the two paradigms.
Table 4.3 Quantitative and qualitative approaches to methodology14
Qualitative
Approach
Quantitative
Approach
Connection of theory and data 
Relationship to research process 
Inference from data
Induction
Subjectivity
Context
Deduction
Objectivity
Generality
14 Adapted from Morgan (2007:71)
95
5.1.2 Oversimplification o f dichotomous divides?
Discussions about the differences between quantitative and qualitative research have 
oscillated between philosophical and technical levels (Baum 1995, Bryman 2006). 
The disparate philosophical concepts in each paradigm and assumptions about how 
we define and theorize notions of reality have been viewed as incommensurable 
(Kuhn, 1970), and the technical methods employed, as “incompatible” (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori 2003). Although many purists still argue that the disparities cannot be 
overcome (see Howe 1988, Green et a/.2001, Guba & Lincoln 2005, Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie 2004), closer examination of the two paradigms highlights 
considerable areas of overlap.
Positivism was dislodged from its prominent position after World War II and 
replaced by postpositivism. Many of the tenets of postpositivism were defined by 
Karl Popper, who argued that scientific inquiry is influenced by the values, theories 
and the ontological position of the investigators (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003,
Stokes 2006). Quine (1951) also attacked the assumptions of positivism, arguing 
that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation from the web of beliefs and ideas of 
which it forms a part. In addition, Heisenberg’s (1958) Theory of Uncertainty 
highlighted that “science alters and refashions the object of investigation. In other 
words, method and object can no longer be separated”. ‘Reality’ cannot be 
apprehended.
Postpositivists essentially reject positivist claims that a hypothesis can be proven; 
instead postpositivists indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis (Cresswell 
2003). Although many aspects of positivism have remained in postpositivism 
(Guba & Lincoln 2005), the recognition that observation does not provide a direct 
window on reality removes one of the fundamental disparities between the 
paradigms. Science, once the arbiter of objective Truth, now provides us with one 
truth amongst many.
Disparities can also be seen within the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm. Guba 
and Lincoln (2005) define the ontological position of the constructivist paradigm as 
relativist, but there is a considerable variety of ontological views within the
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constructivist paradigm. Taking social constructionism, a subset of the interpretivist 
paradigm, as an example, it is clear that there is simply no single feature, or 
adequate description, which defines the social constructionist position (Burr 2003). 
Rather, writers referred to as social constructionists share a “family resemblance” 
(Burr 2003:2), or “shared consciousness” (Gergen 1985:266).
Social constructionists are called upon to “absolutely believe” (Burr 2003:2) in the 
central tenets, such as taking a critical stance toward taken for granted knowledge, 
acknowledgement of historical and cultural specificity, acceptance that knowledge 
is sustained by social processes, and recognition that knowledge and social action 
are inherently intertwined (Gergen 1985, Burr 2003). However, there is little 
consensus in beliefs on the limits of social constructionism (Cromby & Nightingale 
1999). In essence, there are two broad schools of thought; a divide between realism 
and relativism, which reflect the extent to which writers reject or accept essentialists 
notions of reality.
The relativist account of reality argues that our experience of the world and of 
ourselves is defined by social processes, and therefore we cannot reach beyond our 
representations of the world to access an external reality (Edwards et al 1995, Bun- 
2003, Burkitt 2003,). Edwards et al (1995:36) posit that “relativists have no 
problem with reality as the practical and commonplace ground for everyday living”, 
but to closely examine taken-for-granted reality draws attention to the “workings of 
consensual agreement”. Edwards et al. (1995:2) provide support for Derrida’s 
(1988) (albeit contested15) claim that “there is nothing beyond the text” through 
their assertion that the world, like texts “all has to be represented and interpreted” 
(1995:2).
Edwards et al (1995:41) present relativism as a “non position, as critique or 
scepticism, not as a positive statement opposed to realism”. Gergen (1994:72) 
proposes that “constructionism is ontologically mute”; as soon as we attempt to 
articulate ‘reality’ we are drawn into the world of discourse, and “at that moment
15 According to Searle (1995:160) all that Derrida meant “by the apparently spectacular declaration 
that there is nothing outside of texts is the banality that everything exists in some context or other”. 
Also see Derrida (1988: 136).
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the processes of construction commences, and this is inextricably woven into 
processes of social interchange and into history and culture” (Gergen 1994:72). For 
relativists there is no possibility of reaching an objective and universal human 
science; taken-for-granted reality, whether physical or social, is essentially a 
product of discourse and rhetoric (Harre & Langenhove 1999, Burkitt 2003).
In contrast, realists argue that our representations of the world are underpinned by a
physical reality (Burr 2003). Searle (1995) examines the relation between physical
and social reality and argues that intrinsic (physical) features of the world should be
distinguished from “observer-relative” (social) features.
“Some features of the world exist regardless of our feelings and attitudes 
[...] They include such things as force, mass, gravitation attraction, 
photosynthesis, etc. Other things are dependent on us because they are our 
creations. These include money, property, government, hammers, cars, and 
tools generally.” (Searle 2005:325)
For Searle (1995:19), the assignment of functions to objects and other phenomena,
such as money and property, is the “first feature we need to note in our discussion
of the capacity of conscious agents to create social facts”. Searle expands on these
notions considerably. Categories and sub-categories are created to describe complex
social processes. However, some fundamental premises remain; physical “brute”
facts exist independently of social facts, and social reality is a complex reaction to
the physical world.
Harre (1990:352) seems to accept the existence of both a physical and social reality 
as two ontological positions “that do not mesh”. One reality emphasises a physical 
reality; “as embodied beings we are located in physical space-time and have such 
powers as our material embodiment endows us with”. The other reality emphasises 
a social reality: “that as psychological and social beings we are located in another 
world”, the world of discourse (Harre 1990:352). Although Harre (1990) claims 
there are conditions of reality that stand outside of discourse, Harre fails to reconcile 
how external conditions “inform meaningful human activity in the world and vice 
versa” (Burkitt 2003:321). Physical and social realities remain discrete entities.
The three stances outlined above represent the range of ontological views held by 
researchers within the interpretivist paradigm, and highlight the continuum between
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relativist and realist stance. Little is known about actual views of those who identify 
themselves within the postpostivist paradigm, because qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, researchers have spent considerably more time defining the ontological 
and epistemological position of quantitative researchers (Bryman 1984). However, 
the increasing range of theoretical approaches used by those who are posited by 
others to “belong” to the postpositivist paradigm, suggest that there is a similar 
continuum between the relativist and realist stances (Grbich 1999).
Arguably, qualitative purists (and the authors of methods text books) have created a 
rather monolithic version of the postpositivist paradigm that does not accurately 
reflect the true diversity and complexity of views. Although it would be unwise to 
suggest that there is a complete convergence of views between the interpretivist and 
postpositivist paradigms, the differences have clearly been overemphasised (Grbich 
1999, Mason 2006). Even Kuhn (1970), who claimed that the paradigms were 
incommensurable, in a later postscript (1996:198-204) described 
“incommensurability” as a “breakdown of communication” between paradigm 
purists, rather than a fundamental incompatibility of the two paradigms.
The “paradigm wars” are still being waged, but perhaps only by those who posit 
themselves at the extreme ends of the two paradigms. Many researchers, particularly 
in the field of public health and nursing, have long been successfully mixing 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003). Although there 
remain some practical and conceptual difficulties, perhaps it is time to move away 
from a narrow focus on postposivism and interpretivism to develop a third 
paradigm; to turn our attention to the area where the two extremes converge. In the 
following section I address the practical and conceptual difficulties I experienced 
during the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. Subsequently, 
I explore the possibility of reaching a ‘middle ground’ between the ontological and 
epistemological divides.
5.2 From quantitative to qualitative: practical and conceptual difficulties
Although the disparities between the two paradigms appear to have been overplayed 
and overemphasised, there is no doubt that collecting and analysing both
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quantitative and qualitative data can initiate both practical and conceptual 
difficulties. In this section I explore my own experience of mixing methods, and the 
critical demands of moving sequentially from a quantitative to a qualitative 
approach to data collection and analysis.
Moving from one data collection method to another required a process of transition. 
Inherent to the practice of analysing quantitative data is the desire to find 
predictable, regular patterns; numbers to be “crunched” into an informative, uniform 
picture. Alas, my numbers demonstrated a profound resistance to crunching. Neatly 
envisaged categories proved to have inherently porous boundaries. Every time I 
created another rubric to encompass the category (e.g. “risk aware”), another ill- 
fitting family emerged; a round brick in a dam of data squares. I reassured myself 
that the collection of qualitative data would silence the cacophony of confounding 
factors; neatly folding misshaped entities into distinct categories... and so the 
process of qualitative data collection began.
I started conducting interviews with an implicit intention to obtain factual data on 
the key factors that participants felt had influenced their reproductive decision­
making. A number of problems arose. First, mothers did not appear to have a 
‘shopping list’ of factors that had affected their decisions; instead I was presented 
with reconstituted memories -  more akin to glancing at a kitchen cupboard, often 
years after the ‘shopping’ had been done. There was no reassurance that the items 
on display were ever on the ‘reproductive decision-making list’, nor that factors, 
once paramount, had not been gobbled away; dissipating with the passing of time. 
Second, many of the factors I had spent a considerable amount of time collecting 
quantitative data on (e.g. carrier risk information), rarely appeared as primary 
considerations in the reproductive decision-making process. Lastly, expected items 
were replaced by unexpected influential factors, such as change of partner, desire 
for children and perception of disability; a veritable can of worms.
The culmination of problems initially proved frustrating. My expectations that the 
qualitative data would clarify the quantitative data, or provide a neatly categorised 
package of “factors affecting reproductive decision-making”, were not realised. In 
fact, the qualitative data seemed only to exacerbate the complexity and highlight the
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phenomenal variety of lived experience. However, the more interviews I conducted, 
the more I realised that the point of the study was not to arbitrarily simplify the 
complexity; indeed it was the very nature of the complexity that proved to be the 
most fascinating aspect of the study. Taking a positivist approach to qualitative data 
only served to eclipse the breadth and depth of lived experience; the qualities of 
which were at the very heart of reproductive decision-making.
To recover a sense of the qualities of lived experience required going beyond the 
traditional empiricist approach of collecting (numerical) ‘facts’. First, I had to 
recognise the temporality of experience and the complex interaction of presentation 
and memory. Each interview lasted 1-3 hours; experience is a boundless process. 
The very act of recounting events in our lives, in the presence of others, constitutes 
a process of renegotiating our experience of those events. Each time we describe a 
past experience to a new acquaintance, our memory serves to polish the 
representation.
“Objectively, stories and ritual scenarios seldom tell the truth 
about what actually happened. They tell a truth that enables people 
to live in the here and now with what happened to them in the past.
In this sense the scenarios are expedient lies; they prioritise the 
existential urge to remaster experience rather than the 
epistemological need to preserve an exact record of it.” (Jackson 
1998:24)
In effect we fail to describe the reality of the event, to preserve an exact record of 
how it was experienced at the time; we can only deliver a remastered version, 
morphed by memory and congruent with our present day persona.
Second, I learnt to recognise that direct, pre-reflective experience is no less 
significant than experience that comes from ratiocination or analytical reflection. 
Often families had not analysed the factors that had influenced their decisions; 
frequently only one reaction, one course of action, had appeared tenable. The 
decision-making process, therefore, was rarely presented as a process of extensive 
deliberation, but as an inevitable response to a tapestry of subconscious motivations.
Lastly, it was necessary to recognise my own influence on the process of data 
collection. In a rather overt sense, my positivist approach to data collection had 
initially blinded me to the complexity of qualitative data collection. However,
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recognition of the need to employ reflective strategies, to recover the qualities of
lived experience, does not and cannot imply that I was subsequently able to
comprehend the complexity of an “other”. This problem is perhaps best
encapsulated by Merleau-Ponty (1964:348):
“How can the word T  be put into the plural, how can a general idea of the I  
be formed, how can I speak of an I  other than my own, how can I know that 
there are other F s, how can consciousness which, by its nature, and as self- 
knowledge, is in the mode of the /, be grasped in the mode of Thou, and 
through this, in the world of ‘One’.”
The question of whether we can know the inner experience of an “other” is one of
the central dilemmas of human coexistence. Our ability to ‘recognise’ each other is
at once intuitive and fallible. Schutz (1973 :11) regarded intersubjective
understanding as a product of “the natural attitude of common-sense thinking in
daily life”. Although we are products of differing biographies, for the most part we
take for granted that we have much in common. We retain a capacity to comprehend
much an ‘other’s’ experience:
“.. .there is always some aspect of oneself, however well hidden, that 
corresponds, albeit obliquely, to the beliefs and behaviours one sees in 
others. Methodologically, therefore, one proceeds from the latent in self to 
the manifest in other, and from the manifest is self to the latent in other in a 
demanding series of essays at recognition” (Jackson 1998:15).
This is not to suggest that we are capable of truly empathetic understanding of
another. The “outward facts and bodily movements are [...] indications of the lived
experiences”, representations, rather than the essence of experience itself (Schutz
1967:111).
Schutz (1967) suggests that genuine understanding of another person comes from 
focusing on what lies behind the indications; the intersubjective meaning. In 
essence, there are aspects of human interaction that suggest that the “other” is not 
the aspect that needs to be known. The other, like the self, is essentially a product of 
intersubjective engagement, not a given property of existence (Husserl 1970). My 
“self’, without others to be myself with/against/in relation to, is difficult to 
comprehend. Likewise, the other is a “self’, not defined by me, or by their ‘self but 
by the intersubjective interaction between our ‘selves’ (and ‘others’).
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My own influence on the interpretation of the data turned from an explicit desire to 
collect ‘objective’ facts, to recognition of my implicit influence on the findings. The 
data collected was not a window onto a world of another, but a window onto the 
world we share; a focus on the intersubjective construction of meaning. The 
collection of qualitative data also served to highlight the subjective nature of 
quantitative data analysis and had a considerable influence on my interpretation of 
the quantitative data.
Although I had initially felt frustrated by the perceived lack of statistical evidence, I 
realised that the quantitative data did provide a useful picture. It was not the 
expected uniform presentation of neat categories, but a fascinatingly complex 
representation of life; many kitchen cupboards, containing many different items. In 
essence, through collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, I developed a far 
greater understanding of the complexity of the reproductive decision-making 
process.
In summary, moving sequentially from one data collection method to another 
required the use of significantly different practical and conceptual skills. However, 
the process also illuminated the complimentary nature of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The collection and analysis of quantitative data actually 
provided a greater understanding of the importance of recognising the temporality 
of experience, the complex interaction of presentation and memory, as well as the 
value of hearing direct, pre-reflective voices. Having access to families medical 
records highlighted the chasm between the factors assumed to be paramount in the 
reproductive decision-making process (e.g. timing of diagnosis and carrier status) 
and those which families described (e.g. experience of living with a child with 
DMD, desire for children, life-event factors such as infertility or a change of 
partner).
5.3 Dichotomous dualisms: finding solace in the place in between
Rather than instigating a conflict between the traditional dualisms of the positivist 
and interpretivist paradigms, the collection and analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data served to bring my theoretical thinking to a place in between. In this
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section, I draw upon the works of Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, Dewey, James and Sartre, 
to clarify my theoretical position. Although these theorists have emerged from 
diverse fields of pragmatism, existentialism and phenomenology, they are all united 
in a rejection of the traditional dualisms, found in the positivist and interpretivist 
paradigms. In this section I describe my focus on intersubjectivity (rather than 
objectivity or subjectivity), transferability (rather than generalisability or context- 
specific data) and abduction (rather than induction or deduction).
Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, Dewey, James and Sartre all focus on the practical realities 
of an individuals experience; the common-sense understanding of lived experience 
is the framework from within which all inquiry should begin and return. Focusing 
on the practical realities enables us to approach the ontological and epistemological 
disputes of postpositivism and interpretevism from a different perspective. James 
(1995) and Dewey (1958), in particular, called for attention to be paid to the 
practical consequences and significance of metaphysical positions. To find the 
meaning of an idea, we must “try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective 
practical consequences” (James 1995: 18). For example, if two opposing ontological 
positions on whether brute physical facts actually exist, or are socially constructed, 
have no bearing on the way we conduct our study, then the distinction has no 
practical purpose.
In this thesis, I focus on the lived reality of reproductive decision-making. Families 
affected by DMD did not debate the possibility that that their experience of living 
with DMD might be a social construct. For families in this study, their son’s 
condition, the progressive muscle weakness, wheelchair dependency and premature 
death are just some of the practical realities of their life. Setting aside questions 
regarding the ontological status of various modes of comprehending and 
experiencing practical realities enabled me to explore the behavioural consequences 
of these modes of understanding.
I also set aside debates on the relationship between the individual and the socio­
cultural. While some argue for the existence of an external, imposed social order, 
others perceive individual actors as the creators of social meaning. I felt it was 
necessary to describe both the social order and individual action. Drawing on
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Sartre’s (1982) progressive-regressive method, I used the introductory chapters in 
this thesis to describe both the pre-existing social and historical factors that 
constitute the human situation (practico- inert), in relation to reproductive choice. 
The data chapters explore the ways in which human action (praxis) reinforces and 
develop prior conditions, in relation to reproductive decision-making.
Exploring the way in which people negotiate the boundary between the human 
situation and purposeful human action serves to illuminate the paths between what 
is given and what is chosen. Although there are inherent difficulties in defining 
reproductive “choice” amidst complex theories of political power, paternalistic 
health care systems, and anti-disability social structures, it is necessary to bracket 
out any distinctions between real and imaginary choice and control, to address 
people’s experience of the world as an active subject and “not solely as a contingent 
predicate” (Jackson 1998:21). The exclusion of circumscriptive notions of power is 
not to deny the potential for their existence, but to emphasise the phenomenal world 
of immediate, lived experience; the notion that choice exists, within constraints.
Through the process of data collection, I drew upon Dewey’s (1958) notion that 
researcher must reject claims of both objectivity and subjectivity; theories, values, 
and motives cannot be discarded in order to impartially collect independent facts. In 
addition, Dewey argued that meaning is not entirely dependent on context. Claims 
that quantitative research is generalisable, while qualitative research is context 
specific, are overly simplistic (Brannen 2005). It is difficult to comprehend 
research results that are either so unique as to have no relevance for any other actors 
in similar situations, or so generalisable as to be applicable in every possible 
historical and cultural setting (Morgan 2007). I therefore focused on the 
transferability of the findings of this study.
Quantitative and qualitative methods have traditionally focused on either side of the 
dichotomous divides between structure and agency, socio-cultural and individual, 
object and subject, macro and micro, and yet the world we live in inevitably 
contains both (Mason 2006). Every human is “at once a subject for himself or 
herself -  a who -  and an object for others -  a what” (Jackson 1998:8). Rejecting the 
forced dichotomy between subjective and objective is achieved by emphasising the
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intersubjective experience. A focus on intersubjectivity helps us to focus on the 
experience of life as enacted on simultaneous scales of macro and micro, socio­
cultural and individual. In essence, lived experience traverses dualisms (Mason
2006).
I also found it was necessary to reject the forced dichotomy between inductive and
deductive reasoning. The actual process of data collection and analysis involved
moving between theory and data, which never operated in only one direction. In
practice, “it is impossible to operate in either an exclusively theory or data-driven
fashion” (Morgan 2007:70-71). As Bateson (1973:60) suggests, rather than
attempting to achieve the unachievable:
“We ought to accept and enjoy this dual nature of scientific thought and be 
willing to value the way in which the two processes work together to give us 
advances in understanding the world. We ought not to frown too much on 
either process, or at least to frown equally on either process when it is 
unsupplemented by the other.”
In our quest for knowledge, perhaps it is time we acknowledged that ways of
knowing are at once physical, cultural, innate and learned; the constant moving back
and forth between induction and deduction, an inevitable process of abductive
reasoning (Morgan 2007). As Dewey (1958) suggests, inquiry should focus on a
naturalistic and process-oriented organism-environment transaction.
In summary, rather than starting with an (unproven and disputed) ontological 
assumption that would have imposed epistemological limitations on the study, I 
started with what I perceived to be the most fundamental aspect of the research 
process: the research question. The process of collecting and analysing both 
quantitative and qualitative data illuminated potential disparities between the two 
paradigms. However, although there was a transitional period between the two 
methods, the process actually appeared to initiate a more thoughtful approach to the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological disparities between the two 
paradigms. Through exploring the work of Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, Dewey, James 
and Sartre, I was able to find solace in their rejection of traditional dualisms and 
found a way to elicit specific issues related to mixing methods, namely: abduction, 
intersubjectivity and transferability (see Table 4.4).
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Table 4.4 An Approach to Mixed Methods16
Qualitative
Approach
Quantitative
Approach
Pragmatic
Approach
Connection of theory and data 
Relationship to research process 
Inference from data
Induction
Subjectivity
Context
Deduction
Objectivity
Generality
Abduction
Intersubjectivity
Transferability
5.5 Conclusions, caveats and contentions
In this final section I address some of the caveats and contentions that may emerge 
from this study. When analysing data, it is necessary to recognise that the drive to 
find conceptual order in our representations of the world, is at best a process of 
wishful thinking. The concepts we use to describe and represent lived experience 
can never truly reflect the complexity, nor symbolize the character of human 
existence, without serious distortions. Lived experience, in Sartre’s (1969) terms, is 
“dialectically irreducible”.
Nonetheless, behind of the curtain of academic endeavour, lies an unerring urge to 
find patterns in our data, to create order in our world. Dewey (1958) and James 
(1995) suggest that our preoccupation with pattern and order is a form of 
instrumental rationality, a historical drive to control nature and the human 
condition. At best, the drive to find order is an attempt to make sense of an unstable 
world; a “consoling illusion” (Jackson 1989), rather than an “accurate representation 
of reality” (Rorty 1979:10). At worst, it serves to create conceptual obligations; a 
need to legitimise research as unproblematic and ‘real’.
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to present the practical and conceptual 
difficulties of both quantitative and qualitative research. I have described my own 
influence on the collection and analysis of data and theoretical difficulties of truly 
comprehending another’s experience. Despite the inherently problematic nature of
16 Adapted from Morgan (2007:71)
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comprehending another through either quantitative or qualitative data, I have, as you 
will see, categorised, summarised and possibly even simplified a cacophony of data.
Recognising our inability to apprehend reality is not to suggest we can just ‘make it 
up’; it merely serves to acknowledge that “there is no constant, substantive “self’, 
which can address a constant, substantive “others” as objects of knowledge” 
(Jackson 1989). For James (1950:296-297) the “fons et origo of all reality, whether 
from the absolute or the practical point of view, is [...] subjective, is ourselves”.
This is not to suggest that I have been consumed by solipsism, but it does serve to 
highlight that the “truth” of this thesis is not an objective truth. Rather than 
presenting my data as an objective Truth, I seek alternative solace in the 
presentation of a small truth; an R.D Laing (1970) worthy17 representation of 
families’ representations of their experiences to me.
In conclusion, the categories, summaries and simplifications of the vast complexity 
of reproductive decision-making have emerged from a reflective account of both 
quantitative and qualitative data. Current beliefs and research conclusions cannot be 
perfect, certain or absolute. Truth, when addressed pragmatically, is temporal, 
provisional; truth is “what happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by 
events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process” (James 1995:77) and therefore, as 
with all research findings, we must “be ready tomorrow to call it a falsehood” 
(James 1995:86).
17 In RD Laing describes the human condition as an interactive reflection of ourselves in others and 
others in ourselves. In his (1970) book “Knots” the complexity of human action is defined through a 
number of ad finitum examples of reflective interaction, such as “Jill thinks she can’t see what she 
thinks Jack can see, and that Jack himself thinks that, Jill does not see it. Jack sees Jill does see it and 
she thinks that she does not, and that she thinks, he thinks, she does not”... etc
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Chapter Five
Implications of diagnostic pathway, carrier testing 
techniques and reproductive technologies for 
reproductive behaviour
Introduction
Reproductive behaviour in families affected by genetic conditions may be 
influenced by the provision of reproductive choice. Providing families with 
reproductive choice depends on two factors; ensuring families are aware of their 
risk and offering families reproductive options. Increasing technological 
sophistication has changed a number of aspects of reproductive choice. The 
development of newborn screening procedures has provided some families with an 
earlier awareness of their genetic risk. The development of carrier testing 
procedures has provided families with an increasingly accurate awareness of 
genetic risk. The development of reproductive technologies has provided risk-aware 
families with a broader range of reproductive options in subsequent pregnancies.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the implications of diagnostic pathways, carrier 
testing techniques and reproductive technologies for reproductive behaviour in 
families affected by Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). Quantitative data on 
reproductive behaviour is presented from 72 families affected by DMD; of whom, 
38 received a later clinical diagnosis (LCD) in the west of Scotland and 34 received 
a diagnosis through newborn screening (NBS) in Wales, between 1990 and 2006.
Reproductive behaviour is a complex phenomenon. Families’ decision-making may 
be influenced by the awareness of genetic risk. “Risk awareness” may be defined 
either as the point at which families received the diagnosis, or the time at which 
they received confirmation of their carrier status. In addition, reproductive 
behaviour after the diagnosis of an affected child may be influenced by reproductive 
behaviour occurring prior to the birth of an affected child (e.g. a family who already 
have three children prior to the birth of the index, may be less likely to have 
subsequent pregnancies).
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To determine how to define “risk awareness” (as either the point at which families 
received the diagnosis, or the point at which mothers received confirmation of their 
carrier status) and to disentangle the varying influences of increasing technological 
sophistication and previous reproductive behaviour, the chapter is divided into six 
sections. The first section outlines the different diagnostic pathways and the 
different carrier testing and reproductive technologies available to families, in the 
LCD and NBS cohorts. The remaining five sections focus on the implications of the 
different diagnostic pathways, carrier testing techniques and reproductive options 
for risk awareness and reproductive behaviour at various points in time. Table 5.1 
outlines the aims and objectives of the five sections on the implications of 
technologies for risk awareness and reproductive behaviour.
Table 5.1 Aims and objectives of the five sections on risk awareness and 
reproductive behaviour
Time period Aims Objectives 
(variables m easured)
Prior to  birth of 
index
To explore w hether the 
cohorts a re  com parable
Number of children born 
prior to index 
- Age of m other
Prior to 
diagnosis of 
index
To explore implications of 
diagnostic pathw ay for risk 
aw areness
Number of pregnancies 
occurring betw een birth 
and diagnosis 
- O utcom e of pregnancies
Prior to
confirmation of 
carrier s ta tu s
To explore th e  implications 
of carrier testing  techniques 
for risk aw areness
Number of pregnancies 
occurring betw een 
diagnosis and 
confirmation of carrier 
s ta tu s
After diagnosis 
of index
To explore th e  implications 
of the  timing of the 
diagnosis on subsequen t 
reproductive behaviour
N umber of pregnancies 
occurring afte r diagnosis 
- Uptake of prenatal 
testing 
Birth interval
Overall To highlight outcom e of 
differences explored in 
previous sections
Family size
Fertility rate  p re/post
diagnosis
Section two focuses on reproductive behaviour occurring prior to the birth of the 
affected male, to address whether the cohorts had a similar family structure prior to
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the birth of the index. Section three focuses on reproductive behaviour occurring 
between the birth of the affected male and the diagnosis, to address the implications 
of diagnostic pathway for risk awareness. Section four explores reproductive 
behaviour occurring after the diagnosis, but before confirmation of carrier status, to 
address the implications of carrier testing techniques for risk awareness. Section 
five addresses reproductive behaviour in families after they have received the 
diagnosis. The final section explores the overall differences in reproductive 
behaviour, occurring before and after the diagnosis of the affected male.
1. Technological opportunities for families in the LCD and NBS 
cohorts
The aim of this section is to describe the different technologies available to 38 
families in the west of Scotland and 34 families in Wales, who had a son diagnosed 
with DMD between 1990 and 2006. First, the differences between the two 
diagnostic pathways are addressed. Second, the differing provision of carrier testing 
techniques is explored, across time and between regions. Finally, details of the 
reproductive technologies offered during 1990 and 2006 in the west of Scotland and 
Wales, are provided.
1.1 Differences between later clinical diagnosis in the west of Scotland and 
newborn screening diagnosis in Wales
Newborn screening for DMD was introduced in Wales in 1990. Unlike many 
newborn screening programmes for untreatable conditions, the programme in Wales 
requires families to opt for screening. A systematic approach to testing and 
disclosing results was established (Bradley et al 1993), and the programme aimed 
to work closely with each family’s primary health care team, a local network of 
paediatricians and family care officers (van Ommen & Scheuerbrandt 1993, Parsons 
etal. 1996).
Newborn screening for DMD is offered to families when the midwife visits their 
home, six or seven days after the child’s birth. A blood sample is taken from a heel
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prick, to test for other conditions screened for in the UK18. Families are offered the 
opportunity to ‘opt-in’ for an extra test for DMD. Informed consent is sought. If the 
test demonstrates grossly elevated creatine kinase (CK) levels, the health visitor or 
family practitioner is contacted when the baby is about six weeks old. An 
appointment is made with a paediatrician before the family are contacted, to ensure 
the family will be seen within a day of being approached by the primary health care 
team.
The paediatrician offers families a second CK test to ensure the first result was not a 
false positive. If parents accept, blood is taken and another appointment arranged to 
give the results, usually on the same day, to minimise the period of uncertainty and 
anxiety. If the second test confirms grossly elevated CK levels, the family are 
offered genetic counselling and the opportunity to further the diagnostic process, 
initially by genetic analysis and subsequently by muscle biopsy and dystrophin 
analysis.
In the west of Scotland diagnosis relies on presentation and recognition of clinical 
symptoms. Affected boys are phenotypically normal at birth and frequently little 
clinical weakness can be detected before 3-5 years of age. During the early 
symptomatic stages progressive weakness of muscles of the pelvis, knee and hip 
extensors may cause delayed walking, abnormal gait, toe walking, frequent falls and 
difficulty climbing stairs. Often affected males demonstrate difficulty rising from 
the floor. Some boys may also present delayed intellectual milestones, in particular 
a delay in speech development.
In young boys, the cause of their slow development is often not recognised as 
indicative of DMD. However, once DMD is suspected, a CK test is conducted and 
families are referred to a genetic counsellor. If the test demonstrates grossly 
elevated CK levels, families in the west of Scotland are offered the opportunity to 
further the diagnostic process, initially by genetic analysis and subsequently by
18 As already noted in Chapter One, in the UK, the Newborn Screening Committed currently 
recommend newborn screening for five conditions: phenylketonuria (PKU), congenital 
hypothyroidism (CHT), sickle cell diseases (SCD), cystic fibrosis (CF) and medium chain acyl CoA 
dehydrogenase deficiency (MCADD) (National Screening Committee 2005).
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muscle biopsy and dystrophin analysis. Table 5.2 highlights the differences between 
the two diagnostic procedures.
Table 5.2 Differences between the diagnostic procedures
Cohort: LCD NBS
Method of diagnosis: Clinical diagnosis Population screening
Child's condition: Sym ptom atic Pre-sym ptom atic
Age of child when paren ts 17 to 96 m onths 1.5 m onths
informed of diagnosis
The different diagnostic pathways had important implications for the timing of the 
diagnosis. Families received a later clinical diagnosis (LCD) when the affected boy 
was aged, on average, 56 months; nearly four years and four months. Some families 
received the diagnosis before their child’s second birthday. However, some families 
did not receive a diagnosis, until their child was eight years old. In comparison, 
families in the newborn screening (NBS) cohort received a diagnosis around six 
weeks after their child’s birth. The timing of the diagnosis obviously has significant 
implications for families’ risk awareness in subsequent pregnancies.
1.2 Carrier testing techniques used in the west of Scotland and Wales between 
1990 and 2006
In relation to reproductive behaviour, families may perceive themselves to be “risk 
aware” after receiving the diagnosis, or after they have received confirmation of 
their carrier status. The diagnosis of an affected child provides families with 
awareness that their child has a genetic condition, which may be passed on to 
subsequent children. However, to provide families with an exact awareness of their 
risk in subsequent pregnancies, it is necessary to conduct carrier tests on the mother.
To explore the differences between the cohorts in the provision of carrier testing 
techniques, this section is divided into two subsections. First, the different carrier 
testing techniques available to families in Wales and the west of Scotland are
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described. Second, the differences between the cohorts in the time taken to provide 
mothers with confirmation of their carrier status are explored.
1.2.1 P rovision  o f  carrier te stin g  techniques
Chapter Two highlighted the increasing sophistication of techniques used to 
diagnose affected boys and identify carriers. Families living in Wales, and the west 
of Scotland, relied on the testing procedures used in laboratories in Cardiff and 
Glasgow, respectively. Table 5.3 highlights the different procedures used in 
laboratories in Glasgow and Cardiff between 1990 and 2006.
The first test offered to a mother after her child was diagnosed with Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy in Wales or the west of Scotland between 1990 and 2006, was 
the creatine kinase test and/or linkage. The results of these tests provided some 
mothers with some awareness of their carrier risk. However, for most families the 
results of CK and linkage are inconclusive; it was often necessary to conduct further 
genetic tests. There was a gradual change in the specific tests used to identify 
genetic deletions and mutations between 1990 and 2006, enabling the identification 
of an increasing number of deletions and duplications.
Once a gene deletion or duplication has been identified in the affected boy, it is 
possible to test the mother to ascertain whether she is a carrier or has a risk of 
germline mosaicism (GM). A carrier of the condition has a 1 in 4 (25%) risk of 
having an affected boy in each pregnancy, whereas a mother with a GM risk, will be 
informed that she is has a 1 in 20 (5%) risk of having an affected boy in each 
pregnancy. However, it is only in recent years that it has become possible to detect 
all known deletions, duplications and point mutations. During the period of data 
collection, 1990 to 2006, it was not always possible to inform families whether the 
mother was a carrier or had a GM risk.
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Table 5.3 Diagnostic and carrier testing procedures used in Glasgow and 
Cardiff between 1990 and 2006
Time G lasgow Cardiff
Early
1990s
Creatine Kinase
Linkage
FISH
cDNA
PFGE
PCR -  confirmed by Southern 
Blotting (initially on 8 exons, then 
1 1 , then  17 exons:
3 Prime: 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 
50, 51, 52, 53, 60 
5 Prime: 3 ,4 ,6 ,8 ,13 ,19)
Creatine Kinase 
Linkage
cDNA
PFGE (conducted in Oxford)
PCR -  not confirmed by Southern 
Blotting (initially 11 exons, then 
17 exons:
3 Prime: 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 
50, 51, 52, 53, 60 
5 Prime: 3 ,4 ,6 ,8 ,13 ,19 )
Mid-
late
1990s
Creatine Kinase 
Linkage
PCR (17 exons)
Creatine Kinase 
Linkage
PCR (17 exons)
PTT (conducted in London)
Early
2000s
Creatine Kinase 
Linkage
PCR (17 exons) 
dHPLC
Creatine Kinase 
Linkage
PCR (17 exons)
PTT (Conducted in London) 
dHPLC
Sequencing (Conducted in 
London)
Mid
2000s
Creatine Kinase 
Linkage
PCR (17 exons)
dHPLC
MLPA
Creatine Kinase 
Linkage
PCR (17 exons)
PTT
dHPLC
MLPA
Sequencing
During the early 1990s, laboratories in Glasgow and Cardiff used complementary 
deoxyribonucleic acid (cDNA) probes to detect deletions and duplications. 
Approximately 70 percent of deletions could be identified using cDNA probes, and 
around seven percent of boys were found to have duplications. If a deletion or 
duplication was identified in the child, it was possible to test the mother and inform 
her whether she had a 1 in 4 risk, or a 1 in 20 risk, in subsequent pregnancies.
When a deletion or duplication could not be identified, the affected boy was 
assumed to have a point mutation, which was undetectable by cDNA. In these 
families, the mother’s carrier risk was calculated by combining pedigree analysis,
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creatine kinase results, and linkage analysis, in a Bayesian calculation. Rather than 
providing a mother with information on whether she was a carrier, or had a GM 
risk, she would be provided with information on her “carrier risk” (e.g. that the 
mother had a percentage risk of being a carrier).
In 1993, laboratories in both Glasgow and Cardiff started using polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR), to identify deletions and mutations in 17 exons at the 3’ and 5’ 
“hot-spot” regions of the dystrophin gene. Although PCR increased the reliability 
and accuracy of detecting deletions and duplications, it was still only possible to 
detect gene deletions in about 70 percent of cases, and duplications in around seven 
percent of cases. In the remaining families, the mothers’ risk of being a carrier was 
assessed using pedigree analysis, creatine kinase results, and linkage.
In the early 1990s, in an attempt to identify point mutations, the laboratory in Wales 
started sending samples to a laboratory in Guys Hospital, London, to carry out 
protein truncation tests (PTT). In Scotland, the laboratory was unable to detect point 
mutations until the early 2000s, when denaturing high performance liquid 
chromatography (dHPLC) was introduced. The ability to identify point mutations 
further increased the proportion of mothers who could be informed of their carrier 
status, rather than their “carrier risk”. By the mid-2000s both laboratories, in 
Glasgow and Cardiff, were using multiplex litigation-dependent probe amplification 
(MLPA). The procedure is capable of detecting all known deletions and 
duplications. In Cardiff, if a mutation was not detected, sequencing was conducted.
1.2.2 T im e taken to  p ro v id e  m others w ith  confirm ation o f  carrier sta tu s
The use of different carrier testing techniques in Wales and the west of Scotland, 
combined with differing administrative procedures, led to considerable differences 
in the provision of carrier status information. Table 5.4 highlights the difference 
between the two cohorts in the time taken to confirm carrier status, through cDNA, 
PCR, PTT, dHPLC, MLPA, or sequencing.
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Table 5.4 Number of months between diagnosis and confirmation of carrier 
status
Time Period NBS
(range)
LCD
(range)
Overall
(range)
19 9 0 -1 9 9 5 77.60 
(5 to 169)
85.30 
(35 to 118)
79.38 
(5 to 118)
19 9 6 -2 0 0 0 26.67 
(4 to 89)
7.94 
(0 19 to  44)
13.05 
(0 to 89)
2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 6 17.10 
(3 to 44)
9.53 
(0 to 54)
13.88 
(0 to 54)
Families who received a diagnosis of DMD before 1995 had to wait, on average, 
over six and a half years before receiving confirmation of their carrier status (range 
= 5 years to 14 years). The difference between the three time periods highlights the 
impact of increasingly sophisticated carrier testing techniques on the capacity to 
provide families with prompt confirmation of their carrier status. After the 
introduction of PCR for 17 exons, the time taken to provide confirmation of carrier 
status reduced dramatically. However, during the period 1996 to 2006, families who 
received a newborn screening diagnosis had to wait over twice as long to receive 
confirmation of their carrier status, than families in the LCD cohort.
Although there are clearly differences between the two regions, the range of time 
taken to provide families with confirmation of their carrier status also indicates 
differences between families. In some families, the gene deletion or duplication was 
easy to identify; in others, a variety of tests had to be conducted before the mutation 
could be found. In Wales, samples often had to be sent to Oxford for PFGE, or 
London for PTT. In the west of Scotland, families had to wait until more 
sophisticated techniques had been introduced in the laboratory in Glasgow. The 
delay resulting from sending samples, or waiting for the introduction of more 
sophisticated techniques, often lasted for a considerable number of years. The 
implications of the different carrier testing procedures, for reproductive behaviour, 
are addressed in section four.
19 Carrier testing was conducted and results were received within a month of the diagnosis
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1.3 Reproductive technologies
Once families were aware of the diagnosis, it was possible to offer them prenatal 
testing in subsequent pregnancies, using either amniocentesis, performed at 15-18 
weeks gestation, or chorionic villus sampling (CVS), performed at 10-12 weeks 
gestation. If a gene deletion or duplication had been identified in the affected boy, it 
was possible to determine whether the foetus carried the same mutation. If the gene 
deletion or duplication was found in the foetus, families were provided with the 
option of termination. The majority of families, who opted for prenatal testing, 
chose to use CVS. Although some families used amniocentesis, no difference could 
be found between those who opted for either test. There were also no differences 
between the regions in the provision of prenatal testing.
By the early 2000s, a number of parents in both cohorts were expressing interest in 
using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). However, data could only be found 
on one family who been through the process of PGD. Unfortunately the family’s 
attempts to conceive had not been successful. Due to the lack of subsequent 
pregnancies occurring as a result of PGD, only the use of prenatal testing is 
addressed in this chapter.
2. Reproductive behaviour prior to the birth of the index
Before comparing the influence of diagnostic pathway, carrier testing techniques 
and reproductive technologies on reproductive behaviour, it was essential to ensure 
the possibility of comparative analysis. If the underlying family structure of each 
cohort differed significantly prior to the diagnosis, it would be difficult to address 
the influence of technological developments on reproductive behaviour after the 
diagnosis. Two quantifiable variables were identified, which may also have 
influenced subsequent reproductive behaviour; the position of the index (whether 
the first affected child was first/second/third bom etc), and the age of the mother. 
These two variables are explored in the next two sections.
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2.1 Index position
A total o f 58 pregnancies (LCD=34, NBS=24) occurred in 42 families (LCD=23, 
NBS=19), prior to the birth of the index. According to national data collected by the 
Office o f National Statistics (ONS 2008a) and the General Registrars Office 
Scotland (GRO-Scotland 2006), the most common family size is two children in 
both Scotland and Wales. Therefore, families, in which the index was the third bom 
child, might be less likely to have subsequent pregnancies, than families in which 
the index was the first bom child. Figure 5.1 shows the position of the index in each 
cohort.
Figure 5.1 Position of index by cohort
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The index was the first or second bom child in a very similar proportion o f families 
in both cohorts. The index was bom third or more in a slightly higher number of  
LCD families (n=8), than NBS families (n=3). However, table 5.5 shows that the 
difference was not statistically significant. However, the slightly higher number of 
previous pregnancies in the LCD cohort might result in a slightly higher number of 
subsequent pregnancies in the NBS cohort. Index position cannot be ruled out as a 
potential confounding factor.
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Table 5.5 Confidence interval for difference in proportion of index by position
Fam ilies (n = 7 2 ) Difference
betw een
proportions
95%  
Confidence 
interval 
for difference
LCD
(n = 3 8 )
NBS
(n = 3 4 )
No. w ith index  
position
n (% ) n (% )
First 15 (39.5) 15 (44.1) -0 .046 -0 .262 to 0.173
Second 15 (39.5) 16 (47.1) -0 .076 -0 .289  to 0.146
Third or m ore 8 (21.1) 3 (8.8) -0 .122 -0.051 to 0.286
2.2 Age of mothers
The age of mothers has important implications for reproductive behaviour. The 
probability of being able to conceive is twice as high for women aged 19-26 years 
compared with women aged 35-39 years (Dunson et al. 2002). Therefore, any 
significant difference between cohorts in the age of mother at first pregnancy, or the 
age of mother at the birth of the index, may have considerable implications for the 
number of subsequent pregnancies.
National data shows that the mean age of mothers at childbirth in Scotland and 
Wales21 has remained fairly consistent between the regions. The mean age of 
mother at first birth has gradually increased from around 26 years in 1977, to 27 
years in 1991, to 29 years in 2005 (ONS 2008a, GRO-Scotland 2006). National data 
on mothers’ age are separated for each birth; first, second, third or more, on a yearly 
basis. Due to the relatively small numbers in each cohort it was not possible to 
directly compare the mean age of mothers, for each pregnancy, on yearly basis. 
However, the overall similarity between the regions suggests that there should be no 
significant difference between the cohorts in the mean age at childbirth.
Table 5.6 demonstrates the difference between cohorts in the mean age of mothers 
at first pregnancy and at the birth of the index. The range of ages in the LCD cohort, 
were 16 to 38 years at both first pregnancy and birth of index, compared to 18 to 35 
years in the NBS cohort. The difference between the cohorts in both the range of
20 Standardised ages are used to take into account the different age structures of the populations
21 ONS data on age of mother is amalgamated for England and Wales and therefore not possible to 
extract relevant data for Wales only.
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ages and the mean age is consistently small, suggesting that the age of mother is 
unlikely to be a confounding factor in subsequent reproductive behaviour.
Table 5.6 Confidence interval for difference in mean age of mothers
Mothers (n = 7 2 )
LCD
(n = 3 8 )
NBS
(n = 3 4 )
Difference
b etw een
m eans
95%
Confidence
Interval
Data missing 0 3
Mean age of m other a t 
1st pregnancy
24.55 25.00 -0.45 -2 .09 to 2.99
Mean age of m other a t 
birth of index
27.71 27.69 0.02 -2.39 to 2.43
3. Reproductive behaviour between birth of index and diagnosis
The aim of this section is to explore the implications of diagnostic pathway for risk 
awareness in subsequent pregnancies. All families received a newborn screening 
diagnosis within weeks of their child’s birth. As it was not possible for NBS 
families to conceive prior to the diagnosis, this section only explores reproductive 
behaviour in the LCD cohort, occurring between birth and diagnosis.
In the LCD cohort, affected boys were diagnosed clinically between the age of 17 
months and eight years. The average age was four years and four months. Seventeen 
LCD families had 29 subsequent pregnancies after the birth of the index. Ten of the 
17 families had 13 pregnancies before the diagnosis of the first affected male, and 
therefore 44.8% of subsequent pregnancies in the LCD cohort occurred prior to the
99diagnosis. Figure 5.2 shows the outcome of the 14 births.
22 One pregnancy resulted in the birth of twins
121
Figure 5.2 Outcome of subsequent pregnancies in LCD cohort, occurring 
between birth and diagnosis of index
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The majority o f the 14 births, occurring prior to the diagnosis o f the index, resulted 
in the birth o f unaffected males or females (n=10). However, only four o f the 13 
pregnancies occurred in carriers; two of which resulted in the birth o f a second 
affected male. The proportion o f mothers who were carriers was 53% in both 
cohorts. However, the proportion o f carriers in the LCD cohort, who had subsequent 
pregnancies prior to the diagnosis, was only 44%. If the proportion o f carriers 
having subsequent pregnancies prior to the diagnosis was representative o f the total 
LCD cohort, it is possible that there may have been a greater number o f second 
affected boys.
4. Reproductive behaviour between diagnosis and confirmation of 
carrier status
The aim of this section is to explore the implications o f carrier testing for risk 
awareness. To address whether reproductive behaviour is affected by the provision 
of more accurate carrier testing techniques, this section addresses the number of 
pregnancies occurring after families received the diagnosis, but before mothers 
received confirmation o f their carrier status.
Chapter two and section one o f this chapter highlighted the significant technological 
developments that have enabled an increasingly prompt provision o f more accurate
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carrier testing. Before the introduction of more sophisticated diagnostic and carrier 
testing techniques, many mothers were provided with a probability of being a 
carrier (carrier risk) and a probability of having an affected boy (reproductive risk). 
As noted in Chapter Three, a number of studies highlight the difficulty mothers’ 
encounter when trying to make sense of complex assessments of risk, particularly in 
defining the difference between carrier risk and reproductive risk (Parsons & 
Atkinson 1993, Parsons & Clarke 1993).
Section two of this chapter highlighted the decreasing length of time taken to 
provide mothers with confirmation of their carrier status, over the three time 
periods; 1990 to 1995,1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2006. Table 5.7 shows the number 
of pregnancies occurring between the diagnosis and confirmation of carrier status, 
during these three time periods.
Table 5.7 Number of pregnancies between diagnosis and confirmation of 
carrier status
Time Period NBS LCD Overall
1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 5 14 3 17
1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 0 1 1 2
2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 6 0 5 5
Total 15 9 24
The data from this study suggests that the accuracy of carrier tests may not be a 
primary consideration in reproductive decision-making; of the 50 pregnancies 
occurring after the diagnosis of the index, nearly half (n=24) occurred before 
mothers had received confirmation of their carrier status.
Table 5.7 shows considerable differences, between the cohorts, in the number of 
pre-confirmation pregnancies occurring in each time period. In the NBS cohort, the 
majority of pre-carrier confirmation pregnancies (14/15) occurred between 1990 and 
1995, when the average time taken to confirm carrier status was 6.5 years. In 
contrast, between 1996 and 2006, only one pregnancy occurred before NBS families 
had received confirmation of their carrier status. However, the data suggests that the 
fewer pre-confirmation pregnancies were a result of families having less time to 
conceive, rather than waiting for confirmation of their carrier status. During 1996
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and 2006, the average time between diagnosis and confirmation of carrier status had 
reduced dramatically to 27 months (range = 4 months to 7.4 years) and the average 
birth interval23 was 38.5 months (range = 11 to 6 years).
In the LCD cohort, pre-carrier confirmation pregnancies were more evenly spread 
throughout 1990 and 2006. However, the data does not suggest that families in the 
LCD cohort were more likely to wait for confirmation of carrier status. Although 16 
boys affected by DMD were bom in the west of Scotland between 1990 and 1995, 
only three received a diagnosis during this period. The majority of the 16 families in 
the LCD cohort (13/16) received a diagnosis when the average length of time taken 
to provide mothers with confirmation of their carrier status had reduced from seven 
years to eight months. It was therefore unlikely that families would conceive 
between receiving the diagnosis and obtaining confirmation of their carrier status.
Although mothers did not appear to wait for confirmation of their carrier status, 
many chose to use prenatal testing; 14 of the 24 pregnancies occurring prior to 
receiving confirmation of carrier status were tested. One possible interpretation of 
the data is that the availability of prenatal testing had a greater influence on 
reproductive behaviour than the availability of accurate carrier testing techniques. 
Due to the lack of evidence to suggest families waited for confirmation of their 
carrier status before proceeding with subsequent pregnancies, from this point 
onwards “risk awareness” is defined as the point at which families received the 
diagnosis.
5. Reproductive behaviour after the diagnosis
The aim of this section is to explore the differences in reproductive behaviour in 
risk aware families who received a later clinical diagnosis, and those who received a 
newborn screening diagnosis. The section is divided into three subsections to 
address the following reproductive factors, occurring after the diagnosis:
• Number of subsequent pregnancies
• Outcome of subsequent pregnancies
23 Birth interval is explored in greater depth in section five
124
• Uptake of prenatal testing
• Birth interval between the index and each subsequent pregnancy 
5.1 Number of pregnancies after the diagnosis
The focus of this section is on reproductive behaviour in risk-aware families (i.e. 
families who have received the diagnosis). However, defining the influence of risk 
awareness in LCD families who chose not to have subsequent pregnancies is 
inherently problematic. The decision to cease family building may have been 
affected by the diagnosis, or families may have already completed family building 
prior to receiving the diagnosis. Although it is not possible to assess the influence of 
risk awareness on the decision to cease family building, families’ decisions not to 
have subsequent children are as relevant as their decisions about how to proceed 
with subsequent pregnancies. The first part of this section therefore addresses the 
number of subsequent pregnancies in all LCD families, including those who may 
not have been risk aware at the time of the decision.
Over half of the 72 families (51.4%) in the LCD and NBS cohorts, chose not to 
have subsequent pregnancies after the birth of their affected child (LCD=21, 
NBS=16). Table 5.8 shows that the proportion of families choosing to not to have 
subsequent pregnancies was higher in the LCD cohort (55.3%) compared to the 
NBS cohort (47.1%). However, the difference was not statistically significant.
National data shows that the average family in Wales and the west of Scotland is 
two children. Of the 72 families in the total cohort, 42 (58.3%) had reached family 
size of two, at the birth of their affected child. It is therefore possible that many 
families had already completed family building after the birth of their affected child. 
The lower proportion of LCD families having subsequent pregnancies may be 
related to the slightly higher number of previous pregnancies, which was 
highlighted in section three.
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Table 5.8 Number of subsequent pregnancies after birth of index
No. of Fam ilies 
(n = 7 2 )
D ifference
betw een
proportions
Confidence
Interval
Number of 
su bseq uen t  
pregnancies
LCD
(n = 3 8 )
(% )
NBS
(n = 3 4 )
(% )
0 21 (55.3) 16 (47.1) 0.082 -0.143 to 0.296
1 9 (23.7) 10 (29.4) -0.057 -0 .256 to 0.143
2 5 (13.2) 4 (11.8) 0.014 -0 .152 to 0.172
3 or more 3 (7.8) 4 (11.8) -0.039 -0.196 to 0.109
A total of 63 pregnancies occurred after the birth of the first affected male in the 
family; 29 pregnancies in 17 LCD families and 34 pregnancies in 18 NBS families. 
A total of 50 pregnancies (LCD=16, NBS=34) occurred in 27 women (LCD=9, 
NBS=18) after the diagnosis of the first affected male. Table 5.9 demonstrates the 
difference between risk-aware families in the two cohorts in relation to carrier status 
and number of subsequent pregnancies.
Table 5.9 Number of subsequent pregnancies in risk aware families by carrier
status
No. of Pregnancies  
(n = 5 0 )
D ifference
betw een
proportions
95%  confidence  
Interval
LCD
(n = 1 6 )
NBS
(n = 3 4 )
Carrier
sta tu s
N (% ) N (% )
Carrier 8 (50.0) 23 (67.7) -0.177 -0.433 to 0.100
GM 6 (37.5) 9 (26.5) 0.110 -0.143 to 0.377
Unknown 2 (12.5) 2 (5.8) 0.066 -0.094 to 0.305
In the NBS cohort, 11 risk aware carriers had 23 subsequent pregnancies and 8 
mothers with a germline mosaicism (GM) risk had 9 subsequent pregnancies. In 
contrast, in the LCD cohort, only four risk aware carriers had eight subsequent 
pregnancies and five women with a GM risk had 6 subsequent pregnancies. A 
greater proportion of pregnancies occurred in carriers in the NBS cohort (67.7%), 
than in the LCD cohort (50.0%). However, the confidence intervals show that there 
were no significant associations between cohort and carrier status, in the number of 
subsequent pregnancies. The data suggests that the difference between a 25% carrier 
risk and a 5% GM risk may have not been a primary consideration in the 
reproductive decision-making process.
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5.2 Outcome of subsequent pregnancies after diagnosis
Figure 5.3 highlights considerable differences in the outcome o f the 50 pregnancies 
occurring in risk aware families. In the NBS cohort, the most frequent outcome of 
subsequent pregnancies was the birth o f a female. In the LCD cohort there were no 
similar trends. The most frequent outcome o f pregnancies in the LCD was a 
miscarriage. However, it should be noted that this figure is skewed by one woman, 
who experienced three miscarriages.
Seven pregnancies were terminated in the NBS cohort; five o f which occurred after 
prenatal testing identified a foetus affected by DMD. One pregnancy was terminated 
after prenatal diagnosis identified another condition and one was terminated prior to 
prenatal testing. In contrast, only two pregnancies were terminated in the LCD 
cohort, both o f which were males affected by DMD. Interestingly, in risk-aware 
families, there was one second affected child bom to a NBS family, but none to 
LCD families.
Figure 5.3 Outcome of 50 subsequent pregnancies in risk aware families
1  20
l »O)
2
a. 10
0k. ^ 
&
1 0 J J l
LCD
NBS
Female TOP Unaffected Miscarriage Untested Unknown Affected 
Male Male sex  Male
O utcom e of p reg n an c ie s
5.3 Uptake of prenatal testing
A number o f interesting findings emerged from the data on the uptake o f prenatal 
testing. First, there was a significant difference in the uptake o f prenatal testing 
between cohorts, suggesting that the diagnostic pathway influences reproductive 
behaviour. Second, there was a marked decline in the uptake of prenatal testing
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between 1990 and 2006, across both cohorts. Third, some families did not 
demonstrate consistency in their decision to use prenatal testing. These findings are 
explored in the sections below.
5.3.1 Comparison o f  uptake o f  prenatal testing between cohorts
To assess the uptake o f prenatal testing, it was necessary to exclude families who 
were not provided with the option of prenatal testing. Obviously families who had 
not received the diagnosis were not offered prenatal testing for DMD. In addition, 
eight risk-aware families miscarried prior to prenatal testing (LCD=5, NBS=3), and 
two risk-aware families chose to terminate prior to testing (LCD=1, NBS=1). 
Therefore data were analysed from a total of 40 pregnancies (LCD=10, NBS=30). 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the considerable differences between the cohorts in the uptake 
of prenatal testing.
Figure 5.4 Proportion of tested pregnancies by cohort
NBS LCD
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40% □ Tested pregnancy 
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Table 5.10 shows a contingency table o f the difference between the two cohorts. In 
the LCD cohort, only 40% (n=4) o f pregnancies occurring in risk aware women 
were tested. In contrast, 77% (n=23) o f pregnancies were tested in the NBS cohort. 
There was a significant association between cohort and whether or not subsequent 
pregnancies were tested; p=0.0524. Families who received a later clinical diagnosis 
were significantly less likely to opt for prenatal testing in subsequent pregnancies.
24 Calculated using Fishers exact test
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Table 5.10 Contingency table for difference in uptake of prenatal testing
N um ber of p re g n a n c ie s  in risk  
a w a re  w om en
Total
LCD NBS
T ested 4 23 27
Not te s te d 6 7 13
Total 10 30 40
5.3.2 Comparison o f  uptake ofprenatal testing between 1990 an d2006
In addition to the significant difference in the uptake o f prenatal testing between the 
two cohorts, there was also a marked difference over time. Figure 5.5 highlights the 
gradual decline in the uptake of prenatal testing in both cohorts. Between 1992 and 
1996, 83% (n=10) pregnancies were tested, compared to only 36% (n=5) between 
2002 and 2006. The majority o f untested pregnancies occurred between 2002 and 
2006; four o f the seven untested pregnancies in the NBS cohort and five o f the six 
untested pregnancies in the LCD cohort occurred during this period.
Figure 5.5 N um ber of tested/untested pregnancies between 199225 and 2006
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No. of pregnancies tested 
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2002-2006
The data collection finished in 2006 and therefore it is not possible to assess 
whether the decline in the uptake of prenatal testing is a temporary or lasting 
change. However, it is possible that families are becoming less inclined to use 
invasive prenatal testing.
25 There were no subsequent pregnancies prior to 1992
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5.3.3 Consistency o f decision to use prenatal testing
Another important factor in the uptake of prenatal testing is whether families 
consistently made the same decision, in each subsequent pregnancy. Nine families 
(LCD=2, NBS=7) gave birth to more than one child after the diagnosis of the index. 
Both LCD families, and the majority of NBS families (n=5) were consistent in their 
decisions whether or not to test each pregnancy (i.e. if they tested the first 
pregnancy after the index, they also tested subsequent pregnancies).
However, two of the seven families in the NBS cohort did not demonstrate 
consistency in their decisions about prenatal testing. One NBS family chose not to 
test their first pregnancy, but tested their second subsequent pregnancy. Another 
NBS family chose to test and terminate her first pregnancy, tested the second 
pregnancy, but chose not to test her third pregnancy. The genetic counselling notes 
in the family’s medical file suggested that the mother “could not cope” with the 
prospect of terminating another pregnancy. The lack of consistency suggests that the 
influences on reproductive behaviour, and perceptions of the benefit of testing and 
terminating, may change over time.
5.4 Birth interval
Another important aspect of reproductive decision-making in families affected by 
DMD is whether families choose to delay having subsequent children after 
receiving the diagnosis. National data for the whole of the UK shows that the 
median birth interval between first and second child, ranged from 33 months in 
1990 to 38 months in 2006. Birth interval between second and third child remained 
consistently higher than birth interval between first and second, and ranged from 37 
months in 1990 and 42 months in 2006. The birth interval between third and fourth 
child was similar to that between first and second child (ONS 2008b). The data 
from this study showed a marked difference in birth interval between the two 
cohorts. Figure 5.6 shows the average birth interval, between the index and the first 
subsequent pregnancy, in both cohorts.
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Figure 5.6 Mean birth interval between index and first subsequent pregnancy
NBS LCD risk unaware LCD risk aware
Cohort
Due to the relatively low numbers in each cohort, it was not possible to directly 
compare the birth interval by both year and index position. However, the mean birth 
interval found in NBS families (33.5 months) and LCD risk-unaware families (38.5 
months) is roughly equivalent to that found in the general population. The slightly 
lower birth interval in the NBS cohort may be related to the position o f the index 
(i.e. birth interval between first and second, and third and fourth child, is generally 
found to be lower than the birth interval between second and third child). The index 
was the first or third bom child in a higher proportion o f families in the NBS cohort 
(55.5%), than LCD cohort (33%).
The mean birth interval in risk aware families in the LCD cohort was 79.6 month 
(range 35 to 136 months); considerably higher than either the 33.5 months (range 11 
to 66 months) in the NBS cohort, or the 38.5 months (range 11 to 72 months) in 
families who were unaware o f their risk in the LCD cohort. One possible 
explanation is that families in the LCD cohort, who had not had subsequent 
pregnancies prior to the diagnosis, deliberately delayed further child-bearing for 
some years after the diagnosis. However, the considerable range in birth intervals 
suggest that the diagnostic pathway may not be the only influence on whether or not 
to delay childbearing; there was no statistically significant difference between the 
two cohorts.
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6. Overall reproductive behaviour
The aim of this section to is to summarise the outcome of all the differences 
between the cohorts, which were explored in previous sections. To achieve this, two 
factors are addressed: the fertility rate before and after the diagnosis, and the overall 
family size at the end of data collection.
6.1 Fertility rate pre/post diagnosis
To assess the implications of diagnostic pathway on risk awareness, the overall 
fertility rate was calculated in families, before and after they received the diagnosis. 
The fertility rate was calculated by dividing the number of pregnancies by number 
of woman-years, when women were aged between 16 and 45. Although this 
calculation is extremely crude, it provides an overview of reproductive behaviour 
both prior to and following the diagnosis of the index.
Table 5.11 highlights the mean number of woman-years in each cohort in which a 
woman is fertile and either risk-unaware (prior to diagnosis of son) or risk-aware 
(after diagnosis of son), as well as the fertility rate during each risk awareness 
category. There was a marked difference between the cohorts in the fertility rate 
after the diagnosis, suggesting that diagnostic pathway may influence reproductive 
behaviour. However, in both cohorts, the fertility rate was higher prior to than 
following the diagnosis.
Table 5.11 Crude fertility rate before and after diagnosis
LCD
(n = 3 8 )
NBS
(n = 3 4 )
Mean no. of fertile years per w om an, prior to  
diagnosis
16.70 12.19
Crude fertility rate  prior to diagnosis 0.13 0.14
Mean no. of fertile years between diagnosis and 
end of data collection (2006)
6.08 9.44
Crude fertility rate  a fte r diagnosis 0.07 0.11
Mean no. fertile years remaining (after 2006) 6.86 7.93
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The fertility rate prior to the diagnosis is similar between the cohorts (LCD=0.13, 
NBS=0.14). In both cohorts, the fertility rate is higher prior to the diagnosis. One 
possible explanation for the higher fertility rate prior to the diagnosis is that families 
chose to deter or defer child bearing after receiving the diagnosis. However, it is 
also possible that many families may have already completed family building prior 
to the diagnosis.
The fertility rate after the diagnosis is higher in the NBS cohort (0.11), than the 
LCD cohort (0.07). One possible explanation is that families in the LCD cohort 
delayed childbearing and may have more children in the future. However, mothers 
in the LCD cohort had a lower mean number of fertile years remaining, before they 
reached the age of 45, which suggests that LCD families are more likely to have 
completed family building.
6.2 Overall family size
The data on overall family size highlighted some interesting differences between the 
two cohorts. As previously noted, the most common number of children bom to 
families in both Wales and Scotland, is two. The number of one-child families has 
remained fairly consistent during the last three decades. However, the proportion of 
families having three or more children has fallen. It is difficult to directly compare 
national data to data collected during this study, not least because families may not 
have completed family building26. However, it is clear from figure 5.7 that the 
family size in the NBS cohort broadly reflects national data. In contrast, family size 
in the LCD cohort bears no resemblance to national data.
26 Data in this study was collected and analysed on the total number of pregnancies, whereas national 
data shows the total number of live births. National data on family size is collated when mother is 
over 45 years old and assumed to have finished family building. In the LCD and NBS cohorts only 6 
of 72 mothers were over the age of 45 when data collection finished in 2006.
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Figure 5.7 Total family size in the LCD and NBS cohorts
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Figure 5.7 shows a clear disparity between the cohorts in the most common family 
size. In the NBS cohort the most common number o f pregnancies in each family 
was two, compared to three in the LCD cohort, closely followed by one pregnancy. 
Of the 13 LCD families who had a total o f three children, the index was the third 
bom in four families. A further four families were aware o f their risk before 
reaching a family size o f three. However, five LCD families were unaware o f their 
risk in seven pregnancies, before reaching family size o f three children.
One possible explanation for the higher number o f families in the LCD cohort who 
had only one child might have been that the LCD mothers were younger, and 
therefore more likely to have subsequent children after data collection finished. 
However, the mean number o f fertile years remaining in each woman, after data 
collection completed in 2006, highlighted that LCD families had less time left, in 
which to conceive subsequent pregnancies. Only three o f the 10 mothers in the LCD 
cohort, who only had one pregnancy, were under 40 years o f age in 2006, compared 
to nearly all the NBS women (4/5). The age o f the mothers suggests that LCD 
mothers, with only one child, were less likely to have subsequent children.
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The data presented in this section highlights two key points. First, when addressing 
the overall implications of diagnostic procedure on reproductive behaviour, it is 
important to consider the number of families who have pregnancies prior to the 
birth of their affected child. Many families will have completed family building 
when the index is bom, and therefore the provision of reproductive choice may be 
irrelevant. However, it should be noted that the risk-awareness may be relevant to 
at-risk female relatives.
Second, the fertility rate after the diagnosis was higher in the NBS cohort, despite 
the similarities in crude fertility rate prior to the diagnosis. Data on family size 
demonstrated considerable differences between the two cohorts. Family size in the 
NBS cohort was more likely to reflect the national average, whereas family size in 
the LCD cohort demonstrates an unusual pattern. One possible explanation is that 
NBS families, and in particular carriers, feel more confident in attempting to reach 
their ideal family size. The significantly lower uptake of prenatal testing in the LCD 
cohort suggests that families, who received a later clinical diagnosis, were less 
comfortable with the prospect of testing and terminating a subsequent child.
7. Summary of findings
During the period of data collection, 1990 to 2006, the provision of reproductive 
technologies remained fairly consistent between the two regions. However, different 
diagnostic pathways and carrier testing techniques had significant implications for 
families who received a diagnosis of DMD in Wales, or the west of Scotland. 
Affected males received a later clinical diagnosis at an average age of 4 years and 4 
months (range 17 months to 8 years). In contrast, newborn screening families 
predominantly received a diagnosis for their affected child at around six weeks, 
after the birth.
The use of particular carrier testing techniques differed across time and between 
regions. Between 1990 and 1995, families in both cohorts had to wait an average of 
79 months before receiving confirmation of their carrier status. After the 
introduction of more accurate and less time consuming testing procedures, there was
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a significant reduction in the time taken to confirm a mothers’ carrier status. 
However, variations in administrative procedures and testing techniques used in 
laboratories in Glasgow and Cardiff, led to considerable differences in the time 
taken to provide confirmation. Between 1996 and 2006, families in the NBS cohort 
had to wait around two years for confirmation; over twice as long as their LCD 
counterparts.
The implications of increasing technological sophistication, for reproductive 
behaviour, varied between families. Table 5.12 highlights how the data presented 
met the aims and objectives outlined at the beginning of this chapter, by defining 
the different reproductive behaviour between cohorts at varying times.
Table 5.12 Reproductive behaviour by time
Time period Difference betw een  cohorts
Prior to  birth of 
index
The underlying family structu re was not significantly 
different.
Prior to 
diagnosis of 
index
Diagnostic pathway had considerable implications for the 
num ber of pregnancies occurring betw een the  birth and 
diagnosis of index in the  LCD cohort. However, there  was 
little difference between the  cohorts in the  num ber of 
second affected boys born.
Prior to
confirmation of 
carrier s ta tu s
Families did not appear to  wait for confirmation of carrier 
s ta tu s, before proceeding with subsequen t pregnancies.
After diagnosis Families in the  NBS cohort w ere m ore likely to have 
subsequen t pregnancies, and w ere significantly more 
likely to  use prenatal testing. Birth interval in the  NBS 
and risk-unaw are LCD families reflected th e  national 
average. In contrast, risk aw are LCD families who had not 
conceived prior to the  diagnosis, appeared  to delay family 
building.
Overall Fertility rate in families prior to  the diagnosis is similar in 
both cohorts. Fertility rate after the  diagnosis is higher in 
NBS cohort. Overall family size in NBS cohort reflects 
national average. Considerably more LCD families have 
either th ree  or only one child.
Over half of the 72 families (51.3%) in the LCD and NBS cohorts, chose not to 
have subsequent pregnancies. Quantitative data does not allow an assessment of
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whether the decision to cease family building was related to the diagnosis.
However, national data shows that the average family has two children. In the total 
cohort, 58.3% of the families already had at least two children at the birth of the 
affected child; suggesting that, for many families, the decision to cease family 
building may not have been related to the diagnosis.
Diagnostic pathway had considerable implications for the number of pregnancies 
occurring between the birth and diagnosis of the first affected male. However, there 
was little difference in the number of second affected children bom. In the LCD 
cohort, nearly half of the subsequent pregnancies (44.8%) occurred prior to the 
diagnosis. Two LCD families had a second affected child before the diagnosis of the 
first27. In contrast, all NBS families had received the diagnosis prior to embarking 
on subsequent pregnancies. However, one NBS family chose not to have prenatal 
testing and had a second affected child.
Carrier testing did not appear to have a notable influence on reproductive behaviour. 
Nearly half of the pregnancies after the diagnosis (48.0%) occurred before families 
had received confirmation of their carrier status. The majority of families, who had 
to wait a considerable amount of time before receiving confirmation of their carrier 
status, proceeded with subsequent pregnancies regardless. There was a reduction in 
the number of pre-carrier confirmation pregnancies after more sophisticated 
technologies were introduced in the early to mid 1990s. However, the average birth 
interval after families received the diagnosis was considerably greater than the time 
taken to provide families with confirmation. It is therefore not possible to address 
whether families chose to wait for confirmation, or just happened to conceive after 
carrier confirmation had been provided.
Once families had received the diagnosis, families in the NBS cohort were more 
likely to have subsequent pregnancies. There were a slightly higher number of 
previous pregnancies in the LCD cohort, which may have had some influence on the 
number of subsequent pregnancies. However, the overall fertility rate in the NBS 
and LCD cohorts suggests that NBS families are more likely to have more children,
27 It is possible that the number of second affected boys may have been higher, if the proportion of 
mothers, who were carriers, was representative of the total cohort.
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regardless of the number of previous children. It is possible that a newborn 
screening diagnosis increased families desire to have more children.
The overall family size in the NBS cohort closely resembled that of families in the 
general population. In contrast, families who received a later clinical diagnosis were 
more likely to have only one child, or three children. Risk aware families, who 
chose to have subsequent pregnancies, made significantly different decisions 
regarding prenatal testing, depending on which diagnostic procedure they had 
received (p=0.05). This raises an important question: why are families who receive 
a newborn screening diagnosis, significantly more likely to use prenatal testing in 
subsequent pregnancies? This question is explored in the qualitative section of the 
study.
There were also notable differences in the birth interval. In families, who had 
received a newborn screening diagnosis and LCD families who were unaware of 
their risk, the birth interval broadly reflected the birth interval found in the general 
population. In contrast, risk aware families in the LCD cohort who had not had 
subsequent pregnancies prior to the diagnosis, appeared to wait considerably longer 
before proceeding with subsequent pregnancies.
In conclusion, a newborn screening diagnosis appears to “normalise” reproductive 
behaviour. Families who received a newborn screening diagnosis were more likely 
to have subsequent pregnancies, were more likely to use prenatal testing, and were 
more likely to reach a family size that reflected the national average. Interestingly, 
risk aware families in the LCD cohort did not appear to respond to the provision of 
reproductive choice in the same way. Many LCD families chose not to have 
prenatal testing. In addition, the slightly higher number of families choosing not to 
have subsequent pregnancies may suggest that some families chose to cease family 
building, as a result of the diagnosis.
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Chapter Six 
Living with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy
Introduction
Families’ experiences of living with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) altered 
in relation to the progression of the condition, and the severity of symptoms. 
Affected children are phenotypically normal at birth, and frequently, little clinical 
weakness can be detected before the child is three to five years of age. As the 
condition progresses, affected boys find walking increasingly difficult; most 
become wheelchair dependent between the ages of eight and ten years. In the 
interview cohort, the age of the affected boy ranged from five to fifteen years in the 
LCD cohort, and one to sixteen years in the NBS cohort. Families had therefore 
experienced quite different aspects of the condition at the time of the interview.
Family descriptions of their experience of living with DMD can be divided into 
three stages: the early, middle, and late years. The ‘early years’ describe the period 
in which parents received the diagnosis. For families in the newborn screening 
(NBS) cohort, the diagnosis was received soon after birth and the affected child 
remained asymptomatic for a number of years. Families in the later clinically 
diagnosed (LCD) cohort received the diagnosis after signs and symptoms of the 
condition become apparent. The middle years are characterised by the child’s 
decreasing mobility. Families described the process of adapting lifestyles and 
family homes to children’s emerging needs. The final stage, described by families, 
was the experience of living with disability: the time after children have become 
wheelchair dependent.
There was considerable variation in families’ experiences. First, not all families had 
experienced all three stages. All families had received a diagnosis and therefore had 
some experience of the early years, and seventeen out of nineteen families had 
started making practical adaptations to their homes. However, only seven families 
had a child who was wheelchair dependent at the time of the interview (NBS = 4, 
LCD = 3). Second, families’ descriptions of the different stages highlighted
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considerable disparity between the two different diagnostic procedures, particularly 
during the early years. This chapter is divided into three sections, to explore the 
stages of living with DMD, in relation to the diagnostic pathway.
1. The early years
Families’ experiences of the early years highlighted both similarities and disparities 
between the two diagnostic pathways. Eleven families received the diagnosis when 
their child was around six weeks old and eight families received a diagnosis when 
their child was an average age of 3.9 years (range 3 to 5.75 years) . The disparate 
experiences of the early years are explored under two themes: ‘from confirmation of 
concerns to stunned devastation’ and ‘uncertain identity and parental competency’. 
The similarities, in families’ experiences of the two diagnostic procedures, are 
explored under two subsequent themes: ‘disrupting relationships; the role of 
communication’ and ‘resuming normal life and seeking explanations; the role of 
responsibility’.
1.1. From confirmation of concerns to stunned devastation; the variable role of 
diagnostic pathway
Receiving a diagnosis of DMD generated multiple responses. For some, it meant 
long sought confirmation of parental concerns, or the end of blissful ignorance. For 
others, the diagnosis meant the acquisition of an unexpected disease label for a 
seemingly healthy baby, or the creation of unsolicited anxiety. In all cases, the 
meaning of the diagnosis emerged from preceding events, which had profound 
implications for subsequent experiences.
Families who received a later clinical diagnosis described the early years as moving 
from the carefree years, to the recognition of signs and symptoms, to the eventual 
confirmation of their concerns through the diagnosis. In contrast, families who
28 It is important to note that families in the interview cohort received the diagnosis, on average, over 
6 months earlier than the total LCD cohort. In the total LCD cohort the average age at diagnosis was 
4.5 years (range 1.4 to 8 years) and therefore LCD families in the interview cohort were less likely to 
have experienced a particularly delayed diagnosis.
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received a diagnosis through newborn screening in the NBS cohort described the 
early years quite differently; focusing on the diagnosis as the point at which their 
concerns were created, and the years immediately after the diagnosis as the “lost 
years”. Experiences of the diagnostic pathways are explored under four headings. 
The first two, ‘the carefree years’ and ‘recognising signs’, refer to the experiences 
of families who had received a later clinical diagnosis. The remaining two, ‘creating 
concerns’ and ‘the lost years’ refer to the experiences of families who had received 
a newborn screening diagnosis.
1.1.1 The carefree yea rs
Without fail, every family, who had received a later clinical diagnosis, described the
value of receiving a later clinical diagnosis. Families felt that the later diagnosis had
enabled them to enjoy precious, carefree years with their child, without the stress
and worry induced by the diagnosis. For some families, the thought of receiving the
diagnosis at birth would have been simply unbearable.
I think it would have been awful. I think it would have been awful,
I thought, well thinking back I thought I had two perfectly healthy 
kids. You know and for tha t to be taken away like th a t  would have 
been... I think tha t would have been a big one. I had six years not 
to worry about anything like that. Thinking well, he 's alright. [If 
you knew earlier] you'd still have had six years  more worrying 
about them  and thinking what's going to happen to them  and you 
have enough years of th a t  worrying about them  because you do it 
every day of your life. There's not a day in your life th a t  you don't 
think about it. (Pamela, first child diagnosed clinically after birth of 
second affected child)
Families’ immediate response to the prospect of receiving the diagnosis at birth 
always focused on the loss of the carefree years; the loss of happiness and blissful 
ignorance. During the carefree years, Lesley, like many mothers, described bonding 
with her child, enjoying spending time with him without worry or fear of the 
prognosis.
I think we enjoyed him more because we didn't know. We enjoyed 
him more in the five years. I think if we had have known it would 
have changed things. We wouldn't have changed towards him but 
we would have - 1 don't think we would have been - it would have 
felt very happy. We'd have jus t  looked a t  him and knew tha t 's  what 
he had, but he's not - we didn't know for five years and we enjoyed 
him and he was happy. (Lesley, first child diagnosed clinically after 
conception of second child)
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Both Pamela and Lesley received a clinical diagnosis later than the 4.5 year 
average, and both had conceived their second son prior to the diagnosis of their 
first. Pamela had two affected boys. Lesley had decided not to test her second boy 
until he was older because, as Lesley noted, she would “rather enjoy him before 
[she] found out”.
Providing information and choice has become a common rationale for expanding 
newborn screening programmes, but for families who had not had the opportunity 
to benefit from such information, the prospect was entirely bleak. Families often 
described their lives after the clinical diagnosis as haunted by worry, unhappiness, 
and fear of the prognosis. For them, therefore, receiving an earlier diagnosis was 
perceived as merely reducing, or eliminating, precious carefree years.
1.1.2 R ecogn isin g  sig n s
However, the years prior to the diagnosis were not entirely care-free. All families 
had noticed some of the physical attributes of the condition, from enlarged calf 
muscles, to slow development, mobility difficulties, or a tendency toward 
clumsiness. Often families sought justifications from within existing frameworks of 
understanding, as a way of defining symptoms within a familiar context.
The level of concern garnered by early symptoms was dependent on whether
families were able to find reassuring justifications. Families who remained
relatively unconcerned by the symptoms were those who could find simple
explanations from within their own experience. For example, one mother assumed
the premature birth of their son would inevitably lead to slower development;
another assumed her son’s enlarged calf muscles were merely a sign that he had
inherited his father’s large build. In the following extract Maureen demonstrates
how her initial assessment of her son’s symptoms focused on considerations of her
own physical abilities.
Well, Daniel was always -  well, he was fifteen months when he 
started walking but he was quite clumsy and he kept falling quite a 
lot. And he's our only child so we had nothing to com pare it to. At 
nursery he kept on falling and I kept saying to the health visitor, 
he's really, really clumsy. I don't know if it's -  my husband was 
working away a t  the time. And so he was only home a t  the
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w eekends and I'm left handed and quite clumsy as a result. And I 
thought maybe it's because I was going about everything in a left 
handed way and he's right handed. (Maureen, first child diagnosed 
clinically, aged 4.5 years)
The most common approach to the symptoms was to search for a simple 
explanation; there was often nothing in the families’ biographical experience that 
made them think that the signs and symptoms were a product of illness.
Some families used their experience of watching other children’s progression, to
compare their son’s development. However, families without previous children
described the difficulty of accessing such information.
[My son] was like quite hesitant - 1 mean he was what, two and a 
half, ju s t  before he turned three, he was kind of a hesitant getting 
up and down kerbs and really wasn't getting anywhere with going 
up and down stairs. So I did have some concerns. And the way he 
ran w asn 't quite - 1 knew there was something. But then I didn't 
have any other children to compare him with and people kept 
saying oh, they develop a t  different s tages  so I kept thinking oh, 
it's nothing. It 's  nothing. (Mary, first child diagnosed clinically)
Giving birth and raising a first child extends families’ biography into uncharted 
territory. Without recourse to comparative experiences on the development of an 
unaffected child, concern about the aetiology of symptoms was often mitigated by 
assumptions of normal development. When parental concerns were voiced to health 
professionals, reassurance was often provided that the symptoms merely 
demonstrated slow, but normal progression.
A few children were diagnosed after concerns were brought to the attention of
medical professionals. One child, for example, fell over and was slow to recover;
another was admitted to hospital for liver problems; another referred for speech
delay. However, many families experienced no such catalyst. Previously assuaged
concerns only became prominent again once the affected child was in regular
contact with children of a similar age. Many families found their attention drawn to
their son’s development after their children had joined nursery or school.
Me and his dad always noticed he was a wee bit stiff. But we just 
put it down to... he was ju s t  normal. A lot of kids are  like that. But 
it was the  school tha t had noticed. I think somebody goes round 
the schools ju s t  to keep an eye on the kids. And somebody had 
noticed tha t the re  were some things Jonathon couldn't do in the 
gym. So the  head teacher got me down and explained to me and I 
told her I'd make an appointment with the doctor. So then I got 
referred up to the paediatricians. And we done a blood te s t  and
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had to do another one and it confirmed th a t  he had Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy. (Lesley, first child diagnosed clinically when 
Lesley was pregnant with second child)
Parents reported that midwives and health visitors tended to provide families with 
reassurance, while nursery staff and teachers often noted discrepancies in physical 
abilities. The tendency to mistake early signs for slow development became 
progressively more difficult as children grew older, and could be visually compared 
to their contemporaries.
Families who had received a later clinical diagnosis tended to spend more time 
describing the gradual progression towards the diagnosis, than vivid descriptions of 
the actual diagnosis. For many families, the reality of their child’s difficulties had 
already become apparent. Their accounts spoke of a gradual realisation, a slow 
ebbing away of belief in the prospect of having a “normal”, healthy child.
Although none of the families described the diagnosis as a relief, there was an
unerring sense that the diagnosis had at least vindicated, what others had assumed to
be, excessive worry. One mother, Pamela, noted that “everyone had laughed” at her
anxiety about her child’s slow development. Another mother described people’s
dismissive responses to her concerns:
[My mum] used to think... I think she said, "I actually thought you 
were mollycoddling him". And when they found out a t  the  nursery 
they said to me do you know you've been telling us this all along 
and nobody's really been listening to you. Like you always said 
when he came in with new shoes Scott's got new shoes today, 
keep an eye on him now, he'll trip over and he always done tha t 
and he couldn't ju s t  join in anything like a birthday party when all 
of his friends go to get on a trampoline and everything. Oh, 
there 's  no way Scott would be going on a trampoline and I 
rem em ber him, the staircase was in the living room and he crawled 
up the stairs and I rem em ber thinking tha t,  it's ju s t  things. You 
ju s t  go back and think right, I knew it wasn 't ever, you know, 
mollycoddling him at all but everybody else thought that... (Nicola, 
first affected boy diagnosed clinically, after birth of second affected 
boy)
Many mothers, in both cohorts, mentioned hearing stories of families who had 
taken their children back and forth to doctors for years, before their concerns were 
taken seriously. In this cohort, although many had been given false reassurances 
from health professionals, every family expressed relief that they had not received a 
diagnosis through newborn screening. Although some mothers felt their concerns
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had been dismissed as excessive worry or mollycoddling, none expressed 
discontent with receiving a later clinical diagnosis.29
1.1.3 C reating concerns
In contrast to experiencing the gradual progression of the condition and diminishing
belief in the idea of having a “normal”, healthy child, families who had received a
positive newborn screening result were less prepared for the diagnosis. Many
mothers who had received a diagnosis through newborn screening, described their
sons as “normal babies”; they had no cause for concern prior to the diagnosis.
There w asn 't anything... to say... tha t tha t there was going to be 
anything wrong. It was a perfectly normal birth. You know? There 
was nothing... (Anne, second child diagnosed through newborn 
screening)
For newborn screening families, the diagnosis occurred after families had chosen to
have their child screened for the condition. However, only seven of the eleven NBS
families interviewed had some recollection of ticking a box, or signing a form to
consent for testing for DMD. The remaining four families did not appear to be
aware that testing for DMD was optional. Even the families who remembered
choosing to have the test did not recall making a considered decision.
Do you rem em ber being told about th e condition before, you  
know, th e  heel prick?
(Shakes head) because it was, I suppose, you go to the  clinic don't 
you with a screaming baby and they say they 're going to do so and 
so, and such and such and you ju s t  think yeh, ju s t  do it, do what 
needs to be done. You don't think at the time, do you? That 
something's going to come back. So... it's not really something I 
thought through. (Fiona, second child diagnosed through NBS)
The test is conducted when the baby is six days old, when most families are in the 
midst of adjusting to the phenomenal changes a baby induces in daily routines. 
Mothers described themselves as sleep-deprived and somewhat oblivious. As one 
mother noted:
...in fairness whatever they would have told me ... I can hardly 
rem em ber what they said now, I would never have remembered 
what I'd ju s t  been told anyhow. (Lauren, second child diagnosed 
through NBS)
29 It should be noted that five of the eight families interviewed had received the diagnosis 
considerably earlier than the national average of 4.5 years.
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The test for DMD is an extra, optional test that is conducted alongside routine
newborn screening tests. For the majority of newborn screening families, the test
for DMD was perceived to be part of routine care. The decision to opt-in seemed to
be influenced by the timing and availability of the test.
I suppose we ju s t  thought a t  the time well, it's ju s t  another one to 
check. And of course we didn't, you know, it wasn 't -  we weren't 
there thinking oh, but what if it comes -  you know, it -  it didn't 
really -  it was ju s t  like oh well, it's there. We should have it, type 
of thing really I thought. Well, tha t 's  what I thought anyway. But 
I didn't really think too much about it. It was ju s t  a te s t  tha t was 
offered and we jus t  decided to -  to have it done because it was 
you know, available, as I say with the o thers anyway th a t  were 
normally done, so. (Jess, first child diagnosed through NBS)
None of the families considered the consequences of testing; all assumed the results
would be negative, and most had forgotten having the tests by the time they
received the diagnosis. In Lauren’s words:
"I completely dismissed what could come out of it. I didn't think it was 
anything to worry about I was completely calm, I forgot tha t I'd even had 
it done" (Lauren, second child diagnosed through newborn screening).
In the NBS cohort, babies were too young to demonstrate any detectable clinical 
weakness. For some families, the lack of signs and symptoms made the diagnosis 
harder to accept.
...if they 're 4 or 5 you can actually see the effects, you know, they 
are falling over more and they can't run as  fast as the  o ther 
children and -  and things like that. So ... you know, you -  you 
probably dwell on it a lot more then because every little thing they 
do you're thinking, oh of course, tha t 's  why he's doing th a t  and 
tha t 's  why he's doing this. Whereas, when Jamie was so young he 
was ju s t  like any o ther ten  week old baby [...] That does make it 
difficult to accept because you look a t  Jamie and you say well it 
can 't be true, look a t  him, he's ju s t  perfect. Erm ... and -  and, you 
know, I still think tha t every day: well there  can't be anything 
wrong with him. Look a t  him, he's perfect. But erm... you know it 
does make it a little harder to accept I suppose when you can't see 
the actual signs there. (Sue, first child diagnosed through NBS)
Newborn screening diagnoses provided families with the opportunity to avoid the 
diagnostic delay. However, by eliminating the opportunity for the gradual 
progression of signs and symptoms, families who had received a diagnosis through 
newborn screening, were often left stunned by the diagnosis.
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1.1.4 The lost years
Descriptions of the diagnosis revealed the depth of devastation felt by families.
Many parents took time off work; homes became places of tears and depression,
whilst families dealt with what many described as a “terrible bereavement”. Many
families, who had received a diagnosis through newborn screening, described how
they “lost” the first few years of their child’s life. Some mothers felt that receiving
the diagnosis so soon after the birth was particularly traumatic, due to the
heightened emotions experienced during the newborn period. One mother, through
tears, and obvious distress, described her devastation:
I can always rem em ber saying a t the time 'you can 't ju s t  tell some 
young m other that! That their son is going to be dead. (Crying)
What? You know? They could jus t  slip, you know ju s t  go into 
postnatal depression and I've got to be honest, yeh... we lost the 
first year of Gethin, you know? It went... a year... ju s t  worrying [...]
We took hundreds of photos of Jim when he was a baby... Gethin's 
just... went. (Anne, second child diagnosed through NBS)
Parents who received a positive newborn screen, tended to provide slightly
lengthier descriptions of the trauma and devastation caused by the diagnosis. For
newborn screening families, coming to terms with the initial devastation of the
diagnosis often took years.
The first -  I think the  first two years it -  you know, I -  I had to take 
anti-depressants, I was -  it was hard, but after the  first two years 
yeah -  yeah things do ge t easier and you know, you -  you do see 
light a t  the  end of the tunnel so -  and now, we -  we ju s t  -  I mean I 
still have days but we -  we try and look on the bright side and you 
know, and we get on with things now... (Louise, second child 
diagnosed through NBS)
In contrast, families who had received a later clinical diagnosis tended to spend 
more time describing the gradual progression towards the diagnosis, and described 
the length of time spent in tears and depression, in months, rather than years.
For some parents, a positive test for DMD confirmed suspicions, or brought to the 
fore some half-conscious concerns, but for others the diagnosis arrived without 
warning, and was met with stunned devastation. Parents, who received a positive 
newborn screening result for a seemingly healthy baby, appeared less prepared. 
Tests, nonchalantly chosen, were promptly forgotten; lost in sleepless wonderment 
in the early days of newborn life. For these parents, there was no gradual 
progression, no slow deterioration to spark concerns, just an unsolicited visit from
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the doctor to announce their child’s “death sentence before they’d started their life” 
(Rebecca, second child diagnosed through NBS).
1.2 Uncertain identity and parental competency; negotiating the medical label
This section explores families’ experiences of the early years, after their child had 
been diagnosed. Receiving the diagnosis marked the beginning of a new life. For 
some families the carefree years were replaced by an endless stream of 
appointments, “and every time you have a hospital appointment”, as Maureen 
explained “it’s another reminder and it’s never good news, it’s never progress”. 
Other families were presented with the diagnosis long before physical deterioration 
was apparent or medical intervention was necessary. These families often described 
either a battle to assert authority over their child’s upbringing, or a sense of isolation 
and doubt about the appropriate way to raise their child.
Many families spoke of the difficulty of distinguishing the aspects of their child’s 
character, which emanated from their condition, and those which were simply 
personality traits. Negotiating medical information, and experience of their child, 
created a sense of uncertain identity; a quest to disentangle characteristics of 
‘disease’ from ‘child’. Experiences of families who had received a later clinical 
diagnosis are explored under the theme ‘receiving a label’, and experiences of those 
who had received a newborn screening diagnosis, are explored under the theme 
‘living with a label’.
1.2.1 R eceivin g  a la b e l
All families, who had received a later clinical diagnosis, had recognised that their
child had some mobility difficulties, or was slow to develop, even if they had not
realised symptoms were indicative of DMD. The diagnosis, therefore, often
provided an explanation for previously recognised behaviours. Many LCD families
described how the diagnosis had merely provided a label for such behaviours;
nothing else had changed.
I think it was to our -  you know, the whole family's benefit because 
the only thing th a t  had changed a t tha t point was the diagnosis; the
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label tha t had been put on it, because he was the  sam e boy. [...] I 
think tha t probably if Daniel had been diagnosed as a baby our 
expectations of him and for him would have been less. Because, you 
know, he went to nursery there  weren't any immediate problems and 
whatever. He goes to a mainstream school; you know and he's very 
much -  well, my life's like more work -  but there 's  nothing wrong in 
here [pointing to head], you know, and yes, he's bright. He's in the 
top groups, [...] he -  goes to boys' brigade. He's had loads of 
trophies and you know, he's -  he really has got a very good quality 
of life. But I think maybe if he'd been diagnosed as a baby we'd have 
thought well, tha t 's  it. You know, we can't expect him to go to boys 
brigade -  we can 't expect this. Whereas I expect him to have 
everything in his life tha t able-bodied boys of his age have. And he 
has, so... (Maureen, first child diagnosed clinically)
For this family, and many others, the later diagnosis had enabled parents to develop 
a personal awareness of their child’s abilities. When parents received a diagnosis, 
they received a label for some, but not all, aspects of their child’s behaviour. During 
the early carefree years parents began to have expectations for their child, which 
some felt would have been diminished by receiving a medically defined label at 
birth.
Many families articulated the benefit of getting to know their child, before the
weight of uncertain identity was placed on their shoulders; defining the line
between “normal” childhood behaviour and attributes of the condition was
inherently problematic.
People have got perceptions of disability and I wouldn't have liked to 
have thought tha t - I know another woman who's got a wee boy and 
I think he was a baby, he was a baby when he was diagnosed. And 
talking to her, everything was to do with muscular dystrophy. 
Everything about this wee boy was to do with muscular dystrophy, 
do you know what I mean? If he had problems on the  potty, it was 
because he had muscular dystrophy. He had problem - whatever he 
had a problem with, it was muscular dystrophy, and I wouldn't have 
wanted to be like that. I mean I wanted - because I think I'm a wee 
bit like th a t  with him as well sometimes because you'll read things 
and you'll see, you know, they can have behavioural problems and 
things and I'm going is it him or is tha t what other children are like? 
Do you know what I mean? I'm sometimes - 1 mean my sister's got 
wee girls and my sister-in-law's got wee boys, and I'm always saying 
to them , you know, what are they like? What are  they like? And I 
think it would have been worse if he'd been a wee baby. I wouldn't 
have wanted - and even my parents in law, they 're obviously - 
they're older, and they 've been very upset by it as  well, and they 
don't understand it. And I ju s t  think it annoys you som etim es when 
they put it down to muscular dystrophy and you feel like saying it's 
not that. He's a perfectly normal wee boy in all respects other than 
that. (Mary, first child diagnosed clinically)
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Mary illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between the aspects of their child’s 
identity that resulted from the condition, from those which merely reflected their 
child’s character. The diagnosis provided a label for a medical condition that was 
outside parental experiences. However, parents who had received a later clinical 
diagnosis often spoke of the mitigating effect of the carefree years; parents had 
grown to know their child, without a diagnostic label. Defining the line between 
behaviour relating to the condition and behaviour relating to the child, whilst still 
problematic, was perceived to be an easier task as a result of the later diagnosis.
1.2.2 L iv in g  w ith  a la b e l
For the eleven NBS families interviewed, the diagnosis marked the end of their
experience of having a “normal” child, and the beginning of their lives with a child
with special health needs. Receiving a diagnosis radically changed families’
perceptions of private family life. The slow ebb and flow of involvement with
medical professionals subsided after the birth, only to be replaced, for some
families, by a tidal wave of involvement. Although one mother, Jennifer, felt that it
was useful to “be in the system”, many others articulated a sense of invasion.
I found it very interfering in the beginning. Really, really interfering 
in the  beginning because... there  was nothing wrong with them. So 
all 1 wanted was the practical things done and they were all fussing 
over the  o ther things and I ju s t  wanted the  practical things done.
Um... there  was nothing you could do for them. There was nothing 
wrong with them  for all these  people to come in and say you know, 
you should be doing this or you shouldn't be doing th a t  and I was 
thinking ju s t  let them  ge t on with being boys please. You know?
When this comes it will come. So I found it annoying. I m ust admit. 
(Anne, second child diagnosed through NBS. First child subsequently 
diagnosed)
Although Anne’s youngest child was diagnosed after the introduction of newborn
screening, she had experienced the slow development of the condition in her eldest
child. Anne articulated her confidence in defining her children’s needs and the
travesty of being told how to care for asymptomatic boys.
...it's the  plonkers out there  tha t try to tell you... w hat you should be 
doing. That is the worst. And it's terrible I can always rem em ber the 
first meeting after they were diagnosed. I was told I had to go to a 
meeting, so I thought right, I'll go to this meeting and how many 
were they? There was about 12 of them, you know? The school, 
psychologist, midwife and they were all... giving me this. And I could 
see me sitting there  thinking woh, woh. So I ju s t  looked a t  them  and 
said hang on now, these  are my sons! This is what I want for them.
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And I thought, you know, Anne tha t 's  you, because tha t 's  the sort of 
person I am. What about the thousands out there th a t  can 't do what 
I want to do. You know? That haven't, tha t aren 't  eloquent enough 
or confident enough or whatever who will sit there and take it. It 
must be heartbreaking! For all these people to tell you what they 
think is best for your children. I thought I'm not having this. You 
know? (Anne, second child diagnosed through newborn screening; 
first child subsequently diagnosed)
Many descriptions of the battle between the medical world and the private family
home emanated from families who had received a diagnosis during the early years
of the newborn screening programme. In contrast, many NBS families, who had
received a diagnosis in more recent years, described their feelings of isolation.
The first year, I - 1 felt tha t there was nobody to talk to a t  all, only 
my family, you know. I -  we -  we've seen Scott's specialist and I 
mean all she did was tell us about the condition and you go and see 
her you know, tha t 's  it. There was no support or anything a t all, you 
know. [...] In the first year or two there  was nothing and it was like 
we had to do it all ourselves, you know, there was nobody there  to 
say, "well why do you not do this, why do you do that?" (Louise, 
second child diagnosed through newborn screening)
Louise, like many NBS mothers, articulated a profound sense of doubt about the
appropriate way to care for her asymptomatic child. Presented with a baby and a
disease label, many described a desperate search for information, which medical
professionals were often unable, or unwilling to provide.
To be honest, we haven 't had all tha t much ... contact with -  with 
people in the  Health Service. I mean the  health visitor was 
absolutely fantastic. I mean she 's  such a lovely woman, but she -  
she'd never dealt with -  she'd never had a, you know, a child with 
Duchenne before and the  sam e with GP, erm ... my GP I've known 
since I moved down to Wales, but he -  he, you know, he's lovely but 
he never had a patient with Duchenne before. So they obviously 
don't know tha t much about it so they couldn't be of th a t  much help 
really. Erm ... and ... we haven't really had contact with anyone else 
apart from [the consultant] but tha t was only to do the tes ts  and for 
-  to tell us th a t  she didn't really have anything to tell us. So it's, 
you know, it's not been ideal. (Sue, first child diagnosed through 
NBS)
The presentation of diagnostic label, to parents who are just discovering how to care 
for their baby, appeared to undermine parents’ belief in their ability to care for their 
child. Contact with health professionals was perceived to be a vital connection to 
expertise and advice on appropriate caring techniques. However, the disengaged 
approach of the health professionals often left families with a sense of isolation and 
abandonment.
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Five of the eleven newborn screening families interviewed had received a diagnosis 
during the first five years, after the implementation of the newborn screening 
programme. Six of the eleven families had received a diagnosis since the year 2000. 
There was a resounding sense that the level of support provided to families was felt 
to be overbearing during the first few years of the programme. However, families 
who had received a newborn screening diagnosis since the year 2000 often 
described feeling unsupported and isolated. One mother, Jacky, noted with some 
disdain that their family care officer had informed them that “we can’t do anything 
until he is five years old, so just enjoy him as you would any other child”. For the 
majority of newborn screening families, the knowledge that their child had a 
medical condition, elicited a belief that medical professionals should be involved in 
their child’s life.
Some families seemed to make a conscious decision to try to ignore the diagnosis
until house adaptations became a necessity. One way of setting aside the diagnosis
was to keep news of the condition away from the public domain, until the signs and
symptoms of the condition became more prominent.
I mean when we first, you know, we didn't tell anybody for a long, 
long time -
No, we ju s t  kept it to ourselves -  
We were -
Told our mothers. My father and my mother.
Wanted people to enjoy him... Because people tend to see him 
differently don't they, if -  and we didn't want that to happen. So 
then I don't know if we're perhaps protecting him.
No, we ju s t  thought he -  you know, might as well not say anything
because you know -
Well, that's it. Nobody would know.
No one would know. And -  You know, we ju s t  thought there 's  no 
point saying until there 's  a need to. {Neil and Jess, first child 
diagnosed through newborn screening)
For some families, the diagnosis was a closely guarded secret; a desire to 
protect their child’s identity from the connotations of a disease label. No one 
needed to know, and - whilst their child remained in the early stages of the 
condition -  no one would know.
After the initial diagnosis, some families felt that the lack of contact with health 
professionals provided them with the opportunity to pretend life was normal. These 
families often attempted to keep life undisturbed by the realities of the diagnosis, 
and avoided facing their child’s future. Families often mentioned actively avoiding
152
sources of information, such as the internet or access to other families’ experiences
through support groups.
[The progression of the condition is] something tha t gradually 
happens... its something you could pretend isn't happening for 
quite a long time. So even though you can see it and you know it's 
there, even with other children and stuff, it's something you can't 
sort of well you know...I've never really been th a t  involved in... um 
the groups and stuff you see so... it wasn't... a t  tha t point you know 
when he was walking and stuff it w asn 't in my face all the time and 
he was going to school up the road and they were wonderful you 
know... so... you can pretty much get on with things and pretend...
Not th a t  you are really pretending because you know tha t, you 
know it's the re  but... you can be as  normal as you can which is nice 
I think. I liked it, I liked... pretending tha t it was all quite normal 
because um... I didn't... I wanted to be as  normal for as long as we 
could really. (Fiona, second child diagnosed through NBS)
NBS families presented the reality of living with a child in the early stages of the 
condition, as a no-man’s land. Although children stumbled a little more than others, 
they were still capable of being a “normal” child. Before the routine of regular 
hospital appointments began, and mobility difficulties signalled the need for house 
adaptations, families were able to continue life as they would have done without the 
diagnosis. For some families the lack of support was frustrating and isolating; for 
others, it was an opportunity to regain some sense of the carefree years.
1.3 Disrupting relationships; the role of communication
Many families in the NBS and LCD cohorts did describe a number of similar
experiences during those early years. Whether the affected child was diagnosed at
birth, or after signs and symptoms of the condition became apparent, the diagnosis
often had a considerable effect on the mother and father’s relationship. For some
couples, the diagnosis strengthened their relationship.
[The diagnosis] probably brought us closer. You know, it's -  
because -  and actually a lot of the times you know, Daniel's in bed, 
we've ju s t  sa t  and cried. You know, but we've got a better 
understanding of each o ther I think. So, and I think it's brought us 
closer. [Maureen, LCD, son diagnosed aged 5]
Many parents noted that, through sharing a traumatic experience, they had become 
more emotionally aware of each other, and their relationship had been strengthened 
as a result.
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In contrast, some families felt that the diagnosis had a negative effect on their
relationship. Sue discussed the reasons why she and her husband had separated
within a year of their son’s birth.
Gary's the type of person who d o e s n ' t ... he 's -  it's as  if nothing 
bothers him, you know, he -  he's ju s t  -  doesn 't worry about 
anything and it -  for tha t reason he doesn 't really talk about things 
either. So it probably does bother him but he hasn 't really ... he 
doesn 't open up about things like tha t and it, you know, and I got 
really down about it obviously and ... found it hard to talk to him 
because he didn't really want to talk about it. So it -  it did put a 
massive strain - you know, I don't know if tha t 's  the reason we split 
up because you know these  things happen, but it definitely didn't 
help.
Rather than causing the relationship to end, the diagnosis introduced new 
requirements from each partner, particularly in the techniques used to cope and 
communicate.
Sue was not the only mother who had once questioned whether her husband’s laid
back and easy going appearance reflected a lack of concern with the diagnosis.
Esther felt that her relationship with her husband was strong, but still commented on
their different styles of coping:
I think a lot of the time men ju s t  get on with it, they ju s t  -  he says -  it 
sometimes maybe seem s as if they 're not as upset but they are, they've 
got different ways of coping.
For families whose relationship suffered after the diagnosis, the primary source of 
contention was how each partner coped with and communicated about their 
feelings. Many mothers, like Esther, commented on how differently their husbands 
had dealt with the diagnosis.
Although many mothers felt that their relationship with their partner had been 
irrevocably changed by the diagnosis of their son, whether the change was positive 
or negative was specific to each family. Some mothers had separated from their 
partners, either temporarily or permanently, whilst others felt that their relationship 
had been solidified and strengthened following the diagnosis.
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1.4 Resuming normal life and seeking explanations; the role of responsibility
Responsibility emerged as a dominant feature in many families’ stories. Parents 
from both cohorts presented two facets of responsibility in relation to the diagnosis. 
First, many families described a sense of duty to cope with the diagnosis, to resume 
normal life, for the sake of their children. Second, mothers described their sense of 
responsibility for causing the condition. The two themes ‘resuming normal life’ and 
‘seeking explanations’ are addressed in subsequent sections.
1.4.1 R esu m in g n orm al life
As already noted, descriptions of the diagnosis revealed the depth of devastation felt
by families. However, many mothers noted a sense of urgency to deal with the
diagnosis; to resume their roles as the responsible parent.
Looking back at my childhood, I think I went through bouts of 
depression, my mum would say "how could a child be 
depressed?", but I think I was depressed. Fixated on death  and 
things [...] And I rem em ber going through s tages  th a t  I could 
hardly function for thinking about that, I'd be paralysed with fear.
But when he was diagnosed, I thought oh my god, you know, if I 
went into a bout like tha t,  where would tha t leave him? He 
needs us to be strong. (Mary, first child diagnosed clinically)
No matter how traumatic families found the diagnosis, few felt in a position to
break down. Many mothers made a conscious decision to act positively, to care for
their children, rather than become someone who needed to be cared for.
We had the  o ther two boys and we had him and you have to get 
on with a normal life. Because if we didn't cope, they wouldn't 
cope. Because I think like -  because if we didn't cope they'd 
maybe want to protect you or look after you, and like they would 
jus t  think there was nothing but despair. And I ju s t  think we had 
to cope and be positive, for them to be positive. (Esther, third 
child diagnosed clinicaiiy)
Interestingly, the perceived responsibility to resume “normal life” seemed most 
prevalent in parents of older children, and consequently occurred more frequently in 
LCD families.
In the NBS cohort, many families described how the earlier diagnosis had enabled
them to grieve whilst their children were still too young to notice.
Because Kirsten was so young, she w asn 't aware of how bad 
things were, you know there  was a bit of a depressed feeling in
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the house but because she was so young she w asn 't aware, 
whereas now a t eight and a half to nine she would have been 
very aware of us all being upset and Jack as well, I think the 
thing about him being a baby he didn't, you know he was 
completely unaware of what was going on and how we were 
feeling and us crying and sobbing around the place all the time.
(Rebecca, second child, Jack, diagnosed through NBS)
Parents who had received a diagnosis through newborn screening tended to provide 
slightly lengthier descriptions of the trauma and devastation caused by the 
diagnosis. One possible explanation is that newborn screening families were not 
beset with the urgent responsibility to resume normal life, for children who are old 
enough to be aware of their parents’ grief.
1.4.2 S eekin g explanations
After receiving the diagnosis, the majority of mothers had undergone carrier
testing. The provision of a carrier status label had a noticeable impact on mother’s
sense of responsibility for the condition. The majority of carriers described how
they had felt guilty for passing on the condition. Some carrier mothers presented the
sense of guilt as a fleeting experience:
I said "oh my god," a t  the beginning I can 't believe it's my fault.
I grew out of tha t in a couple of weeks. It was weird first off, I 
was oh god, but then I grew out of that... (Lauren, carrier, second 
child diagnosed through NBS)
Other carrier mothers experienced genetic responsibility as a constant, unerring 
sense of guilt.
The main feeling every day is... you know... it's my fault. It 's  a 
horrible, sick feeling I think but... how can you not feel tha t when 
you, when you find out that, you know, it's your family tha t 's  
carried this thing down and... I don't know tha t you... It's your 
decision isn't it? When you have kids it's your decision to have 
them... and it's your decision and it's then your responsibility to 
ensure tha t they 're safe... no m atter what you can do and, and 
make sure everything, I know I did, you know, I know I did, I 
know I did everything I could do you know, it's not my fault... but 
without me he wouldn't be here so... what... I, I don't... I can 't see  
how I couldn't feel... responsible... because I feel like I am...
(Fiona, carrier, second child diagnosed through NBS)
30 In the NBS cohort, a deletion/duplication had not been detected in the boy and therefore genetic 
carrier testing was unfeasible. In the LCD cohort, one mother had chosen to delay carrier testing.
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Although all carrier mothers described how they could not have known their risk
prior to giving birth, receiving the carrier label provided them with a previously
unknown sense of “being genetic”.
I try and look a t  it, and I think, well genes, you know, I mean we 
have a cancer a gene, you have this, you have th a t  -  it's ju s t  one 
of these  things. It's ju s t  the way you are, you know... it is -  
you've genes for everything and some of them aren 't  quite right 
and... you know, if your child has cancer or this or tha t,  I mean ...
So I try and look a t  it in tha t way, rather than, you know ... In 
the end then I s ta rt saying, well, you know, a t the  end of the 
day, I've not got the illness, I don't have to cope with it; I have 
to watch it, which is hard. But I try not to bog myself down with 
tha t because I need to focus on Sean. He's the one tha t 's  
suffering, not me. You know, erm, although I'm suffering, but 
not to the sam e extent, if you know what I mean. So I try not to 
go down th a t  way because you could go into self pity, you know 
... and tha t wouldn't be good. That's not good for anybody, is it, 
you know? (Pamela, carrier, second child diagnosed clinically)
For some mothers, feeling genetically responsible had to be addressed in relation to 
their sense of responsibility to deal with the diagnosis. Feeling guilty was perceived 
as a distraction from the role of the responsible parent.
Many mothers, who had been told that they were not carriers of the condition,
expressed their relief and yet were not relieved from feeling responsible. For some
mothers, the elimination of genetic responsibility merely created other avenues of
guilt. In the extract below, Tracey describes her difficulty with understanding the
medical description of the cause of the condition.
We went up [to the hospital] and asked to be tested . When we 
went up [the consultant] had the results and he ju s t  says 
congratulations, you're not, you know, a carrier. I says well, 
actually it doesn 't make me feel me any better, how has it 
happened? And tha t 's  then when he goes on and calls it a 
spontaneous mutation of the genes. I says but how does tha t 
happen? Basically - 1 think to this day you jus t  don't know how it's 
happened because you try to read it up on the internet and it's all 
like technical stuff, eh. And there 's  no -  place like writes it a way 
like m akes you understand, I even tried to... like when we found 
out like it was deletion 3 to 17. It was like - it showed you like a 
normal DNA build up -  for someone who didn't have muscular 
dystrophy. And suddenly like someone who had deletion 3 to 17 it 
was ju s t  all these  shades  of colours was different. So I thought -  
again they say like the cat sa t on the mat, in the genetic books and 
stuff like tha t,  but like I say I ju s t  couldn't get round it... (Tracey,
GM risk, second child diagnosed clinically)
Tracey, like many GM mothers, found the genetic explanation for the condition 
unsatisfactory. Left without a comprehendible explanation of the cause of the
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condition, many mothers sought alternative justifications. Common health 
promotion messages, particularly those surrounding appropriate behaviour during 
pregnancy, emerged in many mother’s accounts.
How did it m ake you fee l, not being a carrier?
I was going to say relieved as an initial thing. Relief tha t I hadn't 
passed it on [...] but then you still want to know where it's come 
from and you never do know do you? It's still an unanswered 
question. You always think, did I do something wrong? Did I eat 
something while I was pregnant or did I do something? Was my 
lifestyle wrong before I conceived? (Rebecca, GM risk, second child 
diagnosed through newborn screening)
Although parents had been informed that spontaneous mutations “just happened”,
mothers often perceived ill-health to be a result of specific behaviours. Mothers
therefore claimed responsibility for their sick child through analysing their actions
during pregnancy, which they perceived to be inappropriate.
...maybe it's like -  I know when you're expecting, they say don't ea t 
soft cheeses and I won't ea t  anything like that. And my pregnancy 
well, was -  I was out cycling my bike [...] I smoked when I was 
pregnant [...] And I spoke to [the genetic consultant], I says, was it 
because I smoked? I says maybe if I had of -  I know I fell when I 
was cleaning a window because the window came down and had it 
been tha t tha t caused it, I don't know. But he says no, he says it's 
ju s t  -  it ju s t  happens. (Tracey, GM risk, second child diagnosed 
clinically)
Family accounts demonstrate a wavering belief that the condition must have 
happened for a reason. Although tempered by genetic explanations, these rarely 
dampened the sense of responsibility. Many mothers were still searching through 
their lives, to find answers to the unanswerable.
For mothers who are carriers, the sense of responsibility is imbued with guilt; it was 
them, their families who had caused their child’s condition. Previously unknown 
aspects of their bodies become illuminated. A carrier becomes genetic, becomes 
genetically responsibility, genetically at fault, and yet, as one carrier mother, Jacky, 
stated “at least I know where it came from”. For mothers who have a risk of 
germline mosaicism, there is considerably less comprehension of the origin of the 
condition. Although they often present themselves as absolved from genetic 
responsibility, this merely leaves them with the unanswered question of causation. 
Mothers with a germline mosaicism risk often assumed responsibility by referring 
to health promotion messages regarding appropriate behaviour during pregnancy.
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2. The middle years
The middle years refers to the time when signs and symptoms of the condition 
became more apparent. Affected children often struggle to negotiate common 
features in the family home, such as steps, stairs, baths and toilets. In anticipation of 
their future needs and wheelchair dependency, family homes and lifestyles must be 
adapted. Families who had received a newborn screening diagnosis often spoke at 
length of the value of having time to prepare for the future.
Although many NBS families felt that a later diagnosis would have caused delay in 
starting the process of house adaptations, the average age of the affected boy when 
families started house adaptations was six years in both cohorts. In the NBS cohort, 
one family started the process when their son was two years old, and two families 
started when the boy was four years old, but others delayed until their child was ten, 
or in one case twelve years old. In contrast, families in the LCD cohort started the 
process of house adaptations when their child was between five and seven years old.
Families in both cohorts noted a number of factors that affected the time at which 
house adaptations were commenced. First, many families found the process of 
house adaptations an incredibly distressing experience. Choosing to start the 
process was sometimes experienced as a disruption of normality, which many 
parents, particularly in the NBS cohort, chose to delay. Second, the majority of 
families, in both cohorts, had felt that their attempts to start adaptations had been 
hindered by the lack of necessary information and support from social services. 
Families’ experiences of adapting life to disability are explored in three subsequent 
themes: ‘lifestyle preparations’, ‘disrupting normality’ and ‘seeking 
assistance/fighting the system’.
2.1 Lifestyle preparations
Without fail, every family who had received a newborn screening diagnosis 
expressed gratitude for the provision of time to prepare, practically, rather than 
emotionally. However, the degree to which NBS parents made practical
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preparations for life with a disabled child differed significantly between families. 
Some families had made considerable changes to their lifestyles, whilst others 
waited until they were struggling to cope with their child’s progressive weakness, 
before addressing the condition. Despite the differences, all families felt that they 
had benefited from knowing earlier, although for many, the reasons were difficult to 
elucidate.
It's ju s t  tha t finding out before, I've been able to plan things, but not 
an awful lot -  you know we bought a bungalow. Just thinking more 
about the  future... But then again, saying tha t I suppose you know, if 
they are, you know, diagnosed a t five, seven, then you know that's  
going to hit then anyway because it's a slow progressing thing 
anyway, it's not as  if, you know, they're going to ge t really ill 
overnight or anything, but... I don't know, I can 't really say, ju s t  -  I 
feel tha t I think tha t you know, I'd prefer tha t it happened, we found 
out then rather than, rather than later on. (Jess, first child diagnosed 
through NBS)
A number of families simply felt that it was better to know; forewarned is 
forearmed. NBS families rarely perceived any benefit of receiving a later diagnosis. 
Families described the view that if they were to receive a diagnosis sooner or later, 
sooner was surely better than later.
A few families had made significant changes to their lives as a result of the 
diagnosis.
With work and things we've made choices. We've stayed round the 
area so we can be closer to friends and family because we need that 
support network and I think that, whereas we might have flitted 
round the  o ther side of the world or we might... and we do things like 
we try and pack in as  much as we can now. You know so tha t he'll 
have memories and he'll have... and as a family we do as much as 
we can because I don't want to say, 'oh I wish we'd done tha t ' or 'we 
could have done tha t ' and you know? So now I think it was good. At 
the time, no it was devastating, but it would be devastating 
whatever age they are to find out. But I think we've definitely been 
able to make choices for things with other children. You know Jack 
could have been our first child and I could have been a carrier.
(Rebecca, second child diagnosed through newborn screening)
Many families had chosen to stay, or move closer to friends and relatives, in an 
attempt to access networks of support. Mothers, in particular, often changed career 
plans to ensure flexible hours, or work patterns which fitted in with school holidays. 
Numerous families felt that they would make more of their years with their child, 
before he became wheelchair dependent.
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Many families felt that the newborn screening diagnosis had provided time to
emotionally prepare for their child’s prognosis. One mother, Lauren, described the
benefit of being able to introduce her children to the equipment required, before her
son actually needed it.
I think being told early on for us... we've had seven years to get used 
to the idea without any of them... nobody realising. You're always 
one step  ahead of the kids, and you're always in control as much as 
you can possibly be; you're organised. You, like for instance when 
the lift went in the kids thought it was for ... so th a t  I didn't have to 
carry the hoover up the  stairs [...] I didn't want the  kids to figure 
out tha t all the gadgets, as they call them, tha t we've got were for 
Ryan. I wanted them to grow up with them and see  them  everyday,
I didn't want them  to be brought in at the wrong time. (Lauren, 
second child diagnosed through newborn screening)
Lauren had moved house and completed adaptations within a few years of the 
diagnosis. It should be noted, however, that the approach taken by Lauren and 
her family was unusual in the newborn screening cohort. The majority of 
families did not introduce equipment into the family home until it was 
required by their child.
For many parents, a profound sense of loss at learning their child’s prognosis at 
birth, co-existed with heart-felt gratitude for the early provision of life-changing 
information.
I can rem em ber being offered [the test]... And choosing to take it! 
(laughing)
Do you regret doing that?
No. No. I think a t  the time when he was diagnosed yes, because you 
felt like your child had died. It was like the death sentence you know 
before they'd started their life but now no because we've been able 
to make choices tha t will benefit him long-run w hereas I think we 
would probably be banging on doors now - we might not even have 
had a definitive diagnosis (Rebecca, second child diagnosed through 
newborn screening)
Although many families found the newborn screening diagnosis devastating, many 
described how, with hindsight, they felt they had benefited. Some families felt that 
they had been provided with the opportunity to make early preparations for their 
child, their families, and their future.
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2.2 Disrupting normality
Many families found themselves living in houses that were unsuitable for adaptation 
and were therefore forced to uproot from their family home. Families who had older 
children often found this a very disruptive experience for their children, who had to 
be moved away from their schools and friends.
So did you have th is house before -
No, we moved. We moved, we were up hill. And I think tha t was 
probably -  m ade it very hard. It was a t  th a t  time. We were going to 
stay over there  because it was such a -  the kids loved it and we had 
all our friends. (Esther, third child diagnosed clinically)
In contrast, some NBS families felt that the earlier diagnosis had enabled them to
avoid disrupting their older children, by moving before they had settled into a
particular neighbourhood.
Our house wasn 't adaptable. You know we'd had plans done but it 
w asn't adaptable. So it m eant the other children would have been 
uprooted. Well they might have got settled and had friends where 
they were. So we were able to make tha t choice to move before the 
kids all got to the point. (Rebecca, second child diagnosed through 
newborn screening)
Once a suitable house had been found, the process of adapting the house for
wheelchair use could begin. For many families, starting the process of house
adaptations was the point at which the diagnosis, and prognosis, became a living
reality. The condition, quite literally, had to become part of the family home; many
families described this as an emotionally distressing experience.
My husband's certainly been affected by it more than me. Quite a 
sensitive person and I think - 1 do think about it every day, but it 
doesn 't always upset me. Sometimes when I talk about the 
extension, talk about things like that, it's not for that. When I talk 
about even wheelchairs or hoists and that, it's like it's not him, it's 
like I'm ju s t  talking about it, whereas my husband can 't disassociate 
it. I'm not saying he's upset all the time, but he definitely hasn 't 
slept properly since [the diagnosis], definitely more stressed and 
he's still struggling to accept it. (Mary, first child diagnosed clinically. 
House adaptations s tarted  when affected child aged seven)
Some parents presented a pragmatic approach to the adaptations and were able to 
disassociate them from their child’s condition. Other parents found the prospect of 
having their homes filled with equipment incredibly distressing.
For some of the NBS families who had chosen to delay house adaptations, the 
decision seemed to be related to a desire to maintain a sense of normality.
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I rem em ber once three  people jus t  turning up out of the blue on 
the doorstep basically saying tha t I was, you know when I said I 
could pretend, there  was a nice quiet time when I could jus t  
pretend tha t things were normal and it was you know it was nice, 
well they turned up, th ree  of them, to have a look around the 
house, to talk about an extension and I think he could have only 
been about four... to talk about an extension and I didn't even 
know they were coming and they, they ju s t  came and said... along 
the lines of, now these  weren't their words but along the lines of 
'you're pretending this isn't happening, therefore we've turned up, 
we're going to have a look a t an extension being done and... you 
know... we've come to... wake you up' really. And I was, I was so 
upset [...] Um... they were awful. They had no idea what they were 
talking about and they were, they said they'd make the  garage into 
a room for him and then they'd have tracking all the way round 
and out and going into the bathroom so we'd share... one 
bathroom... and um... have all this equipment in it th a t  we were all 
going to have to be in there with it... all and you know I was so 
worried about it I thought this is ju s t  ridiculous. So... I didn't do 
anything about it for a long time because I thought I ju s t  can 't 
bear to see them  again. (Fiona, second child diagnosed through 
newborn screening. House adaptations started when affected child 
aged twelve)
Some families were keen to have the equipment in the house before their child 
actually needed it. Others chose to avoid the emotional strain of adaptations until 
the physical strain of lifting their child, on and off the toilet, in and out of bed, 
simply became unfeasible.
2.3 Seeking support/fighting the system
In addition to the emotional strain placed on families by the need to have their
homes adapted, the majority of families felt completely unsupported by social
services. One mother succinctly described their experiences:
To be honest, coping with Daniel having muscular dystrophy would 
be a lot easier if there  w asn 't so much bureaucracy and red tape and 
fighting to be done for what he needs. (Maureen, first child clinically 
diagnosed)
Families were left to decide exactly what their child might require during each stage 
of the condition, and forced to fight every step of the way.
Stories of short-term measures abounded. Families often described how social 
services were only willing to provide equipment and adaptations that were required 
at that particular stage of the condition. A few years later, when the child’s mobility 
had decreased further, families were forced to fight for another set of adaptations.
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We couldn't have a handrail we had to put our own handrail in for 
them to s ta r t  with and then they wanted to put... the  stair lift in.
They wanted to do in s tages  as  they were going. Oh it was rubbish if 
I'm honest. It was jus t  not on. You know, you jus t  can 't do this, I 
said one day he's jus t not going to be able to do it. What am I 
supposed to do then? You know? (Anne, second child diagnosed 
through newborn screening)
Family accounts demonstrated the exceptional determination required, to avoid
constant disruption to the family home, and family life.
Many families felt completely unsupported when deciding what adaptations might
be required in the future.
So th e ex ten sion , are you getting som ebody in to help out 
with plans and th ings for that?
Well, to be honest with you the social, they don't seem  to actually 
help, you know, it's like I know it's a private dwelling and it's up to 
you, if you get an extension done, it's up to you to get builders and 
architects and that. But I ju s t  thought because there  has to be 
certain things in the extension, it has to be - I don't know about 
disabled adaptations and I thought they would give me further 
information. And tha t 's  why I've got this big manual. And tha t 's  the 
muscular dystrophy campaign's manual. I don 't think there 's  
anything else available. (Mary, first child diagnosed clinically)
Families felt they were expected to become experts on suitable adaptations for a 
DMD child, before they had any experience of the later stages of their child’s 
condition.
One NBS family had moved to a bungalow within a few years of the diagnosis, and
had adapted their new house “with their son in mind”. The adaptations transpired to
be incorrect and at the time of the interview they were facing the prospect of re-
adapting their home. In the extract below, Neil describes the process that he
thought should have taken place.
I think the system is wrong. I think it should all change. It should be 
a case of Lewis is diagnosed', this what you need', this is what you're 
having, this is when it's -  when you're having it but -  It should all be 
automatic. It should be a process [...] It should be like this is what 
you've got. You know, or it's in we go, change the house ready, it's 
all done. Or -  or say well, right. You need maybe wheelchair access 
for the back door and maybe you need a bathroom with aids. So 
you know, they build a bathroom with aids. You know. They could 
do it bit by bit or they could come in and do it in one go. They say 
it's cheaper to do it in one go don't they, it's easier; you know, just 
do a -  to me it's like when the diagnosis is made you should, to me, 
you should have a doctor, social worker you know, and someone to 
tell you about these are the things you're going to need. May -  
maybe not so much on the day of diagnosis because we can't take it
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in but... Within a couple of days. [Neil and his wife Jess continue to 
discuss the issue and eventually conclude that a couple of months 
would be a more appropriate time than a couple of days] (Neil, first 
child diagnosed through newborn screening)
The majority of families, in both cohorts, described the lack of information and 
support, and the constant need to fight for every change that needed to be made. 
Many NBS families felt that an earlier diagnosis had enabled them to start 
preparing for adaptations, and was therefore beneficial. However, an equal 
proportion of families, from both cohorts, had not completed house adaptations by 
the time their child became wheelchair dependent. Families in the NBS cohort 
either described an emotional reluctance to start the process, or a lack of support 
from social services. In the LCD cohort, families perceived the delay as resulting 
from a lack of support.
One family, who had not received a diagnosis for their eldest child until he was 
nearly six years old, had struggled to complete house adaptations before their child 
became wheelchair dependent. The mother, Nicola, was particularly outspoken 
about the value of having carefree years with her children. However, Nicola also 
described the difficult and delayed process of completing house adaptations. When 
asked if she would have swapped the carefree years for more time to prepare, 
Nicola replied:
Aye, I probably would because you see a t  the end of the day if it's in 
and it's in place then they think nothing of it and they 're used to it 
and I think before tha t you would have thought, oh, I don't want 
them seeing all tha t equipment and I've read tha t about folk but, see 
if it's there , and you use it and you let o ther folk use it then it's not 
scary. You know and it's mainly the kids tha t come in here and go,
Wow! Could I do that? Do you want a wee shot? Do you want to go 
in the hoist? Because I think you've got to do that. No probably 
not, probably you don 't need all; tha t s tress  tha t 's  a lot of tears  and 
heartache and anger and frustration with folk ju s t  passing the buck 
and you don 't need tha t because when tha t is happening, tha t 's  
happening when your child is off his feet and tha t 's  a big thing in 
your life. (Nicola, first child diagnosed after birth of second affected 
boy)
Preparing for a future with a child with a disability requires considerable time and 
effort. Families who had received a later clinical diagnosis often began the process 
of house adaptations within a few years. Most families felt that they had plenty of 
time to adapt their houses, whilst others struggled to complete by the time their 
child required the adaptations. In contrast, families who had received a newborn 
screening diagnosis expressed gratitude for the extra years to prepare for the future.
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Some parents made many decisions about their families’ future, but others actively 
avoided the diagnosis, resulting in delayed adaptation.
3. The later years
Children affected by DMD became wheelchair dependent between the age of eight 
and ten years. The experience of living with a wheelchair-dependent child did not 
vary between cohorts, but it varied considerably between families. Some families 
described a gradual progression from fearing the day their child would require a 
wheelchair, to discovering that the wheelchair provided their child with a renewed 
sense of freedom. Many families presented living with their son in a wheelchair, as 
a normal life. In contrast, other families described their child’s frustration as their 
freedom became limited by the wheelchair. Many families described their sense of 
isolation from social networks, generated by the sheer number of locations that were 
physically inaccessible to wheelchair users. However, many families felt that their 
relationship with their immediate family had been strengthened as a result of living 
with DMD. The four themes: ‘from fear to freedom’, ‘from freedom to frustration’, 
‘diminishing social networks’ and ‘strengthened family ties’ are explored below.
3.1 From fear to freedom
Many parents described an emotional progression, from fearing their child’s
wheelchair dependency, to realisation of the sense of liberation the wheelchair
provided their son. Parents, who had watched them stumbling, falling and unable to
run, often described how the wheelchair had provided him with a new lease of life.
I think when -  I think like going into the chair actually was better for 
him because he could keep up with his friends because I think -  
because I did, I said to him about steroids and he says he wanted 
something to keep him walking for longer and I don't know if he 
would have -  well, he liked walking but I think he always felt he was 
always a t  the end and he was never a t  the front of the  queue and he 
was ju s t  all -  he ju s t  felt always to slow and he couldn't keep up with 
anybody. And so I think when he went into the chair and his pals 
pushing him, brought him back into the kind of fore of it. And then 
when he got his first electric chair, kind of like -  the people would 
stand a t the  back of it and riding on it and all, and you know. So I 
think -  because sometimes what he'll say it's like he doesn 't -  he 
would rather but he doesn 't -  he doesn 't mind not being able -  he 
could cope with not being able to walk but he wishes he wouldn't
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lose everything else because he knows the full prognosis so -  
(Esther, third child diagnosed through newborn screening)
Rather than confining the child’s mobility, some families had found their children 
felt more secure and mobile in a wheelchair.
Many families were keen to present the normality of their child’s life. Parents often
mentioned that their children attended mainstream school and had been provided
the opportunity to ‘do what other children do’.
I suppose...we're lucky. I've got good social work... good network...
They've never missed out. [...] You know we've been on holiday with 
everyone else, They've always attended mainstream school. You 
know? They've always done what everyone else has. In fact, a 
friend, a little girl, one of the little girls when I was in school because 
I used to help in school and she was doing something and she said 
well why is he called disabled Miss? And I said well, he 's like, you 
know, in a wheelchair and she said 'he 's  not disabled, he's in a 
wheelchair!'. (Anne, second child diagnosed through newborn 
screening)
A few mothers, who also had unaffected children, described their attempts to treat
their affected son the same as their other children. For some parents, it was not just
the wheelchair that provided freedom. Some parents described negotiating their
responsibility for caring for their child, with the sense of responsibility to let them
get on and be teenagers.
I do know tha t there 's  people, tha t they... wouldn't leave them  like.
But I ju s t  think I'm not -  I'm not the only one th a t  can look after him 
and he's old enough now to tell people what he needs. And I'd say 
tha t he's probably getting better a t other people helping him because 
I think he realises if other people don't help it limits his world.
Because he was actually taken to Lourdes last Easter and like that, 
he knew tha t I wasn't going to be doing his care and if he hadn't -  if 
he doesn 't let people do tha t then his world's going to shrink. So he 
has -  well, I say and he -  he's got a wee friend, he s tays down the 
road with and his chair gets parked in the garage and they carry him 
in. But he always -  he sleeps in his clothes and comes back in his 
clothes, and he ju s t  -  but if he needs to do, like have his brother 
could take him to the loo, do you know what I mean, so -  (Esther, 
third child diagnosed clinicaliy)
For some families, the wheelchair had provided their child with a sense of freedom. 
However, a few families also described a conscious effort to stand back from the 
caring role during the teenage years, in an attempt to provide freedom by not 
limiting their child’s world.
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3.2 From freedom to frustration
In contrast, some families described the frustration their child had experienced, as a
result of becoming wheelchair dependent.
It ju s t  got to tha t point tha t he was more comfortable, felt 
safer being in his chair, so tha t 's  the way it went. But then, that 
comes with other problems tha t you don't think about. So you think 
tha t he feels safe in his chair and what have you and... um... it brings 
on this o ther sort of train of thought tha t you've got to have and 
things like when ur... little things happen all the time. We went on 
holiday with fourteen of us... and we were all walking somewhere to 
get lunch and next thing you suddenly hear this screaming and 
you're so busy chatting and stuff tha t he's got stuck on the kerb!
(laughs) And you've got to back and get him you know and he thinks 
you're all going to walk off and leave him and he's ju s t  stuck and it 
must be an awful feeling. Absolutely terrible. I couldn't imagine 
myself, you know, the  feeling. He's quite young for his age... so um... 
being a child and being stuck somewhere thinking tha t everybody is 
ju s t  going to go and leave you there, must be awful. And we never 
would. We'd never get more than a couple of paces and he'd scream 
but it makes you feel awful because it's little things because when 
you're busy and tha t you do forget, the smallest things tha t do count 
and you feel awful because of it. Funny how... you... can 't possibly 
imagine... (pause) how it's going to be. You know you think you 
know... the  things you're going to have to do and you see  people in 
wheelchairs in the superm arket and you think yeh, you know, not 
too bad, you know. But it's all these little things th a t  you jus t  
couldn't even imagine... (Fiona, second child diagnosed through 
newborn screening)
Fiona, in particular, provided numerous examples of society’s impatience with 
wheelchair users; from people in restaurants complaining about moving to let her 
child pass, to people in supermarket car parks, impatiently honking their horn as she 
tried to push her child’s wheelchair up the ramp, into the car. For Fiona, living with 
a child with a disability was the source of considerable distress and frustration. 
Although few families described so many negative experiences, many expressed a 
sense of isolation from society.
3.3 Diminished social networks
Many families described how their son’s wheelchair dependency had placed 
physical limitations on his social networks.
...obviously really most people have to come to us. Ben's got -  rather 
than go to friend's houses because often they aren 't  very -  it's very 
difficult to get -  get in there  with electric chairs -  And not everybody's 
got enough room or -  he's got one -  one of his best friends he can go
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there. They -  they put a little ramp up for him to go [Jennifer, son,
Ben, aged 12]
Many mothers mention that the houses of their friends, or their son’s friends, were 
rarely wheelchair accessible; most social interaction took place within their own 
homes.
Many parents articulated diminution of their own social networks, through practical
considerations or social exclusion. Nicola and Stuart’s first child was diagnosed
with DMD after they had already given birth to a second affected son. Both boys are
now wheelchair dependent. Nicola felt that their friends excluded them from
parent/child activities:
You know, I ju s t  think, having two is not ju s t  as  easy  as going 
joining things and you know it's like, like last night we were round at 
a friends' and all the  guys had obviously been a t  the  golfing. They're 
all taking their kids golfing you know and Stuart 's  dying to go 
golfing, S tuart 's  got a golf set you know and you think, folk just 
don't think and you get left out quite a lot as a family I would say. It 
always has to be here and you can get in other houses but folk just, 
if it's not happened to you, you don't need to make tha t effort and 
I'm probably one tha t always makes the effort. And it probably hurts 
more now because folk don't make the effort. I think tha t 's  probably 
the hardest thing.
Parents described their feelings of exclusion from social networks, caused either by 
physical limitations of wheelchair manoeuvrability, or other families’ tendency to 
exclude families with DMD from physical activities.
Families often moved, or had chosen to stay, close to family support networks.
However, as the affected boys’ condition progressed, many families found that
access to family support diminished. As each boy grew less mobile and more reliant
on others to deal with his own physical needs, grandparents were often
simultaneously facing their own physical limitations.
It's since um... since Ben's gone off his feet now (Fiona gets up to get 
a tissue).Um...there's um....there's no one else tha t can....sort him 
out...so, u r .J t 's  up to us to be here really. I don 't know who else 
would put him on the loo and um...and who could, it's not tha t they 
wouldn't it's who could m anage to do it you know. My mum's got a 
bad back she couldn't do it, my Dad's got bad knees, you know 
they're all getting older now... [Fiona, second child diagnosed 
through newborn screening]
Fiona and Paul, like many other parents, felt they had little access to family support. 
In the middle to late stages of the condition, affected boys need to be assisted from
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their bed to their wheelchair, from their wheelchair to the toilet, to the bath, to the 
car. The physical demands required to deal with an affected child were often 
presented as the reason for the limited support provided by family networks.
3.4 Strengthened family ties
Social networks may decrease, family support may become less feasible, but the
interpersonal exchange relationships within the family may simultaneously be
strengthened. Many families noted that their relationship with their immediate
family had been enriched by the diagnosis.
I think it's made us better people, much better parents and a better 
family because you appreciate ... because you go out and you see 
members of your family and you look and you think god what's wrong 
with you, why don't you take those kids down the park, why don't you 
do this, why haven 't you done this, why, why and they 're all ju s t  me, 
me, me. They don't appreciate their children. [Lauren, NBS, affected 
boy aged 8]
Like many mothers, Lauren expressed a profound sense of having gained 
perspective on life. Families often spoke of making the most of the time they have 
with their children.
Families often found that the medical description of the condition had not matched
the reality of living with, and loving, an affected child.
Daniel's got muscular dystrophy but things are not as  bad as you 
think they 're going to be. That's our experience you know, because 
you don 't -  you -  you don't understand what a child with muscular 
dystrophy can give apart from what they -  you know, you -  you've 
jus t  not get any -  Any concept of how th a t  is. You know, I said that 
to Daniel. I says you know, Daniel, you're the best thing tha t 's  ever 
happened to me and dad. [Maureen, LCD, affected boy aged 11]
Maureen highlights the unexpected value of having an affected child; a sentiment 
expressed by many families. Although access to social networks may diminish, the 
intensity of interpersonal relations is increased.
There was simply no unified experience of living with child in a wheelchair. While 
some families were keen to present the normality of their child’s life, others 
concentrated on the limitations induced by wheelchair dependency. The diagnostic 
procedure did not appear to influence the experience of the later years. Disparate
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experiences appeared to be related to the parental approach to disability, and their 
ability to access supportive social networks.
4. Summary of experiences of living with DMD
Families’ experiences of living with Duchenne muscular dystrophy varied 
considerably, depending on the stage of the condition and the severity of symptoms. 
The role of the diagnostic pathway also had considerable influence on families’ 
experiences, particularly during the early years, and to some extent, the middle 
years. There was considerable variation in families experiences in the later years, 
but this appeared to be unrelated to the diagnostic pathway.
Exploring families’ experiences of the early years of the condition offers rich 
insight into the influence of diagnostic procedure on the relationship between two 
sources of knowledge: personal experience and medical information. Parents who 
accepted the offer of newborn screening received a disease label for their 
asymptomatic baby; those who received a later clinical diagnosis, acquired 
confirmation of half-conscious concerns. Parents were propelled forward on a 
journey of learning, disentangling their sons’ character from the character of the 
disease label.
Families, who received a later clinical diagnosis, expressed the value of having 
carefree years with their child. These families had come to know their child and had 
developed expectations of their child’s abilities, which some felt would have been 
diminished by an earlier diagnosis. The gradual progression towards the diagnosis 
often meant the disease label provided confirmation of half-conscious concerns; a 
justification for their worries. In addition, families who had older children often felt 
a sense of responsibility to resume normal life.
In contrast, families who received a newborn screening diagnosis are presented with 
a baby and a disease label. Many families articulated their devastation, and 
described the benefit of being able to grieve for their child whilst their children were 
too young to be aware. Some expressed doubt about whether they were treating
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their child appropriately, and often felt abandoned when health professionals 
seemed unable, or unwilling, to impart information or advice. For these families, the 
weight of uncertain identity characterised their early years with their child, as they 
struggled to define aspects of the condition from their child’s personality. Families, 
who had more involvement with health professionals during the early years, 
described the difficulty of negotiating authority over their child’s upbringing.
During the middle stage of the condition, families who had received an earlier 
diagnosis expressed gratitude for the provision of extra time to prepare. However, 
the average age of the boy when house adaptations commenced was six years in 
both cohorts, and the range of ages much greater in the NBS cohort. Although some 
NBS families made life-changing decisions and early preparations as a result of the 
diagnosis, others chose to ignore the reality of the condition, until faced with their 
child’s increasing immobility. Most families, in both cohorts, described the 
difficulty of obtaining support from social services, and the need to fight for both 
information and practical assistance.
Descriptions of the later stages of the condition highlighted the different 
experiences of families living with the same condition. Some families felt that their 
child’s wheelchair dependency was ‘better than expected’ as it provided a renewed 
sense of freedom. However, other families described the limitation of freedom, and 
a sense of isolation from social networks.
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Chapter Seven 
Dealing with what is done; choosing what is to become
Introduction
The previous chapter illustrated the diversity in families’ experiences of living with 
a child with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). Families’ approaches to their 
reproductive future were characterised by equal variation. The different experiences 
of dealing with the diagnosis and living with DMD provided the context, within 
which families chose to defer, deter from or continue family building. It should be 
noted from the outset that there was no simple recipe for reproductive decision­
making. No single variable was identified, such as the number of previous children, 
or awareness of genetic risk, which had a direct and unambiguous effect on 
reproductive decision-making. Families in similar situations often made strikingly 
disparate decisions.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the factors that families discussed in relation to 
reproductive decision-making. There was considerable variation in the choices 
families made about their reproductive future and a range of factors families felt had 
influenced their decisions. First and foremost, the majority of families described the 
formation of fertility intentions prior to having any children, which often remained 
paramount in subsequent reproductive decision-making. Second, mothers described 
their aspirations for the future, in relation to their sense of responsibility towards 
their partners, their existing children and their future unborn child. Third, many 
families described their perception of risk, either risk of having a second affected 
child, or risk of miscarriage, in relation to reproductive decisions. Lastly, families 
described their reproductive decision-making in relation to their perceived ability to 
cope with a number of aspects of the condition.
The four themes: ‘planning the family’, ‘reproductive responsibility’, ‘negotiating 
risk’ and ‘coping with today, coping with tomorrow’ are explored after the 
background demographics of the cohorts are addressed. The first section outlines 
the situational aspects of reproductive behaviour, to provide information on the
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context of reproductive decision-making. The background demographics of both 
cohorts are explored; the number of children prior to and post diagnosis, the age of 
mother and affected child, awareness of genetic risk and the uptake of prenatal 
testing.
1. Reproductive characteristics of the LCD and NBS cohorts
Families were at quite different stages in the reproductive decision-making process. 
In some families, the children were teenagers, and family building appeared to have 
been completed some years previously. In other families, children were still 
toddlers. Some expressed belief that their families were complete, whilst others 
were still considering, or trying for more children. Table 1.1 shows the age of 
mothers and the age of the affected male at the time of interview, as well as the age 
of mothers at the birth of their affected son. Mothers and sons, in the LCD cohort, 
tended to be a little older at the time of the interview, but the age of mothers at the 
birth of their affected son was very similar between the cohorts.
Table 1.1 Age of mother and sons in interview cohort
Mean age of: LCD NBS
Mother at time of interview 40
(range 28-50)
38
(range 30-49)
Mother at birth of affected male 30
(range 23-38)
30
(range 21-35)
Affected male at time of interview 9.5
(range 5-15)
7.6
(range 1-16)
Another factor that may affect reproductive decision-making is the number of 
children bom prior to the affected boy. Table 2 demonstrates that the position of the 
index (whether he was the parents first, second, or third-bom child).
Table 1.2 Position of index in interview cohort
Position of index LCD (n=8) NBS ( n = l l ) Total n=19)
First 4 4 8
Second 3 7 10
Third 1 0 1
A slightly higher proportion of families had one or more children prior to the birth 
of their affected son in the NBS cohort (64%, n=7), compared to the LCD cohort
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(50%, n=4), suggesting that LCD families might be more likely to have more 
subsequent pregnancies. In families in which the index was the first bom, the same 
proportion of families in both cohorts, were trying, or had tried for more children 
(75% n=3). However, in families in which the index was second or third bom, less 
than half of the families in the newborn screening cohort (44%, n=3) had tried, or 
were trying for more children. In contrast, the majority of families in the LCD 
cohort, in which the index was second or third born (75%, n=3), were either trying 
for another child, or had another child
Differences in reproductive behaviour were also apparent. Two LCD families had 
subsequent children before the diagnosis of their first affected child, whereas all 
NBS families were aware of their risk, prior to embarking on subsequent 
pregnancies. After receiving the diagnosis, five NBS families had subsequent 
children, compared to only one LCD family. In contrast, three LCD families had 
tried or were trying to conceive, compared to only one NBS family. The data 
suggests that five out of six NBS families had been successful in their attempts to 
conceive after the diagnosis, compared to only one out of four LCD families. 
Possible reasons for the differences are explored in subsequent sections.
Of the remaining nine families, who had not had children after the diagnosis, five 
families (NBS=3, LCD=2) had either considered, or were still deliberating about 
whether to have more children. Four families (NBS=2, LCD=2) described their 
families as complete prior to receiving the diagnosis and chose not to have 
subsequent pregnancies.
Families’ decisions, and views, on how to proceed with having subsequent children 
also varied considerably. Of the six, risk aware, families who had more children, 
four had opted for prenatal testing (NBS=4, LCD=0), and two opted for no 
intervention (NBS=1, LCD=1). Of the five families who had considered or were 
trying for more children, most expressed a desire to opt for prenatal testing, some 
expressed interest in, or had tried, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and 
others had considered adoption.
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Table 1.3 shows the offer and uptake of prenatal testing in nine families that had 
subsequent pregnancies. As already noted, only two of the four LCD families were 
aware of their genetic risk at the time of conception; one of whom chose not to have 
prenatal testing and gave birth to an unaffected male, and the other family had a 
number of miscarriages prior to reaching 10-12 weeks gestation period in which 
prenatal testing is offered. In the NBS cohort, all five families were aware of their 
genetic risk and all were offered prenatal testing. Four families chose to test their 
pregnancies, two of which were found to be carrying girls, one was found to be 
carrying an unaffected boy and one chose to terminate a foetus with a different 
condition before continuing to conceive a girl. One family chose not to test their 
pregnancy and had a girl.
Table 1.3 Subsequent pregnancies in the interview cohort: offer and uptake of 
prenatal testing
LCD (n=4) NBS (n=5) Total
No. of families aware of genetic risk 2 5 7
No. of families offered PND 1 5 6
No. of families who had PND 0 4 4
Although the number of families in the interview cohort who had subsequent 
children was small, their decisions regarding the number of subsequent children, 
and the uptake of prenatal testing, reflected the data from the quantitative section of 
the study. Factors which families discussed in relation to their reproductive 
decision-making are discussed in subsequent sections.
2. Planning the family
Families often described forming fertility intentions prior to starting a family. 
Original fertility intentions were presented as a paramount feature in the decision­
making process after the diagnosis. For example, if a family spoke of “always 
wanting two children”, they were likely to have acted in accordance with their 
stated desires. A family who already had two children prior to the diagnosis usually 
ceased family building; a family that only had one child, usually continued family 
building, albeit with redefined justifications.
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Although families tended to act in accordance with their stated desires, following 
original fertility intentions was often described as problematic. Families who 
presented themselves as having completed their families, often deliberated about 
whether to change original plans in light of the diagnosis. Families who chose to 
continue family building often considered a variety of reproductive options before 
proceeding, such as adoption, prenatal testing, and pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis. In the following two sections parents’ fertility intentions are addressed, 
followed by an exploration of the reproductive options families considered when 
assessing their reproductive future.
2.1 Forming fertility intentions
Each of the 19 families interviewed were asked whether they had discussed their 
fertility intentions prior to starting a family. The majority of families (n=13) 
described their considerations of their ideal family size, prior to having children. 
Intentions were sometimes presented as a desire for a specific number of children, 
for example:
I -  I think it was always two, a boy and a girl. I think tha t 's  what 
really, you know - That's what we always wanted really. (Louise,
NBS second child affected)
Other families expressed fertility intentions as a general desire for children, rather
than for a specific number:
We both knew we wanted children and we both - and I think we both 
thought we wouldn't want only one, but we hadn't really discussed it 
further. In my head it probably would have been ju s t  the two. I 
don't think he would have wanted any more than that. He's not 
really said. No, I think he'd have been happy with two as  well.
(Mary, LCD, first child diagnosed aged three)
Some families presented their reproduction as a fait accompli, with no indication
that fertility intentions had been considered prior to having children. In these
families, fertility intentions were often superseded by unplanned pregnancies:
We didn't discuss any children before Mike was born. Mike jus t 
happened and then about five years went by before we tried for 
another child. The gap was just... the years had jus t  flown by.31 
(Sandra, NBS, second child diagnosed)
31 All extracts from the interview with Sandra and John are paraphrased, due a technical fault with 
the voice recorder
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Many families expressed their fertility intentions as a desire to replicate their own
experiences of childhood family life. Notions of ideal family size appeared to be
socially, if not biologically, inherited.
I've always wanted a t  least two because I've got two sisters and a 
brother and I've, you know, I've loved growing up with brothers and 
sisters. I think it's really important, so I, you know, I'd like -  I've 
always wanted to have more, more than one. [Sue, first child 
diagnosed through newborn screening]
Family trees often showed clear associations between the parent’s family size 
(number of siblings), and their choices about their own family size (number of 
children). However, transforming intentions into behaviour was often met by 
biological obstacles, such as infertility; or social obstacles, such as separation from 
a partner. Although Sue expressed the desire to replicate her own family life, like a 
number of mothers in both cohorts, she had separated from her partner shortly after 
the diagnosis.
In contrast, some families chose to avoid replicating their childhoods. Rebecca and 
James’ second child had been diagnosed with DMD through newborn screening. 
They chose to have a subsequent pregnancy to reach their ideal family size of three 
children:
We always wanted more children. We always wanted three.
[Rebecca, NBS]
James had come from a large family, and all his siblings had since created their own
large families, whereas Rebecca felt she’d had a lonely childhood:
I think it's Important to have, I've got one brother and there is ten 
years between us so I grew up mainly as  an only child so I really 
missed not having brothers and sisters and you know there is always 
somebody here to play with. [Rebecca, NBS]
For Rebecca and James, the decision to have more children after the diagnosis of 
their affected son, represented a continuation of their original intentions; formed in 
childhood, followed in adulthood.
Other families described a selection of disparate factors that had influenced their 
fertility intentions. Anne and David’s second child was diagnosed through newborn 
screening. Their decision not to have more than two children did not seem to occur 
as the result of the diagnosis, nor as a result of the trying to replicate their own 
childhood experiences:
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...it's ju s t  me and two brothers. David comes from, he's one of four.
His m other lost a few in between, but no, no jus t  one of three I am.
It's ju s t  th a t  I'd worked, I was thirty, I was getting married, I 
wanted to ju s t  give them  the best and when you've got a houseful 
you ju s t  can 't do it. I'm not tha t maternal to be honest. My mother 
was shocked tha t I had one.
Anne expressed a multiplicity of factors that had influenced their decision to limit 
family size, including age, a desire to focus resources on two children, a lack of 
maternal instinct, and the demands of paid employment.
Lauren, like Anne, chose not to replicate her own experiences of childhood and 
expressed a desire to retain autonomy and to exercise control over her fertility 
behaviour.
I thought it would be nice to have two because I like to be in control.
I like to be organised, I couldn't s tand a house full of kids, you know.
I love the people who say I want four, why? ... I ju s t  don't 
understand why people would want more. I couldn't cope."
Both Lauren and Anne express an explicit desire to deal effectively with the 
responsibilities of motherhood, and chose the limitation of family size as a way of 
achieving their goal.
The majority of families had considered their ideal family size, prior to starting a 
family. Often families attempted to replicate their own experience of childhood 
family life. Other families described other factors which had influenced the 
formation of fertility intentions, such as age, a desire to focus resources by limiting 
family size, or an expressed need to retain autonomy and control in the family 
home. Families frequently presented their reproductive decisions after the diagnosis, 
in relation to their original fertility intentions, albeit with reformulated justifications 
and deliberation of a wider range of reproductive options.
2.2 Deliberating reproductive options
Many families described how the diagnosis had complicated reproductive decision­
making; original intentions had to be reassessed.
I think you've got to be more careful about things, your choices, 
you've got to, I've got to think about things a bit more... but... we 
definitely waited and thought about things really, really hard before 
deciding well we'll ju s t  give it one chance... and we'll see what 
happens and then if it doesn 't work out...you know we've given it a
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try sort of thing rather than  jus t  giving up completely. (Fiona, second 
child diagnosed through newborn screening)
For many families, the diagnosis created new complications, and a wider variety of 
reproductive options, which had to be carefully deliberated.
Families, who considered having, or had children after the diagnosis, often reviewed 
a range of reproductive options, from adoption, to prenatal testing, and pre­
implantation genetic diagnosis. Families presented their deliberations about whether 
to have subsequent children, in relation to their fertility intentions, biological and 
social circumstances, and views on the available options. Few families addressed all 
available options; the majority only presented those which were perceived to be 
potentially suitable and acceptable. For example, a family who had moral objections 
to prenatal testing and termination considered adoption and pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis. A family who had difficulty conceiving considered adoption.
Some families presented themselves as unwilling to negotiate the new-found
complications presented by reproductive options.
I did think about [having more children], but the risk was jus t  -  it's 
jus t too high, I think to take tha t risk -  I mean I would have my 
eggs sorted out but I think "Oh god it's ju s t  -  this takes so long" and 
I -  you know, I'm 35 now, I don't -  but I don't think I can -  I don't 
think I want to go down tha t road -  Two is enough and they're hard 
work anyway! I don't know if I want to s ta r t  all over again, you 
know. (Louise, second child diagnosed through newborn screening)
Louise had moral objections to prenatal testing and termination and did not discuss 
the possibility of adoption. The remaining option -  pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis -  was perceived to be too time-consuming. It is important to note that the 
majority of families, who presented themselves as being discouraged from having 
more children, also described themselves as having already met their original 
fertility intentions.
A number of families in both cohorts had considered adoption. However, the
reasons for adopting varied considerably. One set of parents, Jennifer and Tom,
went quite far through the process of adoption whilst they waited for confirmation
of their genetic risk. However, once they had been informed that they were “low
risk” the adoption process was abandoned, in favour of prenatal testing.
We did go ahead and sort of go through the adoption process and go 
on, sort of, a course and -  and go through the process, you know,
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seeing people and -  and going on training, you know, sort of tha t 
type of thing. So we did go, you know, when it got as  far as  tha t and 
then I -  I had a result -  it would -  came back to say tha t I was -  I 
should have got the things out -  the documents but I was sort of 
relatively low risk [...] and so -  in tha t case then we thought we 
would try then. (Jennifer, GM risk, first child diagnosed through 
newborn screening)
Other families, who were unsure about prenatal testing, considered adoption as a
way of avoiding the risk of having another affected child.
[My husband] would rather adopt I think because, only because he 
thinks it would be a lot of work, I think it would be a lot of work 
probably a t  the beginning being up through the night yes, but,
So he w an ts to  m iss out on th e sort of first m onths?
Aye, I think only because of tha t I think, and because of fear of it 
having it. Having another one with [DMD] I think. (Nicola, carrier, 
second child diagnosed clinically, after birth of second affected child)
Another family, who had received a later clinical diagnosis, had considered
adopting a child, after the mother had experienced a number of miscarriages. Rather
than considering adoption as a way of avoiding the risk of having a second affected
child, this family considered adopting a child affected by DMD.
[My husband] Kevin was a bit like, well, you know, we're all set up, 
you know, we could have another boy with Duchenne. I'm thinking 
... well maybe - 1 began to sort of come round to his way of thinking, 
so tha t 's  strange, isn't it? In fact, I was looking a t  a magazine, it 
must have been the Muscular Dystrophy magazine, there was a wee 
boy in it who had Duchenne and he was looking to be adopted and 
Kevin said we should adopt him. And I was thinking? -  but I jus t 
don't know if I could do anything like that, but, you know, it is one ... 
you know ... I don't know. I don't know. (Pamela, second child 
diagnosed clinically)
Although Pamela expressed doubts about adopting an affected child, presenting
their consideration of the option suggested that families are not always averse to the
possibility of caring for another boy with DMD. As another mother stated:
You don't always ... you don't always you don't like to think 'oh gosh 
I don't want to have another baby with Duchenne'. You know, you 
don't -  tend -  you tend not to think like that. (Sue, first child 
diagnosed through newborn screening)
Many families felt that their reproductive plans had been complicated by the 
diagnosis and as a result deliberated about a wider range of reproductive options. 
However, their deliberations did not always result from attempts to avoid a second 
affected child; many described positive experiences of living with a child with 
DMD.
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3. Responsibility
Mothers presented their experiences of the diagnosis, and their subsequent 
reproductive decision-making, as a negotiation of a network of responsibility. The 
diagnosis and carrier testing instigated specific feelings of responsibility towards 
existing children. Views on future children, and the renegotiation of fertility 
intentions, emerged in relation to the mothers’ responsibility to their partners, to 
their children, and to their extended family. Mothers negotiation of their 
reproductive responsibility is explored in the following three sections: ‘providing a 
healthy child’, ‘providing for children’, and ‘protecting the future, unborn child’.
3.1 Providing a healthy child
The negotiation of fertility intentions between partners varied considerably. Some
mothers felt that their partners had handed them responsibility for reproductive
decision making.
[My husband] ju s t  says, "it's up to you". That's all he ever said, 
yeah, "up to you". He -  he, you know, if I said to him "shall we have 
another baby?" He'd say "well it's up to you", you know. (Louise, 
second child diagnosed through NBS)
Other mothers briefly mentioned discrepancies between their own fertility 
intentions and their partners. However, mothers usually expressed a belief that their 
own fertility intentions had been followed.
In contrast, families who had embarked on new relationships seemed to dwell on
their different intentions. Fiona separated from her husband after their second child
was diagnosed with DMD, and did not consider having more children. Some years
later Fiona began a new relationship and described having to renegotiate her
reproductive plans.
I think settling down with Paul was the thing that...and being so 
happy was the thing that... made us think about [having children] 
more I suppose. I think it was something tha t I probably wouldn't 
have done anyway... although it... how can I put it? [The diagnosis] 
jus t confirmed it a bit more you know, definitely I was definitely not 
going to have anymore, tha t was it you know. I'd got my hands full, 
tha t was plenty and then of course Paul didn't have any of his own.
(Fiona, second child diagnosed through NBS)
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Fiona presented the decision to have a third child, not as her ideal choice, but as a
sense of responsibility to provide her partner with his own, biological family, which
was exacerbated by his parents.
I kind of felt pressured as  well from his parents point of view 
because they...obviously everything being so complicated they... 
weren't exactly impressed tha t we were going to get married... and... 
they've always... always made excuses to get him on his own... and... 
to... every time I was out the way 'well are you sure, you know, she 
might never want to have a child with you' and you know, tha t made 
me furious and that... kind of felt like a bit of pressure as well (Fiona, 
second child diagnosed through NBS)
Another mother, Tracey, who already had one child with another partner before her
second child, with a new partner was diagnosed, highlighted her own sense of
responsibility to provide her partner with an unaffected child.
I'm hoping to try and have another one, yeah. I know tha t the age 
gaps is big but Connor is the only child tha t Tony's got anyway so -  
it's a decision I've got to come round to. (Tracey, second child 
diagnosed clinically)
Mothers, especially those with new partners, presented themselves as responsible 
for providing their partners with (unaffected) children. Fertility emerged as a 
responsibility; a need to negotiate conflicting desires. In nuclear families, resolving 
disparate fertility intentions was presented only briefly, suggesting relatively easy 
resolution of conflict. However, mothers with new partners often presented 
themselves as responsible for providing their partners with a healthy child.
3.2 Providing for children
Mothers often presented a sense of responsibility to provide a suitable family 
environment. Parents combined their sense of responsibility towards their children, 
with their original fertility intentions, reformulating them in light of the diagnosis. 
Although most parents seemed to follow their stated fertility intentions, families 
often presented fertility behaviour as a responsible consideration of the families’ 
new needs.
Many mothers, who presented themselves as having already decided not to have 
more children prior to the diagnosis, revaluated their circumstances in light of the 
diagnosis and considered having more children. Most decided, in Maureen’s words, 
that the diagnosis was “the wrong reason to have another baby”. However, many
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mothers shelved previous plans to be sterilised, in anticipation of future 
technological developments, which may mean a subsequent child could provide a 
cure.
I went in to be sterilised and then I changed my mind. Because I felt 
-  what -  what made me change my mind really was thinking, you 
know when you see people having babies and it helps the brother or 
sister if they've got some sort of -  I feel what if something like tha t 
happens? You know, and I wouldn't think twice about it then, I mean 
I'd have another one straightaway -  If it was going to help Scott, you 
know. So I think tha t stopped me then, I thought "no I can't go and 
be sterilised". I want to leave my options open. (Louise, second child 
diagnosed through NBS)
Many mothers presented retaining fecundity, not as a desire for subsequent children, 
but as an obligation to their affected child.
For some families, the diagnosis elicited a desire to focus all attention and resources
on the affected child. Lesley, whose first child was diagnosed clinically when she
was seven months pregnant with her second, doubted whether they would have had
another child if they had known.
If I wasn 't pregnant when I found out about Jonathon - 1 had, I'd 
have ju s t  had Jonathon and tha t would have been it, ju s t  to give him 
the time and everything because of what he's got. He'll still get all 
the time and everything, right enough, but for tha t reason I wouldn't 
have had another one so I could be there for him and help him more 
than anything. (Lesley, first child diagnosed clinically)
Lesley’s second son was still young, and as yet undiagnosed at the time of the 
interview. Throughout the interview Lesley expressed difficulty with bonding with 
her newborn. The birth of an unaffected child was perceived as a distraction from 
the parental responsibility towards the affected child.
Families who wanted more children before the diagnosis, presented their decision to
have more as a responsibility towards their affected child, or towards the as-yet
unborn child. Many families presented their decision to have more children as
beneficial for their affected child.
Do you think Michael's d iagnosis has changed your 
reasoning for wanting another child?
Well, yeah, slightly because I did get fixated on the future and how 
my husband's quite a quiet person. He likes the house. He doesn't 
bother about socialising or anything. And I jus t thought for the 
future, what would it mean for Michael if he was kind of isolated in 
the house with jus t us two, being a bit older. I ju s t  thought it 
would be nice tha t we have a younger sibling in the family ju s t  to 
keep things a wee bit kind of lighter and brighter. Who knows? You
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don't know. It might not have worked out like tha t anyway. But I 
jus t wanted for the future tha t he would have somebody. And 
again, with our ages, you thought well is he going to be left with 
nobody, you know, and be disabled. That worries me as well. Not 
tha t I thought another child should take tha t responsibility, but jus t 
for him to feel tha t there  was somebody there, do you know what I 
mean? (Mary, first child diagnosed clinically)
Like many mothers, Mary worried about her son’s future. Although they had always 
wanted “more than one” child, the decision to try for a second was reformulated as a 
responsibility to provide company, and support, for their affected son.
The decision to provide an unaffected child with siblings was not infinite. Some
families felt that two unaffected siblings would be ideal, but most decided that one
would suffice. Jacky provided justification for having another child.
I would have been unhappy with one. I always wanted two 
regardless, and I ju s t  thought you know with Joe I thought it'd be 
good for him to have a sibling. I think for us and also for Rowan as 
well because you know its knowing somebody with a disability, I 
think it's good for her as  well to know tha t but you know there 's  
differences and so on. (Jacky, first child diagnosed through NBS)
However, after Jacky had reached her ideal family size, her reasons for not having 
more children were formulated in relation to her responsibility towards her existing 
children.
I did feel my family was complete once I had Rowan. I don't regret 
never having anymore, you know if we'd started a bit earlier maybe, 
but I think when you've got one child with a disability you want to 
give them  as much as possible, and again you've got to think about 
the room in your house, tha t extra room is going to be f o r ... you 
know the biggest room has got to be for the child with disability, and 
you've got to think how accessible tha t can be for him, and about 
extensions. And I ju s t  don't think it would be fair to Joe if we had 
more children because I wouldn't be able to devote so much time to 
him. (Jacky, first child diagnosed through NBS)
Prior to reaching the ideal family size, the diagnosis was presented as an influential 
factor in continuing family building. Once ideal family size was reached, 
reproductive decision-making was formulated as a responsibility to focus resources 
on existing children.
3.3 Protecting the potential future child
A number of mothers expressed surprise at hearing other families had chosen to 
take the risk of having a second affected child. The sense of surprise ranged from
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wondering how people would cope when their children died, to wondering how
families could choose to put another child through the same condition.
I've heard, I'm sure I've heard of it..in fact in might have been 
[Cardiff based researcher] tha t actually said that... some of the, 
some family members have said well my brother had it and he was 
wonderful and I chose not to have tes ts  done and what have you and 
to me, my personal opinion and I know tha t 's  their choice I jus t  think 
it's absolutely horrendous to think that... I watch Sam every day you 
know and I think how upset he gets... and how much he'd want to be 
able to do things and I can 't see how somebody would want to ever 
put somebody through that... (Fiona, second child diagnosed through 
newborn screening
The extracts from Fiona in the previous chapter highlighted the family’s difficult 
experiences of living with a child with a disability. Some mothers, like Fiona, who 
had negative perceptions or experiences of living with a child with DMD, expressed 
a sense of responsibility to ensure that they had no further children with the 
condition.
Some families, who described their decision not to have more children as occurring
before the diagnosis, reformulated their decision as a responsibility towards the
possible future child.
I don't think I could subject tha t to a sister, who would've ended up 
looking after them  because basically your life revolves round them. I 
don't think it would have been fair on her, personally. I don't think 
it's fair on another child because you jus t  basically (unclear). What 
would they do if we was off to appointments or well, we can't do this 
because they can't do it. You know? And I don't think I would've 
subjected my child to that, personally. (Anne, second child diagnosed 
through NBS)
In this instance, the mother perceived subjecting an unaffected child to life with 
affected siblings as unfair. Many mothers presented their responsibility to their 
existing children as paramount; life with an affected child was perceived to be 
unsuitable for unaffected children.
Reproductive responsibility took many guises. Some mothers described retaining 
their fertility as a responsibility toward their affected child, in the event that a future 
child may provide a cure. Others presented a sense of responsibility towards their 
existing child, to ensure resources were focused on their affected child, or, in 
contrast, to provide their affected son with siblings. Some families felt that it would 
be unfair to subject an unaffected child to life with an affected boy, whilst others
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expressed a desire to prevent another child from experiencing the trauma of being 
affected by DMD. In the majority of cases, families presented a reformulation of 
their original fertility intentions, with the diagnosis providing an extra incentive to 
follow original intentions.
4. Negotiating risk
Many mothers discussed their reproductive decision-making in relation to their 
perceived risk. Although some discussed the risk of miscarriage when choosing to 
test a pregnancy, most mothers focused on their genetic risk and the consequent risk 
of having a second affected child. Interpretations of genetic risk varied considerably 
between families; statistics were deciphered in many different ways.
In addition, families articulated a change in their perception of risk. Many families 
described their decision not to undergo routine testing procedures for conditions 
such as Down’s syndrome and Spina Bifida, in pregnancies prior to the diagnosis, 
as a willingness to “take a chance”. In pregnancies after the diagnosis, “chance” 
became a “risk”; an external tyranny to be desperately avoided. Families’ 
descriptions of risk are explored in the following sections under three themes: 
‘relevant risk’, ‘deciphering statistics’, and ‘from taking a “chance” to avoiding a 
“risk”’.
4.1 Relevant risk
The relevance of genetic risk in reproductive decision-making varied considerably
between families. Some mothers waited for their carrier risk to be confirmed before
proceeding with subsequent pregnancies, whilst others described their reproductive
decision-making as unaffected by genetic risk. The majority families noted their
genetic risk of having a second affected boy when discussing their reproductive
intentions. For most families, genetic risk was described as just one factor amongst
many, which had influenced their reproductive decisions.
After we had Daniel we decided we didn't want anymore anyway. I 
had quite a lot of back problems during my pregnancy and quite a 
difficult labour and my blood pressure had gone up towards the end 
of my pregnancy, so I wasn't all tha t well when he was born anyway.
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And he was nine and a half pounds, or nine pounds three. But we 
were ju s t  quite happy with -  you know, with the one. And my 
husband, he's had asthm a, but it was contract work he was doing so 
he maybe had three months work here, six months work there and -  
And in reality it costs a lot of money to bring up a child. You know, 
so we were jus t  quite happy, plus I was twenty nine when he was 
born and I ju s t  felt you know, quite happy. With the one.
So did th e diagnosis make you re-think about it all?
No. I'm a carrier of muscular dystrophy. (Maureen, carrier, first child 
diagnosed clinically)
Frequently families described genetic risk as one factor amongst many, as an extra 
reason for not having more children. This was particularly prevalent in families 
who presented themselves as having already reached their ideal family size. Parents 
rarely described a single reason for choosing to have, or not to have, more children. 
Reproductive decision-making involved a complex negotiation of circumstances, in 
which the diagnosis became just one more factor amongst many.
For families who felt that they had not yet reached their ideal family size, genetic
risk often became a prominent factor in decision-making. A few families described
their unwillingness to proceed with subsequent pregnancies, until they had been
informed of their genetic risk.
We had to wait. We -  we, you know, we were hoping tha t we could 
be given some help on this to, you know, to help us make a decision 
really [...] I had a result -  it would -  came back to say tha t I was -  I 
should have got the things out -  the documents, but I was sort of 
relatively low risk -  It didn't come back to say I was a high risk. But 
it -  it sort of gave a relatively low risk. But this mutation had 
happened somewhere along the line, and so -  in tha t case then we 
thought we would try then. (Jennifer, GM, first child diagnosed 
through newborn screening)
For some, genetic risk was a key aspect of the reproductive decision-making 
process. Trying for another child was occasionally delayed until the parents had 
received reassurance that their risk of a second affected boy was low.
In contrast, other families, who had proceeded with subsequent pregnancies, did not 
mention their genetic risk as an influential factor in decision-making.
So did you have any te s ts  during your pregnancy?
No jus t in case it gave me a miscarriage and stuff like that. I thought 
I didn't want to take tha t chance I'd rather wait until he's born and if 
he's got the sam e condition he's got the sam e condition. (Lisa, 
carrier, second child diagnosed clinically)
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For this family the risks associated with prenatal testing, were more relevant to 
decision-making than genetic risk, and the consequent risk of having a second 
affected child.
4.2 Deciphering statistics
Despite families’ frequent assessment that genetic risk influenced their reproductive 
decisions, the variety of interpretations of risk highlighted the disparate ways 
families’ deciphered statistical risk. Some families described the difficulty of 
gaining meaningful interpretations of numerical risk.
Do you rem em ber, w ere you given a sort of number?
I -  I think I was given a percentage. Yes.
What -  w hat did that mean to  you?
It's very -  it is really difficult to -  because whatever you do you're 
taking a risk. You are -  and my husband, he was really keen to have 
more children. I was more cautious but giving me this, it did -  it did 
help a little bit -  To think well if -  it would have been a different 
m atter if, you know, if it had said you are  a high risk, it falls in a 
high risk category tha t you're going to -  if it's a boy, you're going to 
have this -  (Jennifer, GM, first child diagnosed through newborn 
screening)
Quantifying risk was often reported as problematic; as Jennifer noted, whatever was 
decided involved risk. Rather than focusing on numerical risk assessments, some 
families described their risk in terms of “low” or “high”.
Some families appeared to have been confused by numerical statements. Jessica,
who had a 1 in 20 risk of having an affected boy in subsequent pregnancies,
described her risk:
I had a te s t  as  well to see  if I was a -  carrier, which wasn't 
identified -  But they said I still -  so it was like, what was it, twenty
-  still 20% chance. [Jessica, NBS, germline mosaicism risk]
Jessica and Neil’s first child was diagnosed through newborn screening and they
had decided to have a second child. They chose not to have prenatal testing. Neil
felt that their decision might have been different if Jessica had been a carrier:
... if Jess had been the carrier I think the choice would have been 
the opposite to what we done wouldn't it because I mean we were 
down if -  if it had been a boy it's 50-50 isn't it? Then you got the
-  the 50-50 chance if it's a boy or a girl. You know, and then 
because Jess wasn't a carrier we went down to a 20% 
chance.[Neil, NBS, wife, Jess has GM risk]
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A germline mosaicism risk of having an affected boy is 1 in 20, or 5% in each 
pregnancy and a carrier has a risk of 1:4 or 25%. It is unclear from the extracts from 
Jess and Neil whether they felt their risk of having an affected boy was 20% overall 
or 20% if it was a boy. Either way, they had grossly overestimated their risk and yet 
were still unwilling to test the pregnancy; implying that a 5% reduction in risk was 
an adequate reduction in risk, enabling them to proceed with a subsequent 
pregnancy without prenatal testing.
One newborn screening family, Christine and Mark, had ceased family building,
after being informed that it was “dangerous to have anymore children, because if
you have a boy it will definitely have the Duchenne”. Christine and her husband,
Mark had decided against having subsequent children and consequently Mark had a
vasectomy. After a recent visit from a genetic counsellor, Christine had been
reassured that it was possible to have an unaffected child. However, Christine still
believed that all male children would be affected.
...of course then it's got to be a girl, it's -  it can 't be a boy, so I'll 
have to have a special test done a t the hospital [...] if I did find out, 
if it -  if I was carrying a -  you know, a boy, I would have to have a 
termination. [Christine, NBS, carrier, trying to conceive after 
diagnosis of second child]
With a newfound belief that it was only dangerous to have boys, Christine 
expressed her desire to continue family building, and her husband Mark was hoping 
to have the vasectomy reversed.
Some families described how their assessment of numerical risk had become
imbued with reflections from real-life experience. Nicola, whose first child was
diagnosed after her second affected boy had been bom, was asked to describe her
risk in each pregnancy. She replied:
One in four and I've got two already. Oh tha t doesn 't mean two 
out of four you know what I mean? But there 's  not many folk have 
two so I ju s t  think, what's the chances? [Nicola, LCD, second 
affected boy born before diagnosis of first]
Nicola understood that the risk was 1 in 4 and that having two already did not make 
the risk 1 in 2. However, her personal experience of having two affected boys led to 
a sense of distrust of purely mathematical risk. Genetic risk was interpreted in 
relation to families’ experiences and situations.
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Although families often discussed their risk of having a second affected child in 
relation to their reproductive decisions, there was no correlation between actual risk 
and uptake of prenatal testing. Of the six families in the interview cohort who were 
offered prenatal testing, a total of two families (NBS=1, LCD=1) chose not to test; 
the NBS mother had a germline mosaicism risk and the LCD mother was a carrier. 
Of the four families who chose to test their pregnancy (NBS=4, LCD=0), two were 
carriers and two had a germline mosaicism risk.
4.3 From taking a “chance” to avoiding a “risk”
Many mothers noted that they had chosen not to have any routine prenatal tests in
pregnancies prior to the diagnosis. However, after the diagnosis these mothers had
often accepted, or felt that they would accept, all available prenatal tests in future
pregnancies. Some mothers presented their changed decision in relation to their
perceived ability to cope with whatever condition might occur. Mary had chosen not
to have routine prenatal tests in her first and only pregnancy. In the extract below
Mary describes her reasons for wanting to test subsequent pregnancies.
If I was - if I was to fall pregnant I would want [prenatal testing for 
Down's syndrome] because I - having said tha t I know - 1 don’t 
know. I think the first time I thought I’ll take what life throws a t me.
If I have a Down's syndrome baby, we'll cope with it, or any other 
disability. But, with Michael, knowing tha t the future's going to be 
difficult, I don't know tha t I would - I don't know. But I'd find it very 
difficult to make the decision. But I think I'd rather know 
beforehand than not know. So I would get a te s t  before it.
So it's - w hat m ade you sort of change your mind?
Well, ju s t  the fact tha t I would have two disabled children. I ju s t  
think, you know, if he's in later stages he's going to be quite 
disabled, then how could I cope with another if it was Down's 
syndrome, something tha t takes a lot of support and a lot of 
parenting, I ju s t  wouldn't want to consider it. I wouldn't want to 
think th a t  tha t - life would just be difficult. But people manage with 
a iot worse, you know what I mean? You see people - even people 
tha t foster like three  or four disabled children and they 're doing tha t 
through choice. I'm not tha t big-hearted, I think. I think if it was 
my baby and yeah, I would, I would love it and I would look after it.
But to make the decision beforehand to do it, no, I'm not tha t 
selfless. (Mary, first child clinically diagnosed)
Families described the changed context of the reproductive decision; from having 
no children, or healthy children, to having a child with DMD. Whilst a chance is 
willingly taken prior to the diagnosis, afterwards the risk of another disabled child 
becomes an external tyranny to be desperately avoided.
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After the diagnosis, families present their decision to test subsequent pregnancies in 
relation to two key contextual factors. First, many families highlighted the 
difference between dealing with what is done and choosing what is to become. 
Second, the decision to test a subsequent pregnancy was made in relation to 
families’ perceived ability to cope with another disabled child. Many families 
presented the perceived burden of coping with two disabled children, to be beyond 
their capacity.
5. Coping with tomorrow, coping with today
Families’ aspirations for the future were frequently presented as a negotiation of 
their perceived ability to cope with two key aspects of the condition. First, a number 
of families discussed the prospect of facing a child-less future, once their affected 
child had died. Second, families articulated the difficulties of family building when 
faced with the immediate demands of caring for a child with DMD. The two 
themes, ‘facing the future’ and ‘coping with the present’ are explored in subsequent 
sections.
5.1 Facing the future
A number of mothers described their fear of being left childless. For some, the
prospect of losing their child had induced a brief, but meaningful consideration of
their reproductive options.
I do sometimes think, you know, is -  is he going to die young which 
and we know tha t they do die younger and I think, "oh, you know, 
do I -  do I want to be left with one child" and think -  tha t did used 
to en ter  my head. But I -  I don't -  I try not to think of tha t anymore 
because you don't know what's around the corner so I, you know, I 
don't think of him dying young anymore. I just, you know, you've 
jus t  got to hope for the  best, haven't you, so -  but I did used to 
think like tha t in the beginning but now I -  I think, you know, you've 
got to deal with tha t when it comes haven 't you and you don't know 
what's around the corner as my mother keeps telling me, so, and 
that's  what keeps us going really so you've -  you've got to have a 
little bit of something to cling to. So it doesn 't -  tha t doesn 't come 
into it now with -  with children. It did in the beginning but it doesn't 
now. (Louise, second child diagnosed through newborn screening)
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While some families chose to direct their focus on the possibility of finding a cure
for the condition, others described how the thought of losing their child had
influenced their decision to have more.
I mean it wasn't until like I saw this thing on television, it was about 
the Liverpool disaster a t the football stadium... where all these fans 
got killed and there was like a - this family had lost two children, and 
I was thinking well you know where am I going to be if I lose Joe and 
I haven't got anybody else. And I suppose tha t was a selfish thing 
so partly I was thinking well I need something else to focus on, I 
mean [when] Joe is not here I need another child. I j u s t ... I couldn't 
then be childless. I ju s t  don't think I could have coped with it.
(Jacky, first child diagnosed through newborn screening).
Although some families described how the diagnosis, and prognosis, had induced a 
desire for another child, fertility intentions appeared to play a greater role in 
reproductive behaviour. If families described that they had always wanted more 
children, the diagnosis was described as adding an extra incentive to have a 
replacement child. For families who had not planned to have any more children, 
consideration of having another child was eventually replaced by their original 
fertility intentions.
5.2 Coping with the present
When parents discussed their aspirations for the future, they often described aspects 
of living with the condition which had influenced their reproductive decisions. 
Parenting a child with DMD was presented as both a physically and emotionally 
demanding role. Parents present themselves as responsible for the practical, day to 
day, management of their child’s condition, from helping them on the toilet, to 
ensuring that they are turned over regularly during the night. In addition, parents 
often described the emotional distress caused by watching their child’s slow 
progression towards immobility.
Families with one affected child often expressed doubts about their ability to cope
with more children. Some families felt an increased sense of fear of having another
child after the diagnosis, as demonstrated by Lauren:
We always wanted two, I'm talking ... we've had a couple of scares 
and I've been practically suicidal, I've really been practically suicidal 
because even the thought of having ... not ju s t  because of Ryan I 
don't think that, but because I was so ill I don't think I could go 
through another nine months of feeling like tha t and the after, plus
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Hannah and Ryan on top do you know what I mean, and I think 
everything else you're supposed to be, to do... superwoman you 
know. I don't think I could cope. [Lauren, NBS, second child 
diagnosed through NBS]
However, as Lauren notes, they had only-ever wanted two children. Lauren’s fear of 
having another was related to her experience of having a difficult pregnancy, Ryan’s 
diagnosis, and her perceived inability to cope with more children.
Interestingly, a family with two affected boys described their ability to cope with
two, but expressed doubt about their ability to cope with three affected children.
...you s ta r t thinking well if you'd known earlier would you have had 
Jamie so then you think well, obviously you would have wanted to 
have Jamie so, I don't know. But then now, I wouldn't have a third,
I couldn't cope with a third one, another. Well maybe if tha t 
happened you would change your mind and that. That's why these 
things I think jus t  have to happen but I wouldn't like to have to do 
that. I don't think I could watch tha t again. It's too cruel to watch I 
think to be honest. But, it's too much hard work as well. I mean 
you can only cope with so much and you've got to stop haven't you?
You know, as  they get older and they're very active you know they 
want to do this tha t and the next thing. (Nicola, first child diagnosed 
clinically, after birth of second affected child)
Parents often presented themselves as capable of coping with the life they had, but
when choosing what was to become, parents were faced with incredibly difficult
dilemmas. For Nicola, coping with the life they had, with the diagnosis, her
children’s day to day needs and the house adaptations, had acted as a distraction
from following her original reproductive intentions.
I always wanted another and I think with them having tha t has made 
it worse because I did want another one and obviously things aren 't 
the sam e now to have another one. There's a lot of ifs and buts 
there and I think tha t makes it more definite but, why haven't I done 
it in the last ten years? That's strange now looking back but you 
were dealing with your worst scenario. You know you were dealing 
with that,  you were dealing with the house. You know we done 
everything straight away so tha t you know to be sitting in this 
position now kind of thing. And I, where we were ten years ago I 
don't know but, you know. I think as years go on it gets, as  the 
clock ticks away I think you start thinking, I should have done tha t 
because it's all I've ever wanted to do. (Nicola, first child diagnosed 
clinically, after birth of second affected child)
Throughout the interview, Nicola presents numerous reasons for and against having 
more children. Her fear of having another affected child or having to cope with a 
baby and two wheelchair bound sons undermined her desire to have another, and yet 
her fear of regret remained excruciatingly palpable.
194
A number of families from both cohorts had experienced difficulties either 
conceiving or carrying to term (NBS=1, LCD=3). The NBS family eventually 
carried to term and reached their ideal family size. However, all of the LCD families 
in the interview cohort were still trying. All three families, who had received a later 
clinical diagnosis, had stopped trying for children immediately after their sons’ 
diagnosis. Mary and Chris’s son was three and half years old when he was clinically 
diagnosed.
We had been trying for another baby before he was diagnosed, but 
as soon as  we heard about it we stopped right away. And when the 
geneticist was telling us there was a one in four chance, I mean my 
age was a factor. I mean I was already 40, 41 then, he said tha t if 
I'd wanted another child, not to hesitate. [Mary, LCD, affected boy 
diagnosed aged 3]
Mary felt that if she had received an earlier diagnosis, she would have tried to have
more children before the years progressed.
I would have tried right away for another - if I'd been - if he'd been 
diagnosed right away and I got my diagnosis right away [Mary, LCD, 
affected boy aged 6]
At the time of the interview, Mary was going through her third round of pre­
implantation genetic diagnosis.
For many LCD families the diagnosis delayed the continuation of family building
for some years. Families were often dealing with the emotional aspects of the
diagnosis, alongside practical demands of getting their houses adapted. Often, by
the time they felt ready to have another child, mothers were in their late thirties and
had difficulty conceiving or carrying to term
I had Sean when I was 31 so, say, I was 33 when diagnosed, yeah I 
might have thought two years after that, a t  3 5 , 1 would have had 
one. But then the delay went on so long because... I -  I wasn't in a 
-  you know, I was upset for a -  for all these  years, so erm... so I 
might have. But then when I was 38, you know ... although they've 
said the miscarriage isn't -  tha t they're ju s t  one of these  things, it's 
purely basically unlucky for three of them. [...] Erm, but you know, I 
think now ... erm, you know, looking back, I probably would have 
had children closer together and more of them. [Pamela, LCD, 
affected boy diagnosed aged 3]
Although a number of NBS families had miscarriages after the birth of their affected 
son, all families who had tried to have more children had eventually given birth to a 
healthy child.
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Many parents, who had received a later clinical diagnosis, had simply put aside 
fertility decisions, in the midst of coping with the diagnosis, and going through the 
process of house adaptations. In contrast, families who had received a newborn 
screening diagnosis often proceeded with their original fertility intentions, prior to 
starting house adaptations.
6. Summary of factors families discussed in relation to reproductive 
decision-making
Families presented a number of factors in relation to their reproductive decisions. 
First and foremost families often felt that they had already deliberated about their 
ideal family size, prior to commencing family building. Frequently, fertility 
intentions were influenced by parental experiences of their own childhood family 
life. For example, if parents had come from a large family, they were often keen to 
replicate their own experiences. However, parents also presented a number of 
reasons for limiting family size, such as a desire to focus resources on fewer 
children, or an expressed need to maintain autonomy and control in the family 
home. Families presented their original fertility intentions as a paramount feature in 
reproductive decision-making.
Although families often sought to reach their ideal family size, regardless of the 
diagnosis, many described how their reproductive decision-making had been 
complicated by the diagnosis. Families often deliberated about a number of 
reproductive options, from prenatal testing and termination, to pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis and adoption. Families’ experiences of the decisions regarding 
testing and terminating and the experience of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis are 
explored in greater depth in the following chapter. Reasons families articulated for 
accepting or rejecting different reproductive options varied considerably. Some 
families focused on avoiding the risk of a second affected child, whilst others 
considered themselves as well-placed to have a second affected child.
Responsibility emerged as a key theme in the reproductive decision-making 
process. Some mothers presented their decisions in relation to their responsibility to 
provide their (new) partner with an (unaffected) child. Others spoke of their
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responsibility to provide for their children. For some mothers this involved retaining 
fertility, in the event that a future technological development might mean another 
child could provide a cure for their affected child. For other mothers, providing for 
their child involved avoiding having subsequent children, which may distract 
resources from their affected son. Others described feeling a sense of responsibility 
to provide their affected child with a sibling, for company and support. In contrast, 
some presented the decision to have another (affected) child as irresponsible.
Many mothers discussed their reproductive decision-making in relation to their 
perceived risk. However, there was some difference in the aspects that were 
described as risky. Although most mothers focused on the risk of having a second 
affected boy, some did not express the prospect as a risk, and others focused on the 
risks of miscarriage, associated with prenatal testing. Despite families’ assessment 
that genetic risk had often been an important consideration in their decision-making, 
many families had an incorrect awareness of their risk. Families often described the 
difficulty of gaining meaningful interpretations of genetic risk; numerical 
probabilities were imbued with personal experiences or perceptions of disability.
Many families described their decision not to have routine prenatal tests on previous 
pregnancies as a ‘chance willingly taken’. However, in subsequent pregnancies, 
families often expressed a desire to test for a number of conditions, alongside 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy. Negotiation of the new family situation often led 
parents to express concern about their ability to cope with another disabled child. A 
chance willingly taken became a risk actively avoided.
Negotiation of the families’ new situation and the prospect of a future, childless life, 
occasionally enhanced families’ desires for more children. However, a number of 
families who had received a later clinical diagnosis expressed a sense of missed 
opportunity to have more children. Whilst dealing with the diagnosis and the 
consequent upheaval of the family home, many had delayed reproductive decisions. 
By the time house adaptations had been completed, many mothers in the LCD 
cohort were met with biological obstacles to transforming their fertility intentions 
into behaviour. In contrast, families who had received a newborn screening
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diagnosis had often continued family building immediately and were consequently 
more likely to be successful in transforming intentions into behaviour.
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Chapter Eight 
Living with choice
Introduction
One of the main arguments that has been used to support newborn screening 
programmes for unbeatable conditions, and of course, the primary focus of this 
thesis, is the early provision of reproductive choice. Inevitably, choice creates the 
necessity to decide between competing options. The aim of this chapter is to explore 
families’ descriptions of living with choice, which highlighted the complex and 
highly emotional context of reproductive decision-making for Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy (DMD).
Families’ descriptions highlighted the difference between two contexts of decision­
making. Families who had received a later clinical diagnosis articulated their 
experiential knowledge of their child and his condition. In contrast, families who 
received a diagnosis through newborn screening described the influence of medical 
information on reproductive decisions. Families who chose to use prenatal testing in 
subsequent pregnancies articulated their hopes and fears, in their quest to seek 
reassurance of a ‘normal’ pregnancy. For those who had followed their original 
fertility intentions, chosen prenatal testing and given birth to a healthy child, the 
experience was described with immense joy, and yet most expressed profound 
trepidation at the prospect of repeating the process. Those who were unsuccessful in 
their attempts to follow original intentions and give birth to a healthy child 
described an intoxicating process; driven by hope and dashed by disappointment.
Family accounts spoke of the value of choice, and yet, those who had already 
completed family building, or did not have choice, expressed a profound sense of 
relief at having avoided being compelled to choose. Some articulated the value of 
choice for others, but not for themselves. Families’ experiences of living with 
choice are explored under four themes: ‘knowing my child, knowing his condition’, 
‘prenatal testing; hope, fear and the quest for reassurance’, ‘testing intentions and 
the limitations of choice’ and ‘oscillating between the public and private domain’.
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1. Knowing my child, knowing his condition; the variable role of 
diagnostic pathway
Once families received the diagnosis, they were then offered the option of prenatal 
testing and termination of subsequent affected foetuses. Families described using 
different sources of knowledge to inform the reproductive decision-making process. 
Families with older children spoke at length of the immense ethical dilemma of 
choosing to test and terminate an affected foetus, which had the same condition as 
the child they had come to know and love. Families with younger children often 
described the difference between medical information and experiential knowledge 
of the condition. Families’ experiences are explored under two themes: ‘ethical 
dilemmas’ and ‘medical information and experiential knowledge’.
1.1 Ethical dilemmas
Families’ descriptions of the decision to test and terminate a subsequent pregnancy 
highlighted the exceptional distress caused by even considering terminating a future 
child, which had the same condition as their existing child. Many families, who had 
received a later clinical diagnosis, were sure that they would find a termination 
unacceptable.
Lesley and Mick’s son was diagnosed when Lesley was seven months pregnant with
her second son. Lesley had been offered prenatal testing, but they had decided that
would prefer to “enjoy their son”, before finding out whether he had the same
condition as his elder brother. When asked if she had considered or would ever
consider terminating a pregnancy, Lesley replied:
No, not a t  all. Never. No, I don't agree with. I wouldn't do it a t all.
No, tha t 's  - no, I don't agree with that. I would never. Never even 
entered my head. No, I wouldn't have done that. No.
Is that for religious reasons or -?
No, it's ju s t  - it's nothing to do with religion, it's ju s t  I would never 
terminate a pregnancy, my own pregnancy a t all. I would never.
It's ju s t  something I wouldn't do, you know, even if I'd got - if I 
knew tha t he had it before he was born I wouldn't have, no. No 
m atter what was wrong. [Lesley, LCD, carrier s ta tus  unknown, 
second boy conceived before first child was diagnosed]
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Lesley articulated her responsibility as a mother, to love and care for any child, 
regardless of “what was wrong”. A number of families in the LCD cohort described 
a strong ethical standpoint against termination, and associated prenatal testing with 
termination. Prenatal testing, therefore, was not a feasible option.
Some mothers noted disparity between their ethical beliefs and their potential
decisions regarding prenatal testing and termination. Pamela described her views on
termination, in relation to her decision not to have prenatal testing, on pregnancies
prior to the diagnosis.
I don't actually agree with [abortion]... on -  it's against my 
principles, erm, I don't -  I don't judge though. I'm not a person that 
would say, you know, personally, for myself, I ju s t  wouldn't do it.
When I had Jemma and Sean I didn't have any of the blood tests  at 
all. Because erm, because the doctor said to me: 'Do you want a 
blood te s t  or not?' And I said: 'Uh, I don't know'. And he said, well, 
he said: 'What would you do if the te s t  cam e back and says it was 
Downs' Syndrome?' And I said: 'I don't -  I don't know'. He said:
'Well, would you have a termination? And I said: 'No'. And he said:
'Well don't have the  test '.  And I didn't. Erm, you know, because ... 
you know, I -  I don't -  I jus t don't believe in it and I don't know how 
much I could live with myself ... if I was to do it. (Pamela, second 
child diagnosed clinically)
Pamela went on to explain that her view on abortion was not influenced by religion,
but was part of her moral outlook on life. Although Pamela had chosen not to have
routine prenatal testing for other conditions, due to her moral standpoint against
termination, in subsequent pregnancies she had decided to use prenatal testing for
DMD. Sadly, all subsequent pregnancies miscarried before ten weeks gestation; the
decision to test therefore remained hypothetical. In the following extract, Pamela
describes the prospect of negotiating her moral standpoint with the prospect of
having a second affected child.
...saying that, obviously if the -  the tes ts  had come back a t ten 
weeks ... what would I have done? I don't know. For the first time I 
would need to have thought very carefully about tha t [pause] So it's 
not right for tha t time, but, you know, would I have considered it? 
Probably yes [pause] But I don't believe in it. But I ju s t  don't know 
if I would have been able to... have another child with Duchenne.
But... I would never swap Sean. Ever. You know, I would never go 
back and -  and swap that. That's what's done is done. Erm, and 
he's a great boy and he's brought so many things to our lives tha t 
probably wouldn't have been there. We've met people and ... I -  I 
jus t -  I ju s t  wouldn't change it. But would I go through it again? ...
And I've not even been through anything yet, I don't think. Apart 
from knowing what's going to happen we've not actually lived 
through it. (Pamela, second child diagnosed clinically)
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Many mothers described the difficulty of negotiating previously held beliefs with 
the prospect of having a second affected child. Families expressed their love for 
their child, and the benefits that they had gained from his existence. However, 
parents love for their children was harshly juxtaposed against the prospect of 
watching another child’s slow progression to immobility.
Many families articulated the belief that the decision to test and terminate a future
pregnancy undermined the value of their child’s existence.
[The consultant] said tha t if I'd wanted another child, not to hesitate 
and tha t they would test ,  well, if I fell pregnant they would test the 
foetus and abort if there  was a - part of me I think I did want 
another child and part of me said yeah, I was prepared to do that.
But my husband couldn't. He said no. He said he knew right away if 
he was faced with it he wouldn't go through an abortion. Well, not 
tha t he would, I would go through it, but he didn't want to face that.
So he said no, no, tha t wasn't an option.
Was th at for religious reasons or - ?
Well, not strongly, ju s t  his own moral reasons, his own feelings on it 
tha t he didn't want - and I think as well it was kind of a feeling tha t 
there 's  something wrong with him [their son], and look a t him, he’s 
a perfectly able, capable wee boy, but obviously in future if you had 
two children the sam e it could be very, very difficult. So I think 
tha t 's  how he felt tha t it was really saying, thinking about him, would 
we have done it and he didn't want to think about ail the issues.
And I think I would have - 1 think I would have found it very, very 
difficult myself. And in the end up, I'd probably went through with 
the pregnancy no m atter what the outcome was. But we decided not 
to take the risk. (Mary, first child diagnosed clinically)
Mary and her husband had decided to avoid the ethical complexity of choosing to 
test and terminate an affected foetus, by opting for pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis.
One possible explanation for the lower uptake of prenatal testing, in families who 
received a later clinical diagnosis, was the age of their affected child at the time they 
were considering further pregnancies. For the LCD families, the option of testing 
and terminating an affected foetus was often wrought with emotional complexity. 
Although many families felt that they could not cope with a second affected child, 
the decision to test and terminate a child for a particular condition was being made 
in the context of already knowing a person with that condition. The decision­
making process included experiential knowledge of living with a child affected by 
DMD.
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1.2 Medical information and experiential knowledge
Many families felt that the medical information provided at the time of diagnosis
provided a stark and distressing outlook for their child. A number of families, who
had received a later clinical diagnosis, described their experience of the condition as
more positive than they had originally imagined.
They said tha t he c a n ' t ... he can't ride a bike, he can 't do horse 
riding, he can't this, you assume he can't do anything and it's funny 
this little one is crawling around and you're thinking hang on a 
minute. So, whatever they do then it's a surprise to you, and you're 
not thinking w e ll ... th a t  gives you, not hope, but you think well yeah 
actually so he can't ride a bike, so? So he can 't go horse riding, so?
He can do that, he can do this. He can't play football, he hates 
football he 'don 't wanna play it anyway, it's a stupid gam e' you know 
[..] but when you're first told it's devastation, and if you see the 
later on s tages  it frightens you to death. 'Cos you're thinking oh my 
god I'm going to be wheeling him around, and he's got a standing 
frame ... s tarts  off as  a little thing and it grows as he does, like you 
grow in your thoughts and ideas, but when you look a t  it you see 
something and you think they've got him strapped up from his feet 
to his head and he's on this plank of wood with wheels on... have I 
got to wheel my son round like tha t because you're expecting from 
day one, he's strapped together and tha t 's  what you e x p e c t ... you 
expect it because you don't know (Lauren, second child diagnosed 
through newborn screening)
The medical description of the condition was often found to be lacking in 
experiential validity. As the affected child grew older, families who had received a 
newborn screening diagnosis realised that medical knowledge did not fully describe 
the reality of living with a boy with DMD.
Anne, whose second child was diagnosed through newborn screening, described the
medical information that they had received at the time of the diagnosis:
You know they say a wheelchair but you know to me a wheelchair 
was not the  end of the world. You know? But, I mean [unclear]... 
they were going to grow up to accept it... it was the prognosis 
tha t you know, by the time they were 16, 17 tha t everything 
would s ta r t to go and you think well what was the point... of them 
being born? But of course it's not been like that. It's not been like 
tha t a t  all. It's been really positive, I've got to be honest. (Anne, 
second child diagnosed through newborn screening. First child 
subsequently diagnosed)
Anne’s family was already complete at the time of the diagnosis, but she felt that if 
she had tried to have more children she would have tested and terminated on the 
basis of the medical information provided.
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I think sort of time you know, from what the things they'd told 
me, what sort of life and what a life span... I really think I would 
have had an abortion. Just for their sake really, you know? You 
know? I mean not now but that 's  with hindsight isn't it? But I 
couldn't blame anybody on what they were told to take tha t 
decision. You know? I really couldn't. (Anne, affected boys aged 
16 and 19 years)
Another newborn screening family had chosen to test a subsequent pregnancy for
DMD. The foetus had been diagnosed with another condition, and the parents had
decided to terminate. Jacky and her husband decided to have another pregnancy
and chose to use prenatal testing; they had a girl and named her Rowan. However,
now her son, Joe, was older, Jacky felt that her decision regarding prenatal testing
and termination would be quite different.
I don't think I probably really thought about [having prenatal 
testing] as  deeply... If I would have known what I know now I 
might not have gone for the tests. I mean if I ever got pregnant 
accidentally I don't think I would go for any testing a t  all 
...because I now know I would never have terminated. I don't 
know what I would have done then... if anything.
So, w hat's changed?
Well knowing Joe I think has ... and what you're doing, I mean 
when they 're young, 'cos Joe was only four then you know he 
wasn't in a wheelchair then, he was able bodied, I ju s t  didn't 
know what to expect, I didn't know erm you know if he had ... 
would have learning difficulties, if erm you know how he would 
cope with it, you know no sort of idea. But then once you've 
grown up with i t ... like with Rowan I was really surprised when 
she said "well, I wouldn't mind if I had a boy like Joe," because 
she's used to it, she can see Joe as a normal person but I think 
because I had no idea what Joe was going to be like I was always 
scared of what... I didn't think I could cope with it. I think now 
well yes, I could, if I had another boy, you know I would cope 
with it because I've seen other families with two boys and they've 
managed. I think I would cope less having to term inate the 
pregnancy... you know if I had to term inate it because of 
Duchennes it would be obviously like saying tha t Joe's existence, 
he shouldn't be here ... [Jacky, NBS, carrier, affected boy aged 12 
years]
This extended extract from Jacky highlights a number of key factors in the 
decision-making process about prenatal testing. First, like many mothers who had 
older children, Jacky felt that the decision to test and terminate an affected foetus 
essentially conveyed the message that a life with Duchenne was not worth living. 
Second, their original decision to test their pregnancy was in effect bom out of fear 
of the unknown. Now that they had got to know their son, realised that he could
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cope with his condition and they could cope with him, their decision would have 
been based on experience, rather than medical information.
2. Prenatal testing; hope, fear and the quest for reassurance
Families who had experienced prenatal testing often described an incremental
process of decision-making. Rather than deciding whether they would choose to
terminate an affected child, families described the decision to test as a quest for
reassurance; hoping for an unaffected child.
So w hat w as -  w hat did you -  w hat did you w ant to gain from  
the am niocentesis?
I suppose to ease  -  to feel more a t ease. I suppose the only thing I 
would possibly gain from it is if it was a girl then I would know you're 
not going to go through the same sort of thing. So it -  tha t was the 
only thing I gained through it because I don't know w hether I could 
have terminated the pregnancy... even if they'd have said it was a 
boy [...] but I suppose it was to ease  really, hopefully tha t was the 
outcome. That would help me feel more a t  ease  for the rest of the 
pregnancy you know. (Jennifer, first affected child diagnosed through 
newborn screening)
Many families hoped that the tests would show that they were carrying a female, so 
that they “didn’t have to make any decisions” (Pamela, second child diagnosed 
clinically).
Those who chose to use prenatal testing rarely described the decision as 
synonymous with the decision to terminate. Families viewed decision-making 
as an incremental process, whereby immediate options were addressed (i.e. 
shall we test the pregnancy?), rather than deliberating about possibilities that 
may not transpire (i.e. would we terminate an affected child if the tests come 
back positive?).
For many mothers, enjoyment of the pregnancy was postponed until reassurance
had been provided that the foetus was unaffected. All of the families who had
prenatal testing described safeguarding news of their pregnancy from becoming
public knowledge. Informing the wider family, and friends, portrayed happiness
with the pregnancy, which families described as absent.
I had no enjoyment of being pregnant. I was happy to be pregnant 
but I couldn't really feel fully happy about it until I'd gone through all 
the tests. So, it stopped tha t initial feel of enjoyment until you knew
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everything was going to be okay. So, you couldn't really bond, you 
couldn't really feel happy and tell everybody until you'd had all the 
results back. So, it did spoil tha t initial bit, but when you did get the 
results back and like you know, you knew Rowan was going to be a 
girl then it was absolutely fantastic, you know elation and I ju s t  had 
a really, really you know enjoyable pregnancy after that, as much as 
I enjoyed Joe. (Jacky, first affected child diagnosed through newborn 
screening)
Many mothers spoke of the difficulty of bonding with their future child, until 
receiving reassurance that no further decisions needed to be made. After receiving 
reassurance, ‘normal’ enjoyment of the pregnancy could be resumed.
Families often described their anxiety, whilst they waited for the test and then
waited again for the results. During this time some mothers, who had avoided the
prospect of deciding whether to terminate, felt compelled to reassess the decision.
Once I had the CVS te s t  I was quite worried because it seem ed to 
take a long time to have the test. I think I was told it could be 
between about ten to thirteen weeks and I think I was almost 
fourteen -  fifteen weeks when they did the te s t  and of course by that 
time I was feeling him moving and so I was really stressed about - if 
it did come back with him having Duchenne how would I cope with 
tha t and what would I do? We talked about it and said tha t we would 
abort. I don't know whether push came to shove if I could do tha t so 
no, tha t was quite stressful and a relief when the te s ts  came through 
and said tha t no, he was fine. (Rebecca, second child diagnosed 
through newborn screening)
Many mothers described an active disassociation from the decision to terminate, 
and consequently with their pregnancy. However, for those who had begun to feel 
the foetus moving, the avoidance of bonding with their child was described as an 
increasingly difficult endeavour.
Some mothers highlighted the end of the tentative pregnancy; once reassurance had
been provided, enjoyment of the pregnancy could commence. However, others
described a lasting sense of fear and trepidation.
[The hospital] phoned us a t about 5 o'clock I don't know how they'd 
done it so quick... um... yeh and said you know it was a little girl and 
I had to say well you know... please, please carry on, um, doing all 
the other tes ts  tha t you can do... because as much as you say things 
are OK from... this particular side of things I still won't be able to 
cope with another child if there 's  anything else wrong, please do 
everything you can, you know. So, which they did do and they 
phoned back a couple of weeks later then and said you know we've 
done everything we can and everything is OK. So, which was, it was 
dead exciting then you know... what a relief, unbelievable um... it was
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quite a horrendous... (Fiona, second child diagnosed through 
newborn screening)
For Fiona, the quest for reassurance was not simply a quest for a child without
DMD. Although Fiona described her relief when ‘all the other tests’ came back
clear, she subsequently explained that her heightened sense of fear that something
else might be wrong, lasted throughout her pregnancy.
Until I had her as well, until she came out and I could see tha t she 
was OK I worried the whole time. I worried the whole way through 
until I actually had her and she was out safely and everything was 
fine, I worried the whole time. Anything could have happened, you 
know, even during birth or whatever you know... you know it does 
make you worry more. I don't know w hether you worry about how 
you'd cope or the fact tha t you know you can't take everything for 
granted tha t everything's going to be OK... but you know it was - it 
was... a big worry all the way through. (Fiona, second child 
diagnosed through newborn screening)
Not only had her son’s diagnosis removed a previously taken for granted belief that 
her child would be healthy, Fiona described her concern about her capacity to cope 
with another child with any other disability. Testing the pregnancy for reassurance 
was not just focused on gaining reassurance that the foetus was unaffected with 
DMD.
3. Testing intentions and the limitations of choice
Seven of the eleven newborn screening families in the interview cohort felt that they
had not reached their ideal family size; four of whom chose to have prenatal testing
on subsequent pregnancies and eventually gave birth to a girl or unaffected boy.
Families often described the value of having an unaffected child. Jacky and Richard
had a second child, Rowan, after Joe was diagnosed, and found that having a
healthy child provided them access to an otherwise inaccessible world.
I said "I've jus t  got to have another child." And I did, and it's the 
best thing I ever did because you know Rowan makes us focus on 
something different - you can have the sam e hopes and dream s and 
aspirations for them , what they would do for the future. Where Joe, 
yes you can have the sam e dream s for them but it gets cut short.
So... and then you know everything's very focused when you have a 
child with a disability, around OT, Physio, wheelchairs and you just 
get fixed in. With Rowan then you've got tha t little reprieve where 
you can go and watch her play football, you know Joe can come with 
us but we wouldn't have that... have tha t opportunity, we couldn't 
have done that. (Jacky, first chid diagnosed through newborn 
screening)
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Jacky’s description of living with a child with DMD, highlights the constant 
rigmarole of hospital appointments; the medicalisation of life with a child DMD. 
Rowan had provided access to a ‘normal’ life, unhindered by immobility issues. For 
Jacky, an unaffected child provided the opportunity to have aspirations for her 
child’s future, which lasted - as most parents hope for - beyond her own lifetime.
None of the parents interviewed had more than one subsequent pregnancy after the
diagnosis of their son. Many families described the decision in relation to having
already reached their ideal family size. However, for some parents, the prospect of
going through the process of testing another pregnancy was decidedly unappealing.
I think my husband would have liked to [have more children] but I 
felt I wanted -  I thought I was pushing my luck. I felt we were lucky 
and we had Rosie [...] you know - be thankful tha t you've got two 
and, you know, I didn't really want to think "I want to do it" -  you 
know, go through tha t again, you know. (Jennifer, first child 
diagnosed through newborn screening)
Jennifer and Tom had previously described their desire to have a large family. 
However, undergoing prenatal testing during her pregnancy with Rosie, was 
described as a quest to be put “at ease”; Jennifer articulated doubts about whether 
she would have been able to terminate an affected foetus. Rather than following 
their original reproductive intentions, Jennifer expressed her desire not to ‘push her 
luck’.
Not every family was successful in their attempts to have another child. In an 
attempt to avoid the immense ethical dilemma of whether to test and terminate an 
affected child, Mary and Chris had opted for pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. 
During the interview, Mary described the captivating fear of missing an 
opportunity.
They've offered me this chance and it's my only chance. I can't 
change my mind. Next year I couldn't change my mind, I'm getting 
older. And I thought I'll go along with it to the end, whatever they 
offer me I'll take it.
At the time of the interview, Mary had already had two unsuccessful rounds of pre­
implantation genetic diagnosis, and was about to commence a third attempt. Mary 
spoke at length of the rollercoaster ride of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis; 
sickness, hope and disappointment. When asked whether she would undergo a 
fourth round, her response oscillated between resignation and lingering hope.
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You'd like to think - you have to be able to say I tried, and you have 
to be able to say no, tha t 's  where it ends and you get on with your 
life. I don't know though. It's very - every time you convince 
yourself you're happy with what you got, you know, having a baby, 
you think oh god, disrupts you life again. Do you really want that?
And then you start this process, you get so caught up in it and then 
they reimplant the egg, you feel as if you're pregnant. I mean it's 
jus t  the sam e as if they told you you were pregnant, you kind of 
have a bond with this wee egg tha t probably doesn 't exist, you 
know, when they put it back nothing happens to it. But you do bond 
with it and when it doesn 't work, no m atter what you thought before, 
it's - 1 wouldn't say devastating, as such. I would imagine it would 
be for women tha t maybe don't have a child and are fairly desperate,
I wouldn't say I was devastated, but I was very upset. Even the last 
time I was quite upset. (Mary, first affected child clinically 
diagnosed)
Despite pondering whether she really wanted another child, Mary describes the 
intoxicating process of being provided with a small chance that they might. When 
each fertilised egg was implanted, previous doubts were swept away in 
contemplation of the future child; only for brief bonding to be replaced by grief. 
Deciding to “get on with your life” was described as another choice not easily 
taken.
4. Oscillating between public and private domains
Although the preceding sections and chapters have focused on the implications of 
diagnostic procedure for reproductive decision-making, it is essential to note that a 
number of families described their reproductive decision-making as unaffected by 
the diagnosis. Many families had already completed family building, prior to 
receiving the diagnosis.
In the interview cohort a number of families, who had received a newborn screening 
diagnosis or a later clinical diagnosis, described having already met their 
reproductive intentions, prior to the diagnosis. These families often spoke of their 
relief at having avoided the complexity of reproductive decision-making, after the 
diagnosis.
I'm very lucky in that, the position in the family where Iain was tha t 
I didn't have all those -  I don't have a lot of the -  the worries and 
things tha t maybe people have if it's their oldest child. Whereas 
they then have to -  seriously think about having any more and going 
through genetics and th a t  and everything else. [Esther, third child 
clinically diagnosed]
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The sense of relief was also expressed by a family who had two affected children.
Anne’s first son was bom prior to the implementation of the newborn screening
programme; he was diagnosed after her second child received a diagnosis through
newborn screening. Whilst discussing whether she might have considered prenatal
testing, Anne announced:
In some ways I've been lucky because I've had all those choices 
taken from me... because I really don't know... (Anne, second child 
diagnosed through newborn screening)
Many families who had not required, or had not experienced the early provision of 
choice, expressed an unerring sense that they had escaped from being faced with 
difficult reproductive decisions.
However, when families were asked to describe the perceived benefit of newborn
screening, many mentioned the provision of reproductive choice. For families who
had already completed their families, the provision of choice was described as
valuable for others, but not for themselves.
I don't know if we'd want -  I don't know if I would have wanted 
to know when he was a baby because we had those three years 
when we were oblivious to that, and then when he was three it 
was then, it's a - ,  like it's a terrible bereavement. So I don't 
know if I would have wanted to. But then tha t was, I had my 
family, like I had my children, the boys and I had one. I think 
it'd probably be different if he had been the first because there 's  
about three years of a gap. So I could have been pregnant with 
another child and so you can see why [newborn screening] is 
controversial. I personally wouldn't have wanted to know but I 
think there 's  -  I think there 's  benefits in people knowing tha t -  
because there 's  so many families tha t have it, they 're pregnant 
with their second child or their sister's having a child and she's a 
carrier as  well. [Esther, affected boy diagnosed aged three]
Like many families who had received a later clinical diagnosis, Esther described 
having received greater value from the carefree years with their child, than they 
might have received from the provision of reproductive choice. However, Esther 
recognised that the provision might be valuable for others.
For newborn screening families who had continued to family build after the 
diagnosis, the provision of choice had enabled them to proceed with subsequent 
pregnancies with an awareness of their genetic risk. One family in the newborn 
screening cohort described the provision of reproductive choice as the greatest
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benefit of newborn screening. The father, Neil, described how a newborn screening
programme would inevitably reduce the incidence of the condition.
I think [newborn screening for DMD] really should be world wide,
I've got to be honest and having been in the position and I think 
it's -  you know; definitely because it gives people an option 
doesn't it? And it may -  I mean Duchene on a whole then may 
reduce maybe. Well, not so much reduce then but it won't grow 
as fast will it, like families having one and having a second one, 
all of a sudden they have two, might even have three or four by 
the time they're found but if -  if those families knew perhaps 
they'd only have one child and then there's only one boy out 
there with Duchenne's, not four boys then isn't there? So it -  it's 
reducing the number of people with it (Neil, first child diagnosed 
through newborn screening)
Despite Neil’s fervent expression of the value of reproductive choice, to reduce the
incidence of DMD, Neil and Jess decided to have another child after the diagnosis,
and chose not to test the pregnancy.
But we had that option and you know, and -  and we -  we couldn't 
make that decision. (Neil, first child diagnosed through newborn 
screening)
Parents often presented different views, depending on whether they were 
discussing the public, or private, domains of reproductive choice. In the public 
domain, reproductive choice is valued. Choice is presented as an asset, an 
entitlement, which each and every family deserves. However, in the private 
domain, the domain where individual families make real decisions, the value 
of reproductive choice must be negotiated. For some, reproductive choice was 
irrelevant. For others, who chose to continue family building, choosing was 
either anxiety ridden and stressful, or the complexity of the decision was 
simply rejected.
5. Summary
The timing of the provision of reproductive choice appeared to have significant 
implications for families’ reproductive behaviour. Numerous families, who received 
a later clinical diagnosis, had continued family building, unaware of their genetic 
risk. Some families had a second affected child, prior to the diagnosis of their first. 
Others had ceased family building immediately after receiving the diagnosis, only to 
be faced with fertility difficulties once efforts to conceive were resumed. In 
contrast, newborn screening provided families with an earlier awareness of their
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genetic risk, and many families had successfully continued family building to reach 
their ideal family size.
However, with reproductive choice comes responsibility. Families’ accounts 
highlighted the complex and highly emotional context of reproductive decision­
making for Duchenne muscular dystrophy. Many families who had already 
completed family building expressed gratitude that they had avoided being faced 
with such complex decisions. For those who desired to continue family building, 
previous fertility intentions were set into turmoil as families wrestled with ethical 
dilemmas. Families that had received a later clinical diagnosis discussed a range of 
reproductive options; prenatal testing, adoption and pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis. In contrast newborn screening families rarely mentioned any options 
other than prenatal testing and termination.
There was considerable variation in families’ views on, and approach to prenatal 
testing. Often families, who had chosen not to have prenatal testing, associated the 
testing procedure with termination (i.e. if they were not willing to terminate the 
pregnancy, there was no perceived benefit of testing). The majority of families who 
used prenatal testing were seeking reassurance; hoping for a positive outcome, 
fearing the possibility of being faced with another decision. All families who 
underwent prenatal testing described the initial weeks of the pregnancy as bereft of 
enjoyment; unable to bond with the child they may choose to terminate. For some 
the fear that ‘something else might be wrong’ permeated the entire experience of 
pregnancy.
Despite the often difficult experience of prenatal testing, many families, who were 
successful in their attempts to have another child, spoke of the value of having an 
unaffected child. Not only had they reached their ideal family size, living with an 
unaffected child served to mitigate the medicalised lifestyle, associated with living 
with a child with Duchenne muscular dystrophy. However, after one experience of 
prenatal testing, nearly all families in the interview cohort had reached their ideal 
family size. Only one family who had received a diagnosis through newborn 
screening cohort suggested that they may not have followed their original 
reproductive intentions. This family presented the prospect of going through the
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stressful process of prenatal testing and termination, as a paramount feature in the 
decision to cease family building.
In the newborn screening cohort, families often spoke of the impact of medical 
information, received around the diagnosis, on their perception of their future life 
with a child with DMD. Many families, who received a newborn screening 
diagnosis, chose to have prenatal testing in subsequent pregnancies. As children 
grew older, families often described their experience of living with a child with 
DMD, as considerably more positive than they had anticipated.
Some families described how decisions to test and terminate in the early years of 
their child’s life, were made before they had come to know their child, know how 
he would cope with the condition, and know how they would cope with him. Once 
families had experiential knowledge of their child, they often described the 
immense ethical dilemma of choosing to test and terminate a child with the same 
disability. Decisions were no longer based on factual descriptions, but experiential 
evidence; knowledge of person with a disability, rather than information on the 
disability alone.
In an attempt to avoid the emotional complexity of choosing to test and terminate, 
one family, who had received a later clinical diagnosis, had opted to undergo pre­
implantation genetic diagnosis. Their experience of reproductive choice was 
described as rollercoaster ride of hope and disappointment. This mother expressed 
the difficulty of saying ‘no’ to choice, when the possibility of having another child 
remained.
When families discussed the public domain, the provision of reproductive choice 
was often described as having value. Choice was perceived as an advantage that all 
should have. However, in the individual domain, the value of reproductive choice 
must be negotiated. For families who had already completed family building, the 
potential values of other competing attributes of the newborn screening programme, 
such as the provision of time to prepare, must be addressed in relation to the 
detrimental aspects of an earlier diagnosis. Families who received a newborn 
screening diagnosis, lost the carefree years and the opportunity to get to know their
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child before receiving a diagnostic label. Despite the perceived value of 
reproductive choice for families who wished to continue family building, the reality 
of living with choice was constituted by hope, fear and disappointment; a process 
some were unwilling to bear.
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Chapter Nine 
Discussion
Introduction
Early newborn screening programmes for Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) 
were implemented with a focus on enabling families to avoid the birth of a second 
affected child. However, the newborn screening programme in Wales aimed to 
provide families with “reproductive choice” in future pregnancies, to enable them to 
plan for the future with a child with a disability; to avoid the diagnostic delay; and 
to identify a presymptomatic cohort who may benefit from future treatments 
(Bradley et al. 1993).
The focus on providing information, support and choice is reflected in a growing 
drive to expand the remit of newborn screening programmes, to include untreatable 
conditions. Newborn screening for treatable conditions aims to improved the health 
of the newborn, whereas screening for untreatable conditions may provide with 
families “broader, but possibly more moderate benefits” (Bailey et al. 2006:270). 
There is a paucity of research documenting families’ experience of, and response to, 
the early provision of information, support and “reproductive choice”.
This study reviewed the implications of two different diagnostic pathways for 
reproductive decision-making, in families affected by DMD. This chapter 
summarises the findings from the quantitative and qualitative data. The chapter is 
divided into seven sections. The first explores the limitations of the findings and the 
unexpected consequences of conducting a mixed methods study. The second section 
explores the literature on illness narratives, in order to contextualise the findings of 
this study. The remaining sections discuss the findings of this study in relation to 
relevant literature. Section three explores the determinants of fertility in families 
affected by DMD. Section four addresses the role of risk in reproductive decision­
making. Section five explores the role of diagnostic pathway in changing the type of 
information accessible to families during the reproductive decision-making process, 
from experiential knowledge to medical information. The sixth section describes the
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experience and outcome of providing families with reproductive choice. The final 
section provides a summary and conclusion of both the quantitative and qualitative 
data, as well as policy recommendations for newborn screening for untreatable 
conditions.
1. Methodological considerations
Methodological issues are often addressed after discussion of the key findings. 
However, in this study, the experience of combining quantitative and qualitative 
methods had a considerable impact on interpretation of the data. Therefore, it is 
deemed necessary to address interpretative issues at the outset, in order to place the 
discussion of the findings firmly within the methodological framework. The 
following sections explore the methodological limitations of the study and address 
the unforeseen depth and potency of the qualitative data.
1.1 The limitations of methodology; reliability and validity
There are many threats to the reliability and validity of any investigation. Biases and 
errors can occur in the conceptualisation of the research idea, and the design, 
sampling and processes of a study (Bowling 2002). As already noted in Chapter 
Four, this study was designed to explore reproductive outcomes, through the 
collection and analysis of quantitative data, and reproductive decision-making, 
through the collection and analysis of qualitative data. The difficulties associated 
with combining methods are explored in the following section. First, the reliability 
and validity of the findings is explored in relation to the comparability of the 
samples used, in both the quantitative and qualitative sections of this study.
Quantitative data was collected from nearly all of the families who had received a 
later clinical diagnosis of DMD in the west of Scotland, and all families who had 
received a diagnosis of DMD through newborn screening diagnosis in Wales, 
betweenl990 and 2006. Unfortunately, it was not possible to assess whether the five 
families, excluded from analysis in the west of Scotland, had different experiences 
of reproductive decision-making. The reason for their exclusion - incomplete
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medical files -  hindered the possibility of addressing potential disparities. In 
addition, the comparable nature of the two cohorts rested on similarities drawn from 
national data on reproductive behaviour; no data was collected on family-specific 
influences, such as the socio-economic status of each family. Although these issues 
raise potential questions about the validity of the comparison, it should be noted that 
the cohorts included the majority of the “DMD population”, diagnosed during that 
time. The cohorts were not selected samples.
In contrast, the participants in the qualitative part of the study were a sample of the 
total “DMD population”. There are two key issues associated with the qualitative 
sample used in this study. First, the sample size was relatively small compared to 
the total cohort (only 26% of the total cohort was interviewed). Second, the 
qualitative sample was selected on the basis of providing maximum variation of 
reproductive behaviour. It is not known whether selection based on another 
variable, such as socio-economic status, would have provided different results.
Ideally, the qualitative sample should have reflected a diversity of factors that may 
have influenced reproductive behaviour. However, the focus of the study was to 
review reproductive behaviour and the selected sample included a range of 
experiences and responses to reproductive technologies. In addition, the sample 
reflected differences in the total cohort in relation to the age of the affected male, 
the stage of his condition, the age of mothers, and decisions regarding whether or 
not to continue family building and whether or not to have prenatal testing. The 
sample also included a range of people with different socio-economic backgrounds. 
It would be a misnomer to call the qualitative sample “representative” of the total 
cohort, and the myriad of variables that may have influenced reproductive 
behaviour. However, from a pragmatic perspective it is difficult to envisage a 
sampling procedure that could have truly reflected the considerable diversity of 
factors, affecting reproductive decision-making.
1.2 Unexpected consequences of conducting a mixed methods study
The original aim of the study was to compare the reproductive behaviour of families 
after receiving a diagnosis of DMD through two different diagnostic pathways. It
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was assumed that the quantitative data would provide a neat list of “factors affecting 
reproductive behaviour”, which could be explored in greater depth during the 
qualitative interviews. Neither the quantitative nor qualitative data provided 
simplistic factors to compare and contrast. The quantitative data highlighted the 
arbitrary nature of porous categories; the qualitative data added unexpected depth 
and complexity. An intentional strategy used to ease participants into the interview 
process had unexpected consequences; participants expressed and articulated their 
experiences of the diagnosis and living with DMD in and through narratives.
Using a narrative approach to qualitative data collection and analysis was 
unintentional and unforeseen. The collection and analysis of quantitative data 
instigated an urge to find predictable, regular patterns in the qualitative data; an 
approach that was frustratingly fruitless. After a considerable amount of re-analysis, 
the depth and breadth of the qualitative data was finally recognised. Instead of 
“shopping lists” of “factors affecting reproductive decision-making”, there were 
powerful narrative accounts; stories that illuminated the influence of context, and 
emphasised the diversity of experience.
2. Illness narratives; contextualising the qualitative data
There is now a significant body of work on chronic illness and disability that has 
used the narrative approach. The use (and meaning) of “illness narratives” has 
varied considerably (for example, see Hyden 1997 for a description of the 
differences between “illness as narrative”, “narratives about illness” and “narrative 
as illness”). One of the most popular distinctions between narrative types is 
presented by Bury (2001), who describes three forms of illness narrative; contingent 
narratives, moral narratives and core narratives.
“Contingent narratives” reflect Hyden’s (1997) concept of “illness as narrative”; the 
personal experience of illness that draws upon biographical and social contexts. 
However, Bury (2001:268) adds a temporal dimension to personal experience of 
chronic illness, focusing on the “beliefs and knowledge about factors that influence
32 Asking people “to tell me a little about how [their] son was diagnosed”, before delving into more 
personal and potentially more sensitive issues of reproductive decision-making.
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the onset of a disorder; its emergent symptoms, and its immediate or “proximate” 
effects on the body, self and others”. The “moral narrative” draws upon notions of 
shame and blame, and reflects moral or religious contingencies used to inform 
personalised concepts of aetiology. In contrast to both contingent and moral 
narratives, “core narratives” focus on form; language and symbols are explored to 
identify narrative structures, such as “tragic, comic, romantic” (Pierret 2003:11).
The narratives presented in this study were authored by both narrator (the interview 
participant) and researcher (myself) and focused on both contingent and moral 
narratives. Families provided accounts that highlighted the complexity of 
reproductive decision-making, and reflected the salience of contextual factors in the 
reproductive decision-making process. Stories were presented that enabled families 
to make sense of the past in order to live in the present, and address their future.
There is a striking resemblance between the narratives presented in this study and 
previous work on illness narratives. In subsequent sections, I explore the factors 
described by families, such as original fertility intentions prior to the diagnosis; 
responsibility toward partners, existing children and the future unborn child; 
perception of risk in relation to perceived capacity to cope with another affected 
child; willingness to undergo prenatal testing and termination; and underlying views 
on, and experience of, disability. Where appropriate, I draw upon previous studies 
on illness narratives to facilitate an exploration of the subjective experiences of 
disability, and to enable an interpretation of the data that is “sensitive to a broad 
range of micro- and macro-contextual influences” (Lawton 2003:23).
3. Determinants of fertility in families affected by DMD
Many of the determinants of fertility in families affected by DMD reflected those 
described in the literature review in Chapter Three. Families presented a broad 
range of economic, social and psychological factors that influenced the formation of 
fertility intentions and the transformation intentions into behaviour; many of which 
were unrelated to the diagnosis. Families discussed the desire to access the 
perceived psychological and social benefits associated with having a healthy child.
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However, families also described the perceived value of living with a child with 
DMD. In addition to the desire for children, families presented their reproductive 
behaviour as a negotiation of responsibility. Before motivations were transformed 
into intentions, families considered the potential impact of their motivations and 
redefined justifications for their decisions, in light of the diagnosis. The four issues, 
forming and transforming fertility intentions, the perceived value of a child with 
DMD, the perceived value of a child without a disability and the role of 
responsibility, are addressed in separate sections below.
3.1 Forming fertility intentions and transforming intention into behaviour
The data from this study highlighted a number of similarities between the 
determinants of fertility in families living with DMD and those outlined in the 
literature review. The majority of families in the interview cohort (n=13) described 
forming a notion of their ideal family size, prior to having children. Couples often 
expressed a desire to replicate their own experience of childhood. Family trees often 
showed clear associations between the parent’s family size (number of siblings), 
and their choices about their own family size (number of children). Few families 
were explicit about the social factors that had influenced the formation of intentions. 
However, like families in the general population, families affected by DMD 
appeared to form intentions through an evaluation of “the economic and 
psychological costs and benefits of children, taking into account personal factors 
and social context” (Lawson 2001:74). The age of the mothers and the number of 
children desired broadly reflected national data.
Original fertility intentions were presented as a paramount feature in the decision­
making process after the diagnosis. Families who felt that they had already reached 
their ideal family sized ceased family building, and those felt that they had not yet 
reached their ideal family size continued family building, albeit with redefined and 
reformulated justifications.
Around half of the total cohort (51.3%, n=37) chose not to have subsequent children 
after the birth of the first affected male. Families in the interview cohort, who 
presented themselves as having completed their families, sometimes deliberated
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about whether to change original plans in light of the diagnosis, but there was no 
evidence to suggest that the decision to cease family building was entirely a result 
of the diagnosis. It is not possible to determine the influence of the diagnosis on the 
decision to cease family building in the total cohort. However, 58.3% (n=42) of 
families already had at least one child before the birth of the index and the average 
number of children in the general population is two, suggesting that many families 
may have already ceased family building prior to the diagnosis.
Families, who described themselves as wanting more children prior to the diagnosis, 
often proceeded with subsequent pregnancies after the diagnosis. A total of 35 
(48.7%) of the 72 families in the total cohort had at least one subsequent pregnancy 
after the birth of the affected male, suggesting that many families had not yet 
reached their ideal family size. However, following original fertility intentions was 
often described as problematic and families reformulated original intentions in light 
of the diagnosis. Families who chose to continue family building often considered a 
variety of reproductive options before proceeding, such as adoption, prenatal 
testing, and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis.
Some of the constraints families encountered, when attempting to transform fertility 
intentions into behaviour, were similar to those found in the literature on the 
determinants of fertility in the general population. Mothers’ reproductive behaviour 
was influenced by the three types of constraints outlined by Miller and Pasta (1995); 
her partners fertility intentions; life cycle factors (such as age, marital duration, 
parity, gender and age of previous children); and changes related specifically to 
reproduction (such as unplanned pregnancy and divorce/separation).
The diagnosis of DMD appeared to influence the experience of the three types of 
constraints. Receiving a later clinical diagnosis appeared to cause families to delay 
family building. By the time families, who received a later clinical diagnosis (LCD), 
felt in a position to continue family building, many were faced with age-related 
fertility issues. Mothers, in both cohorts, who had separated from their partners felt 
that the diagnosis had influenced the separation. In addition, mothers who had 
formed new relationships often felt under pressure to conform to her new partners’
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fertility intentions, to have a (healthy) child. These issues are explored in greater 
depth in subsequent sections.
One of the key factors that emerged in the literature on the determinants of fertility 
was the influence of the perceived value of children. Families who received a 
diagnosis of DMD described the perceived value of living with a boy with DMD 
and living with a child without a disability. These two factors are explored in the 
next two sections.
3.2 The perceived value of living with a child with DMD
Families’ narrative accounts highlighted considerable variation in perceptions and 
experience of living with DMD. Some families felt that their social networks and 
access to social support had diminished as a result of having a child with a 
disability. However, many families described the value of having a child with a 
disability. Some families described how their interpersonal relationships had been 
strengthened and intensified, and their lives enriched by the experience.
However, despite the general view that there were positive attributes of living with 
DMD, the possibility of having a second affected child was met with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm. Families who described their experience of the condition in 
predominantly negative terms expressed a desire to avoid the birth of a second 
affected child. Families who described a more positive experience varied in their 
degree of willingness to contemplate life with a second affected child. One family 
had considered adopting another child with DMD, as they were ‘already set up’ for 
living with a child with a disability. However, another mother, Mary, commenting 
on other people fostering disabled children, described herself as “not that big- 
hearted”. Mary felt that loving a child with a disability was an easy task, but 
choosing to have a child with a disability required a ‘selflessness’, which she felt 
she lacked.
The perceived value of living with a child with a disability varied considerably 
between families. In addition, there was considerable variation in the relationship 
between perceived value and reproductive behaviour. Families who perceived value 
in living with a child with DMD were not necessarily willing to repeat the
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experience. However, it is important to note that some families -  who had been 
provided with the opportunity to get to know their child, prior to making 
reproductive decisions -  described their experience of already caring for a child 
with a disability as a positive asset for facing a future with a second affected child.
It is possible that the newborn screening diagnosis removes families’ opportunity to 
assess the value of living with a child with DMD, before making reproductive 
decisions; contributing to a higher uptake of prenatal testing. This point is explored 
in greater depth in a later section.
Many families interviewed in this study spoke at length of the lack of support 
received from social services, medical professionals and their communities. It is 
possible that the perceived lack of support and access to care was integral to their 
perception of disability and their subsequent reproductive decision-making. Brookes 
(2001) interviewed twenty women who were either affected by a genetic condition 
and making reproductive decisions, already mothering children with a genetic 
condition, or had recently made a decision during pregnancy to accept or decline 
prenatal testing. For some, the perceived lack of care was integral to their 
reproductive decision-making and resulted in an increased desire to use prenatal 
testing and termination. Brookes (2001:137-138) notes that “it is the social context 
that frames women’s decision-making and within which a child’s access to care is a 
central influence on women’s decision-making.”
A crucial consideration in reproductive decision-making is the level of acceptance 
of disability families perceive in their community (Brookes 2001). Clarke 
(1990:1146) notes that “if there is no confidence in the willingness of society to care 
for their child once they are unable to do so, parents may choose to terminate a 
pregnancy against their own wishes and beliefs. This is an external pressure on 
couples that is exerted by social and political decisions.” The very offer of prenatal 
testing creates a social pressure to accept it (Lippman 1991). The perceived 
consequences of having an affected child may therefore be imbued with feelings of 
responsibility and guilt (Kay & Kingston 2002).
3.3 The perceived value of a child without a disability
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A number of families in the interview cohort described the perceived value of 
having a child without a disability. Although living with a child with a disability 
was rarely perceived in purely negative terms, there was a clear perception that a 
child without a disability may provide a different type of value. A number of 
families mentioned that their unaffected child had provided them with access to 
different social networks. In addition, parents had the opportunity to develop hopes, 
dreams and aspirations for an unaffected child, which reached beyond the parents’ 
lifetime. While living with a child with a disability was often perceived to have 
value in the private domain, in the social domain the value of a child with a 
disability was less apparent. Few friends or relatives had wheelchair accessible 
houses and families often felt isolated with diminished social networks.
A number of families in the LCD cohort presented a similar desire to access the 
values and benefits associated with having a child without a disability. However, for 
those who had not conceived again prior to the diagnosis, the emotional distress 
caused by the diagnosis, and immediate practical upheaval associated with house 
adaptations, often led to a considerable delay in family building. The birth interval 
between the affected boy and the next subsequent pregnancy in risk aware families 
was considerably longer in the LCD cohort, than the NBS cohort. By the time 
mothers’ felt in a position to face the upheaval associated with having a baby, many 
were in their late thirties or early forties and facing age-related fertility issues.
Although the later clinical diagnosis may have provided families with the 
opportunity to assess the value of living with a child with a disability, it did not 
diminish the perception of the value of having an unaffected child. However, for 
many families, the later clinical diagnosis appeared to hinder their attempts to reach 
their ideal family size and access the perceived rewards associated with living with 
a child without a disability.
3.4 The role of responsibility
Responsibility emerged as a key factor in many families’ discussions of their 
reproductive decision-making. Families described the need to negotiate the desire 
for children with their sense of responsibility to partners, existing children and the
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future unborn child. Often the way responsibility was negotiated depended on which 
relationships were prioritised, which supports the findings of Downing’s (2005) 
study on reproductive behaviour in families at risk of Huntingdon disease.
In this study, some mothers had formed new relationships and felt responsible for 
providing their new partner with an (unaffected) child. Others worried about the 
effect another (affected) child might have on their existing family, and expressed the 
need to focus emotional and financial resources on their existing children. Many of 
the families who had chosen to have subsequent pregnancies spoke of a sense of 
responsibility to provide their affected child with unaffected sibling(s).
Some presented the desire for a healthy child as a desire to provide the affected 
child with company. Others felt a responsibility to provide the existing child with a 
sibling to care for them if and when the parents were no longer able. A few families, 
who had already reached their ideal family size, chose not to be sterilised. Fertility 
was presented as a responsibility to the existing child in case some future 
development provided an opportunity for a sibling to provide a cure.
The association between responsibility and prenatal testing also varied depending 
on which relationship was prioritised and how motherhood was perceived. Some 
families felt that a mother should love her child no matter what and therefore 
prenatal testing and termination were unacceptable. However, other families who 
had previously rejected prenatal testing on moral grounds reassessed their position 
after the diagnosis. Often families who had previously decided not to use routine 
prenatal testing for Downs’ and Spina Bifida felt that their decisions would be 
different in subsequent pregnancies. A chance, once willingly taken, became a risk -  
an external tyranny to be desperately avoided. The existing child was presented as 
the paramount consideration in the reproductive decision-making process.
Moral narratives emerged in descriptions of responsibility and reproductive 
decision-making. Choosing to continue or cease family were decisions imbued with 
perceptions of the severity and consequences of the condition; on emotional and 
financial resources, in relation to both family and society. Previously held beliefs 
about the morality of abortion sometimes wavered in the spotlight of new
225
considerations. The desire for another child was juxtaposed against questions about 
the morality of abortion versus the moral and practical consequences of having 
another child with Duchenne.
A few mothers presented a moral obligation to avoid the birth of a second affected 
child. Often these mothers were carriers who were beset with profound feelings of 
guilt. Williams et al. (2002a) note that in many people’s minds, responsibility is 
linked with the avoidance of disabled births. The offer of prenatal testing may 
sometimes be perceived “not so much as being about trying to give greater control 
to couples as to the circumstances in which they become pregnant, but rather as a 
feature of good parenting” (Williams et al. 2002a:751). Brookes (2001:143) also 
argues that “a child with a genetic condition has become socially constructed as 
women’s lack of care towards their child, as well as an indication of a lack of social 
responsibility”.
The moral implications of reproductive decisions reflect potential gender 
dimensions (Chadwick 2009). Although couples may discuss reproductive decisions 
together, “the impact of the decision falls predominantly on the woman, who has to 
either carry a foetus to term or undergo a termination” (Chadwick 2009:10). In 
addition, in many societies, it is the mother who is responsible for the day to day 
caring of a child, with or without a disability.
In this study, the role of gender was particularly salient. The mothers in this study 
described reproductive decisions in relation to feelings of guilt and responsibility; 
reflecting previous studies on maternal feelings associated with carrier mothers of x- 
linked conditions (Kay & Kingston 2002). Interestingly, the perceptions of guilt and 
responsibility pervaded many of the narratives presented in this study; regardless of 
whether the mother “carried” the DMD gene. As an x-linked genetic condition, 
carrier mothers often drew upon concepts of genetic responsibility to apportion 
(self) blame, whilst those at risk of germline mosaicism sought alternative 
explanations, which reflected popular health promotion messages surrounding 
appropriate behaviour during pregnancy. In addition, mothers often presented 
themselves as the primary arbiter of subsequent reproductive decisions; the one who 
must live with the consequences of termination, or having another affected child.
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4. Risk and reproduction
A number of salient factors emerged from the quantitative and qualitative data 
regarding the importance of risk in reproduction, and the understanding of how risk 
is defined. The interpretation of risk is paramount feature in reproductive decision­
making and may be affected by a number of factors. First, genetic counsellors have 
played an important role in informing families of their genetic risk and there is a 
significant body of literature documenting the potential influence of genetic 
counselling on subsequent decisions. The first subsection therefore explores the 
potential influence of genetic counselling. The second subsection explores the 
influence of diagnostic pathway and increasingly sophisticated carrier testing 
techniques on awareness of risk. The final subsection explores the perception of risk 
in relation to reproductive decision-making.
4.1 Genetic counselling; framing risk and informing decision-making
The role of genetic counselling in reproductive decision-making has been the 
subject of much debate (Michie & Marteau 2000). Many authors note that 
counsellors’ communication of risk and counselees’ consideration of risk are 
fundamental aspects of decision-making about the use of prenatal testing (Gates 
2004, Emery 2001). The following sections explore the way in which genetic 
counsellors present risk information and the potential influence genetic counselling 
has on reproductive decision-making.
4.1.1 G en etic cou nselling; fram ing risk  inform ation
In Chapter One, it was noted that genetic counsellors have traditionally employed 
classical decision-making theories, derived from the field of economics. Classical 
decision-making theories reflect an analytical, rational model of decision-making. 
As a result genetic counsellors have traditionally provided risk information “in the 
language of rational thinking, explanations, comparisons, logical propositions, and 
problem-solving, or problem prevention” (Anderson 2007:14). Professionals have 
tended to focus on the provision of probabilities (Shiloh 2000).
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The applicability and appropriateness of applying rational decision-making theories 
to genetic-related decisions has long been questioned (Lippman-Hand & Fraser 
1979c, Kessler 1980, Beeson and Golbus 1985). Economic theories were developed 
in relation to “simple choice decisions where decision implementation was easy to 
accomplish and thus easy to overlook” (Kendzierski 1990:27). Observed decision­
making in complex social situations typically deviates, “quite substantially”, from 
the models’ predictions (Sanfey 2007:599). Early decision-making theorists largely 
ignored the influence of emotions (Sanfey 2007), or claimed that “good decision­
making could be derailed by emotions” (Anderson 2007:13).
The degree to which genetic counsellors still use classical decision-making theories 
to inform their genetic counselling sessions is both debateable and dependant on the 
individual genetic counsellor. However, even if genetic counsellors recognise the 
important role of emotions in decision-making, numerous studies have shown that 
the counsellors and counselees often have quite different expectations of the role of 
genetic counselling.
Mishler (1984) argued that the doctor-patient relationship reflects a transaction 
between two distinct worlds: the biomedical world of physicians and the socio- 
psychological world of patients. Studies examining communication between 
clinicians and patients in prenatal decision-making often emphasise the biomedical 
perspective by highlighting the completeness of information provided to patients 
(Bernhardt et al. 1998, Marteau et al. 1993, Marteau & Dormandy 2001) or 
describing the means by which clinicians impart information (Pauker & Pauker 
1987, d’Ydewalle & Kiebooms 1987, Michie & Marteau 1996).
Sorenson et a/.’s (1981) quantitative study of 628 patients attending 47 genetics 
clinics found that patients reported that genetic counselling provided a large amount 
of medical and technical information and spent little time discussing emotional and 
social issues. These results were replicated in a number of subsequent studies 
(Michie et al 1996,1997, Williams et al 2002b, Hunt et al 2005).
Clinicians have been found to have different goals, purposes and values regarding 
testing, which affect their clinical interactions. Hunt et al (2005:302) state that “the
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information clinicians provide patients reflects their clinical interest in identifying 
and controlling pathophysiology, while patients, in contrast are most concerned with 
protecting and nurturing their pregnancy”. Michie and Marteau (2000) suggest that 
the focus on the provision of probabilistic information has eclipsed the provision of 
information about the actual condition.
Latimer (2007) argues that Western ideas of knowledge are based on the notion of 
having perspective, of being distant, objective. Genetic counsellors attempt to 
provide this sense of perspective to assist families to make an informed reproductive 
decision:
“.. .by giving parents objective information about their child’s troubles they 
will be given a more ‘correct’ perspective on these troubles and will therefore 
be able to make better (i.e., more rational) reproductive choices” (Latimer 
2007:15)
In genetic counselling the focus has been on equipping people with appropriate 
information on genetic risk, “believing that if they understood scientific 
explanation, they would use it to make rational or logical reproductive choices (i.e. 
ones that made sense to the provider)” (Biesecker 2001:323).
4.1.2 G en etic cou n sellin g  an d  reprodu ctive decision -m akin g
The framing of risk information has an important influence on perceptions of risk 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Edwards & Elwyn 2001, Shiloh et al 2002). However, 
counselees’ perception of risk prior to counselling remains more closely associated 
with reproductive behaviour (Shiloh & Saxe 1989). After reviewing the literature on 
genetic counselling and reproductive decision-making, Kessler (1989:352) 
concluded that “the role of counselling largely is to confirm or reinforce a decision 
already taken, rather than to shape a reproductive decision from the outset”.
Frets et al (1990) interviewed 164 couples two to three years after genetic 
counselling, and developed a model to study factors related to reproductive 
decision-making. The key factors found to be related to reproductive decision­
making were reproductive outcome before counselling, desire for children, and 
interpretation of genetic counselling information. The model enabled identification 
of reproductive decisions in 96% of cases.
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Several studies have since demonstrated that counselees interpret risk information in 
a personalised manner; perceived risk appears more salient to decision-making than 
actual genetic risk (Lippman-Hand & Fraser 1979a,b,c, Wertz et al 1984, Shiloh & 
Saxe 1989, Kraus & Brettler 1988, Parsons & Atkinson 1993, Denayer et al. 1997, 
Lerman et al. 2002). Perceived risk is often associated with the severity of the 
condition (Lippman-Hand & Fraser 1979b, Verp et al 1988, Ekwo et al 1987) or 
social meanings (Beeson & Golbus 1985, Sorenson et al 1987, Bostrom & Ahlstrom 
2005). Rather than focusing on probabilities, at-risk couples tend to categorise their 
risk as either high, or low (Lippman-Hand & Fraser 1979a, Parsons & Atkinson 
1993, Denayer et al. 1997). Couples at-risk of genetic conditions, who are facing 
reproductive decisions, often focus on the meaning of the pregnancy and their 
attitudes towards both disability and termination (Rothman 1993, Rapp 1999, 
Biesecker 2001).
Despite a pervasive enthusiasm to tar genetic counsellors with a eugenic brush, 
evidence suggests that families are actually more likely to continue a pregnancy 
after receiving information from a genetic counsellor than an obstetrician (Sorenson 
et al 1981, Michie & Marteau 2000). The issue is perhaps less about genetic 
counselling per se, than the general concept of receiving information from someone 
who has no experience -  and is unlikely to ever have experience -  of living with a 
child with a particular genetic condition. A family, who has no experience of a 
condition, and looks to the future with a disabled child with fearful anticipation, is 
likely to find that the medical professional who provided the information has the 
same fearful concept of disability. This does not reflect a paternalistic, eugenic- 
driven health care system; this reflects the negative view of disability found 
throughout society. Perhaps we are all tarred with the eugenic brush.
4.2 The influence of diagnostic and carrier testing techniques on risk awareness
The diagnostic procedure had considerable influence on families who had not yet 
reached their ideal family size. A total of 35 families (48.7%) had subsequent 
pregnancies after the birth of the first affected child in the family. For these 
families, the diagnostic pathway had important implications for awareness of 
genetic risk. Of the 17 families in the LCD cohort, who chose to continue family
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building, 58.8% (n=10) were unaware of their risk in 13 subsequent pregnancies, 
resulting in the birth of two second affected males, prior to the diagnosis of the first. 
However, awareness of risk does not necessarily correlate with an overriding desire 
to avoid the birth of a second affected child; one risk-aware family in the newborn 
screening cohort chose not to have prenatal testing and had a second affected child.
4.2.1 The ro le o f  g en e tic  risk
Significant advances in carrier testing techniques have enabled the provision of less 
complex risk assessments for mothers at risk of DMD. Before the introduction of 
more sophisticated technologies, mothers were often provided with a separate figure 
for carrier risk and reproductive risk. Previous research has shown that mothers 
often confused the two probabilities (Parsons & Clarke 1993, Parsons & Atkinson 
1993). In addition, families may have struggled to make sense of carrier risk figures. 
In recent years, rather than providing families with a carrier risk, (e.g. a 66% or 37% 
risk of being a carrier), it has become possible to provide families with information 
on whether they do or do not carry the same genetic mutation as their child. It is 
now possible to tell a mother that she is either a carrier, with a 1 in 4 risk of having 
an affected child in each subsequent pregnancy, or she has a germline mosaicism 
risk of 1 in 20 in each subsequent pregnancy.
Despite these developments, information on carrier status does not appear to have a 
direct influence on reproductive behaviour. The quantitative data demonstrated that 
when families had to wait a considerable amount of time to receive more accurate 
confirmation of their carrier status, many chose to proceed with subsequent 
pregnancies regardless. Overall, there was little difference in the proportion of 
carriers or women with a germline mosaicism risk who chose to have subsequent 
pregnancies; 53% (n=38) of mothers in the total cohort were carriers and 52% 
(n=14) of risk-aware women who had subsequent pregnancies were carriers. The 
proportion of pregnancies occurring in carriers was higher in the NBS cohort (72%, 
n=23) than in the LCD cohort (58%, n=8). However, the difference was not 
statistically significant.
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There was also no association between carrier status and uptake of prenatal testing.
A slightly higher proportion of women with germline mosaicism risk (77%, n=7), 
who were aware of their carrier status, had a subsequent pregnancy and were 
offered prenatal testing, chose to test the pregnancy, compared with only 61% (n=8) 
of carriers. However, there was a significant difference between the two cohorts in 
the uptake of prenatal testing (p<0.05). Mothers in the newborn screening cohort 
were significantly more likely to opt for prenatal testing than mothers in the LCD 
cohort. Potential reasons for the differences are explored in subsequent sections.
4.3 Perception of risk; perceived burden and the capacity to cope
Findings from both the quantitative and qualitative data suggested that actual 
genetic risk does not necessarily correspond with subjective perceptions of risk. 
None of the families in the interview cohort presented themselves as having ceased 
family building because of the genetic risk in subsequent pregnancies. However, 
those who had continued family building often presented genetic risk as an 
important factor in their decisions regarding prenatal testing and termination.
Many families had an incorrect awareness of their genetic risk, and drew upon 
numerical risk assessment that did not correspond with their actual risk. Risk 
appeared to be related to the perception of the outcome: the burden of having a 
second affected child. This finding suggests that it is not just the severity of the 
condition that informs reproductive behaviour (which was obviously the same for 
each family in this cohort), but the subjectively perceived burden of the condition 
and families perceived capacity to cope. Often the perceived inability to cope with 
another child with a genetic condition is the deciding factor in the uptake of prenatal 
testing and subsequent termination (Brookes 2001). The following two sections 
review the literature on the role of the perceived burden of the condition on 
reproductive decision-making and families’ perceived ability to cope with a second 
affected child.
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4.3.1 The influence o f the perceived burden o f disability; reviewing the literature
Numerous studies have tried to assess the influence of experience of living with a 
condition on the perception of burden; the findings are varied and often conflicting. 
Two studies on reproductive behaviour in families affected by DMD, which were 
reviewed in Chapter Three, highlighted an association between experience of the 
condition and desire to avoid having a child with DMD (Beeson & Golbus 1985, 
Kay & Kingston 2002). Both studies found that the experience of caring for an 
affected sibling appeared to increase motivation to use prenatal testing and 
termination.
The studies conducted by Beeson and Golbus, and Kay and Kingston, also 
addressed reproductive decision-making in other x-linked conditions. Beeson and 
Golbus (1985) reviewed 15 families at risk for haemophilia and Kay and Kingston 
reviewed three families at risk of Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, one at risk of Menkes 
syndrome and one at risk of Fabry disease. Despite the difference in severity of 
these conditions, there was little difference between families in relation to 
reproductive decision-making. Both studies found that the experience of caring for 
an affected sibling appeared to increase motivation to use prenatal testing and 
termination.
The difference between the findings from both Beeson and Golbus’ (1985) and Kay 
and Kingston’s (2002) studies, and this study highlight the importance of the 
relationship with the affected individual and the perceived severity of the condition. 
Participants in this study had an affected child, whereas participants in the studies 
conducted by Beeson and Golbus (1985) and Kay and Kingston (2002) had an 
affected sibling or distant male relative. The differences between reproductive 
behaviour in mothers of children with disabilities and those at risk of having a child 
with a disability is reflected in other studies. Meryash (1989) found that women 
without a child affected by Fragile-X perceived the burden of the condition to be 
higher than mothers of affected children.
Brookes (1991) conducted interviews with 20 women who were already living with 
a child with a genetic condition, or were themselves affected by a condition to
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explore families’ response to the offer of prenatal testing. Brookes (2001) found that 
the experience with people with disabilities did not have a predictable relationship 
with reproductive decision-making. Brookes (2001) found that some women 
perceived themselves to be “at risk” of a genetic condition. However, others “saw 
the experience of already caring for a child with a genetic condition and their 
increased maturity as positive asset for engaging in further caring” (Brookes 
2001:140). Experience of living with an affected child enabled mothers to assess 
their capacity to cope with another affected child. Experience was found to be a 
more useful asset in the reproductive decision-making process than the information 
provided by medical practitioners.
Frets et al. (1991) conducted in depth interviews with 23 families who had either a 
child, sibling or spouse affected by physical or mental disabilities and had chosen to 
have subsequent pregnancies. The authors assessed how “receptive” participants 
were to genetic counselling information regarding reproductive options. Frets and 
colleagues note that “most couples (16/23) appeared to be receptive to information”. 
However, couples with an affected sibling were significantly more receptive than 
couples who had an affected child (p<0.005). Although the study did not address the 
uptake of prenatal testing, the findings suggest that experience of living with an 
affected child may contradict the information provided by genetic counsellors, 
resulting in the appearance of being “less receptive”.
Ferguson et al (2000:81) cumulated research on parents’ experience of living with 
disability and concluded that “there is a level of agreement that the overall 
adaptation profile of families who have children with disabilities basically 
resembles the overall profile for families in general (including children with and 
without disabilities).” In addition, research shows that “family responses to 
disability are immensely variable”. Considering the variability in families’ 
experiences of disability, it would be unwise to view the decision to terminate as 
always right or always wrong; the individual context of decision-making has 
significant bearings.
Despite the significant amount of research suggesting that parents adapt to life with 
a disabled child as well as they might to life with a child without disabilities, there
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remains a dominant view that “a child with a disability poses substantial heartache, 
difficulty and burden to families that far exceed in kind and degree, the stresses 
modem parents typically face” (Asch 2000:22). Lawson’s (2001, 2006) two studies 
on the perception of disability, reviewed in Chapter Three, reflect this view.
Perceptions of disability may be reflected in the uptake of prenatal testing. The 
findings from this study showed a general decline in the use of prenatal testing. 
Between 1992 and 1996, 83% (n=10) of pregnancies were tested, compared to only 
36% (n=5) between 2002 and 2006. A recent study on families at-risk of Fragile X 
found similar results; between 1991 and 1995, 93% of those counselled opted for 
prenatal testing compared to only 33% of those counselled between 2001 and 2005 
(Nelson et al 2009). A study reviewing changes in the utilisation of prenatal 
diagnosis for Down syndrome in the United States found that “the number of 
women receiving amniocentesis or CVS declined more than 50% from 1,988 in 
1991 to 933 in 2002 (P < .001), despite an increase in the number of women of 
advanced maternal age in the population served” (Benn et a l  2004) There was a 
68% decline in the number of women who underwent invasive prenatal testing 
solely on the basis of their age (1,314 in 1991 to 423 in 2002, P < .001).
The findings of these studies suggest that a decline in prenatal testing is occurring 
across conditions, regardless of severity. It is possible that changing views on 
disability and social norms regarding what is deemed an acceptable choice may be 
influencing a gradual decline in the uptake of prenatal testing (Shiloh 2000).
The findings from these studies pay testament to the complexity of trying to explore 
the factors people associate with reproductive decision-making. However, three key 
issues emerge. First, the social context of decision-making may influence the uptake 
of prenatal testing. Second, the majority of the studies demonstrate that families, 
who are risk of a particular condition and have an affected relative, perceive the 
burden of the condition to be high. In contrast, many families who have lived with a 
child with a particular condition perceive the burden of the condition to be reduced. 
Third, families who have direct experience of living with a child with a disability 
may be “less receptive” to medical discourse about the genetic risk of a condition. 
However, not all families who have direct experience of living with a child with a
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disability perceive themselves as able to cope. The following section reviews 
literature on the perceived ability to cope.
4.3.2 The in flu en ce o f  th e p erce ived  ca p a city to  cope: review in g  th e litera tu re
Chapter Three explored the social context of the desire for children and the 
predominantly negative perceptions of living with a child with a disability.
Klitzman et al. (2007:359) state that “sociological interactions and relationships can 
involve a broad array of dynamic, complex pressures and input that individuals can 
accept, resist or negotiate”. However, the capacity and drive of an individual to 
resist social pressures depends on their degree of confidence in ‘swimming against 
the tide’. Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy defines four factors that influence our 
confidence in decision-making: 1) Have I coped with something like this before? 2) 
Have I seen other people cope with it? 3) Has anyone else convinced me I can cope? 
4) Am I calm when I make the decision?
The four factors in the theory of self-efficacy have particular salience for 
reproductive decision-making in families affected by DMD. First, a number of 
families mentioned that their perceived capacity to cope with the condition had 
strengthened as they had got to know their child. For some families this introduced 
the idea that they would able to cope with another affected child. Second, families 
who had the opportunity to get to know other families with two affected boys, 
sometimes felt that seeing others coping increased their perceptions of their own 
capacity to cope. Third, few families felt that they received information or support 
from either the medical profession, or society, to suggest that they could cope with 
another. Fourth, some families who received a later clinical diagnosis were already 
pregnant and were therefore forced to make a stressful, time-limited decision on the 
future of the pregnancy.
Although the latter factor negatively affected the perceived capacity of a few 
families who received a later clinical diagnosis, the first two factors potentially have 
a more negative impact on all families who received a newborn screening diagnosis. 
Few families -  if any -  will have any concept of either their ability to cope with the 
condition, or the opportunity (or desire) to meet any other families with the
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condition immediately after the diagnosis. Many families who received a newborn 
screening diagnosis found meeting other families, whose affected children 
demonstrated greater degrees of muscle weakness, incredibly distressing. In 
contrast, families whose knowledge and experience of the condition had grown with 
their child, often seemed better placed to asses their own capacity to deal with 
another affected child.
Langer (1975) synthesized an impressive body of data documenting how people 
respond to chance by creating an “illusion of control”; behaving as though chance 
elements may be controlled. Langer argues that people develop the illusion of 
control for a number of key reasons. Firstly people are motivated to master their 
environment. Secondly, no one likes to feel that they do not have control. Thirdly, 
people introduce skill elements to assist with coping and lastly, the illusion of 
control tends to help us more emotionally, than it harms us practically. Langer 
concludes that “when an individual is actually in the situation, the more similar the 
chance situation is to a skill situation in outcome-independent ways, the greater will 
be the illusion of control [...] people are more confident and more likely to take 
risks”.
Reviewing Langer’s findings in relation to reproductive decision-making, families 
who perceive that they are able to cope with living with an affected child have in a 
sense learnt to develop an illusion of control over their situation. To learn to cope 
with what we already have, we “seek to make that which is given and inevitable 
seem chosen” (Jackson 1998:26). As Nikos Kazantzakis (1961:274) observed “to 
say yes to necessity and change the inevitable into something done of [one’s] own 
free will.. .is perhaps the only human way to deliverance. It is a pitiable way, but 
there is no other”.
We cannot provide families, who already have a child affected by DMD, with the 
choice to avoid the condition altogether. Offering families the opportunity to avoid 
another child with the same condition therefore presents them with an existential 
dilemma. Families learning to make the most of what they have often find benefit 
and pleasure from their child, but faced with prenatal testing, must simultaneously 
reconcile efforts to say “yes to necessity” with the option of saying “no, we don’t
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want a(nother) child affected by this condition”. Of course some families are simply 
not able to cope, emotionally nor financially, with the prospect of a second affected 
child and it is entirely justifiable for these families to attempt to avoid that which is 
perceived to be negative, but let us not forget -  our capacity to accept is often far 
greater than our capacity to control.
The supposedly transformative properties of genetic technologies may have changed 
clinical understandings, and abilities to detect particular genetic deletions and 
duplications, but has done little to change families’ experience of living with the 
condition. More accurate carrier testing techniques do not appear to have increased 
the accuracy of individual interpretation of risk. Risk is a complex, highly 
emotional, personal and socially complex phenomenon. Accuracy does not mean 
that a mother with a 1 in 4 risk is more likely to avoid risk by opting for prenatal 
testing, than a mother with a 1 in 20 risk.
It is not the technological capacity to provide accurate awareness of risk that 
influences reproductive behaviour; it is the perceived burden of the outcome that 
affects decision-making. The perception of burden is not influenced by the 
probability of occurrence, but the social context of decision-making, and the 
individuals’ perceived capacity to cope. The perceived capacity to cope is affected 
by psychological factors specific to each individual and family, but also by the 
opportunity to experience the capacity to cope; the opportunity to live with and get 
to know a child with DMD.
5. Diagnostic pathway; delayed diagnosis and medical information
Two key factors emerged from the qualitative data on the experience of the 
diagnosis. First, the diagnostic pathway had considerable implications for the 
experience of the diagnosis. Second, the timing of the diagnosis had significant 
implications for the decision-making process, by changing the role of personal 
experience and medical information in subsequent reproductive decision-making. 
These two factors are explored in greater detail in the next two sections.
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5.1 Experience of the diagnosis: lost years versus carefree years
Previous studies have shown that families are in favour of receiving a diagnosis of 
DMD through newborn screening (Crisp et al 1982, Firth et al 1983, Firth & 
Wilkinson 1983, Smith et al 1990, Parsons et al. 1992). However, only one study 
(Parsons et al 1992) addressed actual experience, rather than hypothetical views. In 
this study, the majority of families who received a diagnosis through newborn 
screening expressed relief that they had learnt of their child’s condition at an early 
stage. However, the majority of families who had received a later clinical diagnosis 
expressed relief that they had not found out earlier.
The findings reflect the contradiction found in Firth et a l ’s (1983) study; although 
75% (n=40) of families who had received a later clinical diagnosis were in favour of 
an earlier diagnosis, only 37.7% (n=20) felt that the later clinical diagnosis had not 
been made at the best time. Some LCD families in this study, felt that the provision 
of an earlier awareness of risk may benefit other families, but were personally glad 
to have received a later clinical diagnosis. It is possible that families, when asked 
hypothetically, value the provision of choice for others. However, families’ actual 
experience of the later clinical diagnosis and the early years of their child’s life 
often outweighed the potential value of choice.
The diagnostic pathway had particular implications for the experience of the early 
years of a child’s life. An unprompted diagnosis for an asymptomatic baby 
devastated families, often to the extent that they felt they “lost” the first few years of 
their babies’ life. Although families who received a later clinical diagnosis appeared 
equally devastated, considerably more time was devoted to describing the gradual 
progression of signs and symptoms. For some, the later clinical diagnosis vindicated 
what others had assumed to be excessive worry. The “lost” time was described in 
months, rather than years.
Various studies have reviewed the process of parental adjustment to the diagnosis of 
disabling condition in their child (see Meryash 1989:20 for a review of literature). 
Many conclude that adjustment to the diagnosis occurs in three stages. The first 
stage is characterised by crisis responses in the form of shock, denial and disbelief.
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The second stage entails emotional disorganisation as families experience guilt, 
disappointment, anger and lowered self-esteem. The final stage of adjustment to the 
diagnosis involves emotional organisation, acceptance and adjustment (Meryash 
1989). Although the division of adjustment into stages may be overly simplistic 
(Sorenson et al. 1981), it is clear that it takes time to adjust to the diagnosis, 
regardless of the age of the child.
Although the diagnosis may be equally devastating to NBS and LCD families, the 
process of diagnosis differs substantially. NBS families are presented with a baby 
and a diagnosis, whereas LCD families experience a transition from recognising 
“trivial symptoms” to acknowledgement of a “developing and persisting disability” 
(Bury 1982:170).
There is a striking resemblance between the narratives presented in this study and 
previous work conducted on beliefs and knowledge about emergent symptoms and 
subsequent moral dimensions of understanding. For example, Bury (1982) explored 
how and when first signs of rheumatoid arthritis were recognised, and highlighted 
the complex layers of uncertainty associated with the medical knowledge and the 
individuals’ concept of self. Like many families who had experienced a later clinical 
diagnosis, the participants in Bury’s study drew upon existing frameworks of 
understanding as a way of defining symptoms within a familiar context. Symptoms 
were often mistaken for “normal” development, or inevitable “wear and tear”, rather 
than indicative of a persistent and developing disability. As Bury (1982:171) 
suggests, “there is often nothing in the individual’s biography which provides an 
immediate basis for recognition of illness as illness”.
Uncertainty is a key aspect of the disruptive experience; early signs of DMD are 
often mistaken for slow development, making the problem of diagnosis particularly 
difficult. Uncertainty is a well recognised concept in the experience of chronic 
illness involving both “uncertain knowledge about the impact and course of the 
condition and of appropriate behaviour in the face of its effects” (Bury 1982:172). 
For some families, access to medical knowledge offers an “opportunity to 
conceptualise the disease as separate from the individual’s self’ (Bury 1982:172). 
Little research has been conducted on how a presymptomatic diagnosis may affect
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the development of child identity. For families raising a child who has received a 
diagnosis, but is yet to show symptoms, attempts to separate aspects of the 
condition from ‘normal’ child behaviour can be problematic.
The age of the boy at diagnosis clearly has significant implications for how people 
perceive their child and cope with the diagnosis. For families who receive a later 
clinical diagnosis, their understanding of the medical information about the 
condition is combined with their own experience of their child. In relation to 
decision-making about prenatal testing, two key factors are apparent: the role of 
experiential knowledge and the influence of medical information.
5.2 The role of experiential knowledge and medical information
Many families felt that the medical information provided at the time of diagnosis 
provided a stark and distressing outlook for their child. Consequently, a number of 
NBS screening families felt that their experience of the condition had ‘not been as 
bad as they had expected it to be’. The medical description of the condition was 
often found to be lacking in experiential validity. As the affected child grows older, 
families realise that medical knowledge is incomplete. As Bury (1982:174) 
suggests, “the search for a more comprehensive level of explanation, a more certain 
basis of coping” indicates the “need to complete knowledge gained from specialist 
sources; a need to tie in formal knowledge with the person’s total biography”.
Receiving a diagnostic label for a seemingly health baby had an insidious affect on 
families perception of their capacity to care for their child. As one NBS mother, 
Sharon noted, “there was nobody there to say, “well why do you not do this, why do 
you do that?”. Although many families found involvement with health 
professionals, in the early years, overbearing or interfering, many others felt isolated 
and abandoned during a time in which they felt the need for reassurance about the 
appropriate way to care for their affected child.
For families who received a diagnosis through newborn screening, the difficulty of 
disentangling aspects of the condition from their child’s developing personality was 
exacerbated. Families who received a later clinical diagnosis presented themselves
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as more competent at defining their child’s identity, in relation to aspects of the 
condition. Describing the impact of the later clinical diagnosis, one LCD mother, 
Maureen, noted: “I think it was to our -  you know, the whole family’s benefit 
because the only thing that had changed at that point was the diagnosis; the label 
that had been put on it, because he was the same boy”. LCD families had developed 
expectations of their child’s abilities, which they often felt would have been 
negatively affected by receiving an earlier diagnosis.
Numerous studies have suggested that the provision of medical information alone is 
not enough (Curtis et al. 1994, Vehmas 2001, Marteau & Dormandy 2001), or that 
the medical information provided is too negative (Asch 1999). Health professionals 
tended to focus on information regarding the “worst case scenario” of the medical 
aspects of the condition, rather than the reality of living with, and caring for, an 
affected child (Brookes 2001). However, it may not be possible to provide families 
with a ‘balanced’ view of the condition. Even families living with a child affected 
by DMD demonstrated some reticence to hear about, or see, the later stages of the 
condition. As a number of families noted, information that families living with a 
child with more progressive weakness may perceive to be positive, may be 
devastating to families coming to terms with the early stages of the condition.
The interview data suggest that, although emotion-based reproductive decisions 
may not be better, they are not necessarily less rational decisions. While NBS 
families often decide about whether to use prenatal testing on the basis of medical 
information alone, LCD families are able to access both medical information and 
their own biographical repertoire of experience. One possible explanation for the 
significantly higher uptake of prenatal testing in the newborn screening cohort is 
that an earlier diagnosis increases susceptibility to medical discourses about the 
importance of risk (Grob 2008).
Many of the findings of this study are corroborated by two recently published 
articles on the experience of newborn screening (Grob 2006, 2008). Grub’s (2008) 
study focused on the implications of newborn screening for families’ perception of 
disease and illness. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 35 
parents of children who received a diagnosis of cystic fibrosis either through
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newborn screening (n=16), a later clinical diagnosis (n=l 1), an early clinical 
diagnosis, within days or weeks of the birth of a symptomatic child (n=4), or 
through prenatal testing (n=4). The research aimed to explore how families 
experienced receiving a positive screen for a genetic disease while their child was 
still asymptomatic, and to compare families’ experiences with those who received a 
diagnosis after the emergence of symptoms.
The findings of Grob’s (2008) study highlight a number of potent consequences 
associated with affixing a disease label to an asymptomatic baby. A newborn 
screening diagnosis “deeply affects parents’ feelings of competence to care for their 
newborn and their sense of who the child is, and places the disease -  rather than the 
process of “falling in love with” the new baby -  at centre stage during the child’s 
early weeks and months; and causes health professionals to loom very large in the 
family’s life at this formative time.” The consequences of an early diagnosis on the 
development of the identity of an affected child are not known. Furthermore, 
Sanders (2006) argues that lowered expectation of people with disabilities has a 
pervasive effect on their development, confidence and perception of worth.
Grob (2006:168) explored the experience of newborn screening from the 
perspective of mothers and called for the expansion of newborn screening 
programmes to “proceed with caution”. The participants in Grob’s (2006) study 
highlighted the “cursed blessing on newborn screening”. An early diagnosis may 
provide some families with a welcome opportunity to address the practical and 
emotional consequences of a condition, but for many it profoundly alters the 
experience of new motherhood. The dramatic rescue of a small number of children 
from tragic outcomes must be juxtaposed against the far reaching effects of 
“automatic classification and diagnosis of newborn babies”.
6. The experience and outcome of reproductive choice
The desire for children and the perceived burden of the condition, whether 
influenced by social perceptions of disability or individual assessments of the 
capacity to cope were the defining factors in the decision to continue family
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building and use prenatal testing. None of the eight families in the LCD cohort had 
experienced prenatal testing or termination. The experiences of families in the NBS 
cohort pays testament to the incredible levels of stress and anxiety caused by the 
experience. The following sections explore the difference between choosing to test 
and choosing to terminate, and the experience of prenatal testing.
6.1 Prenatal testing and termination; often discrete entities
The literature shows that there remains an inextricable link between prenatal testing 
and termination; the majority of individuals who actually receive a positive 
diagnosis through prenatal testing choose to terminate (Rapp 1988, Edwards et al 
1989, Palomaki 1996). However, the interview data suggested that, at the outset, the 
decision to test a pregnancy is not always synonymous with the decision to 
terminate.
Qualitative data from this study and others (Garcia et al 2008) suggest that families 
with strong ethical views against termination tended to associate the decision to use 
prenatal testing with the decision to terminate. However, not all families considered 
their views on termination prior to undergoing prenatal testing, and some families 
chose to have prenatal testing even if they felt that they were ethically opposed to 
termination. Although some people who choose to use prenatal testing have a more 
favourable outlook on termination (Tercyak et al 2001), many do not decide 
whether they would terminate until faced with a positive diagnosis. Often families 
chose to undergo prenatal testing in the hope of receiving reassurance of a ‘normal’ 
pregnancy (Laurence 1981, Kraus & Brettler 1988, Sagi et al 1992, Santalahti 
1998).
The lack of perceived association between prenatal testing and termination, for 
some families, suggests a ‘step by step’ approach to decision-making, which has 
some similarities with Simon’s (1978) concept of “bounded rationality”. Rather 
than following the tenets of classical decision making, individuals reduce options to 
a limited number (e.g. whether or not to have prenatal testing) and make decisions 
which appear reasonable, rather than optimal (e.g. not thinking through to the next
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level of decision-making until faced with that option). Under “bounded rationality” 
thorough processing of all possible options is exhausting and potentially futile.
Orasanu & Conelly (1993:9) suggest that in complex real-world situations, people
“think a little, act a little, and then evaluate the outcomes and think and act some
more”. Leach-Schully (2007) suggests that the series of micro-decisions occurs as a
result of the relationship between ethical choice and time. Decisions regarding
genetic testing require people to contemplate an imagined future:
“When the patient asks, How will Ilive with this decision? she is struggling to 
make sense of a past which has not yet happened” (Leach-Schully 2007:209)
The difficulty of imagining an unknown future often leads to people deliberately
limiting their mental projection into the future during the decision-making process.
Families, who are faced with the option of prenatal testing, often hope that they will
not be faced with the option of termination. Avoidance of an ethically and
emotionally difficult decision, until that decision has to be made, can be viewed as
an entirely legitimate response.
6.2 Experience of prenatal testing and termination
During the qualitative interviews, many families described the experience of 
prenatal testing as incredibly stressful. All mothers who had experienced prenatal 
testing felt that the first few months of their pregnancy had been bereft of 
enjoyment. After receiving confirmation that they were carrying a healthy child, the 
majority felt that the pregnancy could be enjoyed as any other. However, for some 
the fear and anxiety that ‘something else might be wrong’ permeated their whole 
experience of pregnancy. Until they held their (healthy) child in their hands, they 
worried.
None of the families in the interview cohort had received a positive prenatal 
diagnosis of DMD. However, receiving a positive diagnosis through prenatal testing 
has been shown to entail a variety of losses for couples “including the loss of joy of 
pregnancy, possibilities inherent in pregnancy, the dream child, innocence, and the 
world as they knew it” (Sandelowski & Barosso 2005:311).
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In addition, couples experience selective termination as a traumatic life-event, 
regardless of the stage in pregnancy in which termination occurred (Kolker & Burke 
1993). A number of authors have drawn upon William Styron’s (1979) novel 
“Sophie’s Choice”33 to describe the paradoxical lack of choice presented by 
termination, which makes a mockery of choosing (Rothman 1994, Chandler &
Smith 1998). Rapp (1999:225) refers to the irony of choosing to terminate a wanted 
child as a “chosen loss”.
Only one of the families in the interview cohort had experienced termination. 
However, they had terminated a child with a chromosomal abnormality. Although 
they had obviously found the experience traumatic, the mother noted that the 
decision was made easier by knowing that the particularly condition meant the child 
would not survive long after birth. This particular mother felt the burden of 
terminating a child with DMD would far outweigh the burden of living with another 
affected child; if she ever became pregnant again, she explained, she would never 
terminate a foetus with DMD.
Another family in the NBS cohort, who was not interviewed, tested and terminated 
her first subsequent pregnancy, tested her second subsequent pregnancy, but chose 
not to test her third. The genetic counselling notes highlighted that the mother felt 
unable to cope with the terminating another pregnancy. Over time, the risk of 
having a second affected child had become less important than the burden of 
terminating.
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is often presented as a way of avoiding the 
traumatic ethical decision of termination. However, while it might be argued that it 
is “advantageous to women to be able to make selection decisions that do not 
involve a termination”, in practice the decision-making context of PGD arguably 
accrues more power to the practitioner than to the woman involved, “as the object of 
the decision is now located outside her body” (Chadwick 2009:11).
33 In the novel, a Nazi officer offers Sophie the opportunity of going free, rather than being sent to a 
concentration camp. The condition of the offer was that she must choose which of her two children 
would join her and which would be sent to a concentration camp. With only a few seconds to choose 
and knowing that the choice was between all three of them dying, or one of them dying, Sophie 
chose to escape with her daughter. However, the rest of her life was destroyed by that choice.
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PGD had only been experienced by one mother, Mary, in the interview cohort and 
although it clearly changed the circumstances of her choice, it was not clear whether 
her choice had been enhanced. Despite pondering whether she really wanted another 
child, Mary described the intoxicating process of being provided with a small 
chance that they might. When each fertilised egg was implanted, previous doubts 
were swept away in contemplation of the future child; only for brief bonding to be 
replaced by grief. Deciding to “get on with your life” was described as another 
choice not easily taken. The low uptake of PGD may reflect limited availability, as 
well as parental recognition of the considerable practical and emotional resources 
required, in an attempt to avoid a “risk”.
Risk is subjective and the perception of risk may change over time. A bad outcome 
is an external tyranny to be desperately avoided. Families who have a positive 
experience of DMD may not always perceive the negative aspects of the condition 
to outweigh the positive attributes of their experience. While few wish their children 
to have the condition, the alternative options -  to have no more children, to 
terminate all affected foetuses, or to embark on the emotional and time-consuming 
process of PGD -  may bring more anguish than a life with an(other) affected child 
could ever bring. The risk of a lost pregnancy, the risk of a lost life may far 
outweigh the risk of having a second affected child. When the risk of one 
potentially negative outcome far outweighs another, the lesser risk becomes a 
chance to be willingly taken. If the chance results in another affected child, this may 
be preferable to no child at all.
7. Summary and conclusion
Conducting a mixed-methods study provided disparate insights into the implications 
of two different diagnostic pathways, for families affected by Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy. The quantitative data demonstrated the nebulous affect of providing risk 
information; there was no association between carrier status and reproductive 
behaviour. Providing an earlier awareness of risk had varied effects. Families in the 
newborn screening cohort were more likely to continue family building, and 
significantly more likely to use prenatal testing (p=0.05). In contrast, families who
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received a later clinical diagnosis were more likely to cease or delay family building 
after the diagnosis; consequently, family size and birth interval differed 
considerably from the national average. There was little difference in the number of 
second affected boys.
The qualitative data illustrated depth and complexity. Receiving a diagnosis of 
DMD (regardless of the diagnostic pathway) marked a “biographical disruption” 
(Bury 1982); a disruption of structures of meaning, relationships, social networks 
and access to resources. In light of the diagnosis, the personal narrative was 
reformulated, reconstructed, “in order to understand the illness in terms of past 
social experience and to reaffirm the impression that life has a course and the self 
has a purpose or telos” (Williams 1984). The meaning of the diagnosis lay in the 
consequences for the individual and the significance of varying connotations 
associated with DMD. Rather than providing a list of “factors affecting reproductive 
decision-making”, reproductive decisions were presented as relative to -  and 
imbedded in -  illness narratives.
The data presented in this study raises important questions about the purpose, 
meaning and consequences of providing families with reproductive choice. The 
following sections explore three key questions, before considering the implications 
of this study in relation to current newborn screening policies.
7.1 Why provide choice?
During the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher developed national policies around the notion 
of free individuals, consumers, able to choose how to live their lives between 
competing market options. Subsequent governments have maintained an emphasis 
on individual choice, and as a result “the UK has become closer to the American 
ideal of competitive individualism and choice has become enshrined as a central 
ethic” (Kerr & Shakespeare 2002:120). Newborn screening for untreatable 
conditions is increasingly presented as a pragmatic response to consumer demand, 
which rests on implicit assumptions that families’ value choice and/or will choose to 
avoid the birth of a second affected male.
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7.2 Are newborn screening and reproductive technologies a real choice?
Disability rights activists have done much in recent decades to dislodge and 
deconstruct the dominant medical model of disability. Highlighting the social 
dimensions of disability has enabled recognition of the aspects of society that 
actively create, or reinforce, discriminatory attitudes towards those with 
impairments. However, both the medical and social model of disability fall prey to 
the pitfalls of reductionism, whether cultural or biological (Danermark & 
Gellerstedt 2004); neither model, alone, provides an adequate reflection of the lived 
experience of disability. The narrative accounts provided in this study highlight the 
ways in which people are disabled by both society and their bodies (Shakespeare 
2008).
Encompassing aspects of both social and medical models of disability enables 
discussion of the practical implications of disability, alongside the influence of 
dominant attitudes towards disability on the provision of genetic services. Kerr and 
Shakespeare (2002:179) argue that attitudes towards disabled people are still 
“largely based on a mixture of fear, suspicion and pity”. Despite increasing 
sophistication of genetic technologies, reproductive interventions far outweigh the 
possibilities for treatments or cures. Overt coercion to participate in reproductive 
interventions is rare, but the widespread view amongst clinicians, scientists and 
policy-makers is that “the birth of a disabled child is a tragedy best avoided” (Kerr 
& Shakespeare 2002:180).
There are still “subtle and not so subtle ways in which people are pressurised to 
comply with genetic testing, particularly screening programmes” (Kerr & 
Shakespeare 2002:180). For example, newborn screening for DMD in Wales is 
presented as an “opt-in” programme, and yet in practice few mothers were aware 
that they had “chosen” to have screening. The few mothers, who had actively 
decided to opt for newborn screening, presented the decision as inevitable; the very 
offer of the test, alongside other routine tests, implied a benefit of testing.
For those who received a positive result, the consequences of an inadvertent 
decision were significant. Families were hoisted onto a conveyor belt of genetic
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information and risk management. In the field of genetics, information has become 
imbued with exceptional significance. Newborns are tested so that families may 
know; may be informed; may have choice. Genetic information is perceived to be 
the cornerstone of human existence, the key to individual identity and health 
(Samerski 2006). It is presented with gravitas, as the foundation of informed 
decision-making; but genetic information is complex and its relevance to each 
family is subjective, opaque, and questionable.
Information is provided to enable autonomous, informed decisions, but reliance on 
the notion of individual choice is inherently problematic. In practice, choices are 
constrained and knowledge may be uncertain (Kerr & Shakespeare 2002). The 
participants in this study demonstrated a wavering ambivalence toward the 
provision of choice. Mothers’ descriptions of the importance of “choice” were 
juxtaposed against accounts of “ignorant bliss”, profound appreciation of the 
“carefree years”, and relief at the avoidance of “difficult decisions”. Choice was not 
always valued and knowledge was not always empowering, especially as nothing 
could be done to alleviate or cure the condition being tested.
7.3 What are the consequences of choice?
Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need to “educate” or “empower” the 
public to make “informed choices” about health and healthcare. However, the very 
notion of “informed choice” raises questions about information and questions about 
choice (Kerr & Shakespeare 2002). Parents received genetic counselling in order to 
educate them about the scientific, biological and genetic facts of their existence, and 
inform them of their risk of DMD, and the risk of miscarriage. This “unleashing of 
genetic terminology” (Samerski 2006) had considerable implications for mothers’ 
perceptions of themselves, and their experience of pregnancy. By informing 
mothers about inherited, physical faults, which constituted a real risk to the health 
of their family, they were left with an unerring sense of responsibility for an 
unchangeable past. By informing mothers of their carrier and reproductive risk, 
mothers became responsible for their families’ future.
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Mothers’ accounts of reproductive decision-making highlight the subjective nature 
of genetic risk and the influence of other considerations, such the desire for 
children, practical considerations of work and finances, and responsibility toward 
partners and existing children. Abstract concepts of risk had to be reconciled with 
other considerations. No matter how mothers accommodated conflicting demands 
and responsibilities, the decision they were urged to make had “real consequences, 
which women experienced physically” (Samerski 2006:199). Abstract facts 
competed with kicking foetuses and emotional consequences. Prenatal testing 
transformed the “state of happy expectation into one of foreboding” (Samerski 
2006:205).
The difference between providing families with risk information at birth, and after a 
gradual progression of signs and symptoms had led to a diagnosis, was significant. 
The narrative accounts from this study suggest that the carefree years, experienced 
by families who received a later clinical diagnosis, provided fertile ground in which 
to develop experiential knowledge. When making reproductive decisions, families 
drew upon both medical information and their own experience of their child and his 
condition. In contrast, newborn screening affixed a disease label to a seemingly 
healthy baby. At best, the early provision of information created new dilemmas; a 
choice between unknowable futures. At worst, genetic information had cataclysmic 
effects; displacing the seeds of experiential knowledge with powerful information 
on prognosis, risk, and responsibility. Many mothers questioned the experiential 
validity of shallow clinical descriptions of the condition; some of whom had tested 
their pregnancies on the basis of such information. Newborn screening stripped 
away the opportunity to “know my child, know his condition”, and paved the way 
for medical discourses on disease and prevention to take unwarranted prominence in 
reproductive decision-making.
7.4 Recommendations
Many studies describe peoples’ positive perceptions of newborn screening. 
However, the majority focus on hypothetical views of the general public (e.g.
Bailey et al. 2005, Fanos et al. 2006, Plass et al. 2009), or hypothetical views of 
affected families (i.e. asking families who had received a later diagnosis if they
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would like to have known earlier) (e.g. Firth 1983). There are few studies that 
explore the actual experience of newborn screening (Grob 2006, 2008).
The studies that have addressed newborn screening for DMD often focus on 
unjustified or outdated notions of benefit; the dramatic rescue of a small number of 
families from the “tragedy” of a second affected boy; the supposed value of 
providing families the opportunity to prepare for the future, practically and 
emotionally; or the avoidance of diagnostic delay (e.g. Parsons et al. 2001). In this 
study, none of the families had experienced a particularly delayed diagnosis. Only a 
few families who received a diagnosis through newborn screening made early 
practical preparations; most lost the first few years to grief34. Families who had 
watched the slow development of signs and symptoms often appeared more 
emotionally prepared, than families who received an unsolicited, and devastating, 
diagnosis at birth.
The hypothetical value of “choice” remains relatively undisputed; few are willing to 
deny others access to a notion so imbued with connotations of freedom and 
individuality. The value of choice also has experiential validity; it has undoubtedly 
led to the “dramatic rescue of a small number of families from tragic outcomes” 
(Grob 2006:161). However, hypothetical views and dramatic accounts of the value 
of choice are problematic when they become -  as they have done -  meta-narratives 
that dominate the political landscape (Grob 2006). In this study, families’ accounts 
of the experience of disability touched on notions of tragedy, but so did the accounts 
of living with choice. The complexity of the experiential value of “choice” is 
missing from contemporary political debates.
Explanations for the oversimplification, or deliberate selection of specific 
experiential evidence, can be found in both philosophical debates about 
methodological issues, and pragmatic considerations of the practical implications of 
policy development. Firstly, the influence of researchers’ values and theories cannot 
be underestimated; we are unable to escape the web of beliefs and ideas that inform 
our academic endeavours. As members of a society that places exponential value on
34 The average age of the affected boy at the time at which house adaptations commenced was 6 
years in both cohorts.
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choice, and simultaneously views disability with a mixture of fear, suspicion and 
pity, we are more likely to recognise -  and emphasise - aspects of others that 
correspond to our own beliefs and hypothetical behaviours (Jackson 1989). 
Secondly, the very nature of political frameworks calls for the development of “one 
fits all” policies. It is in part the recognition of the diversity of human experience, 
and the fallibility of prescribing an overt solution to the “problem” of disability, that 
has led to increasing emphasis on individual choice.
Disability rights activists have provided an essential platform from which to view 
the subtle and not so subtle influences on the provision of, and response to, genetic 
services. Arguably, however, the technological imperative keeps marching on. 
Newborn screening programmes are expanding to include an ever greater array of 
non-treatable conditions. Prenatal testing is presented as a simple solution to the 
“problem” of foetal abnormality (Statham 2000). Couples and families are faced 
with terminating wanted pregnancies; decisions informed by pervasive nuances of 
fear, suspicion and pity, rather than experience of the disability in question.
Individual choice is viewed as a progression; a new, nominally democratic version 
of “one fits all” policies. In practice, the promise of “individual choice” fails to 
recognise implicit restraints and practical considerations. The justification for 
newborn screening for DMD has undoubtedly moved away from the explicit 
emphasis on the avoidance of second affected boys, but the emphasis on 
reproductive choice creates new dilemmas. The findings from this study highlight 
the need for a more considered approach to policy-making. The “opt-in” screening 
programme for DMD proved to be only nominally optional; few remembered 
choosing to test. In addition, families did not always choose to avoid the birth of 
second affected males. Families experienced significant distress and desolation, and 
were faced with desperate decisions and existential dilemmas. Is the provision of 
choice really in the best interest of parents?
Newborn screening policies for DMD need to take into account the minority who 
are “rescued from tragedy”, as well as the majority for whom newborn screening 
inflicts broader, but (arguably) more moderate harm. If policy-makers choose to 
privilege the minority, they must also recognise that the minority is ever-decreasing.
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Changing social dynamics have resulted in smaller family sizes and longer birth 
intervals; fewer families are “at risk” of having a second affected child before the 
first receives a later clinical diagnosis. In addition, increasing acceptance of 
disability and slow improvements in social support also suggest that the experience 
of disability may be less tragic than once assumed.
If newborn screening for unbeatable conditions is to continue, the privileging of the 
minority must be made explicit; it should be clear to families that only a few are 
likely to benefit. In addition, considerable improvements are required in the 
provision of information, choice and support. A nominally optional programme is 
not acceptable. Negative information or information “limited to a shallow 
description of the features of impairment” (Shakespeare 2008:100) will not suffice. 
Abandoning families in the early years of their child’s life ‘until something practical 
can be done’ is a dereliction of duty. If the premise of avoiding second affected 
children still remains an implicit drive, it is my hope that the cost of essential 
improvements to the provision of newborn screening will initiate a desperately 
needed discussion, about the true value of choice.
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